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In the United States today, there are 2.3 million people behind bars in jails and 
prisons. Mass incarceration has swept up the United States to such a degree that we are 
known globally for holding more people in correctional facilities than any other country 
in the world. Although women have always reflected, and still do reflect, a smaller 
proportion of the correctional population, over the last 40 years, their rates of 
criminalization and imprisonment have far outpaced that of men. Drastic increases in the 
criminalization of women are intimately connected to the entrenchment of social 
disadvantage enabled under neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal transformations in the 
economy have contributed to women’s poverty across the globe and have brought an 
increasing number of women into contact with the criminal justice system. The rising 
incarceration rate of women, and the disproportionate rate of women of color in U.S. prisons 
is a timely and urgent issue and one that social work is poised to address. Indeed, some of 
our most prominent national organizations recognize mass incarceration as an urgent 
issue that merits the attention of social workers. As such, it is prudent to examine social 
work’s engagement with this issue.  
This study employed a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of social work 
scholarship in order to: 1) explore current constructions of criminalized women in social 
work; 2) understand the knowledge produced through such constructions; and 3) explore 
how that knowledge supports/shapes practice with criminalized women. Specifically, this 
study draws on Jäger and Maier’s (2009) framework for performing a Foucauldian-
inspired CDA. This approach centers Foucault’s conceptualizations of discourse and the 
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workings of power and builds on the work of Jürgen Link to examine the function of 
discourse in legitimizing and securing dominance.  
Data include a sample of 49 articles published in social work high impact journals 
from 2000-2018. A keyword search was performed to locate articles with an explicit 
focus on incarcerated/criminalized women. Only articles dealing with a U.S. context were 
included. Analysis occurred on two levels consisting of a structural analysis to identify 
initial coding schema and a detailed analysis of select articles. Detailed analysis attended 
to: context of text; surface of text; rhetorical means; content and ideological statements. 
These two levels of analysis led to an overall synoptic analysis, or final assessment of the 
overall discourse. Multiracial feminism, discourse theory, and Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality anchored the research and provided the theoretical framework for 
analysis.  
The overarching finding is that social work high impact journals privilege a 
psychological discourse and that the assessment and management of risk has supplanted a 
holistic approach to meeting client needs and addressing mass incarceration. This, I 
conclude, reflects a neoliberal political climate and aligns social work with penal 
institutions in troubling ways. Criminalized women are overwhelmingly constructed as 
risky in the sample. Embedded in this construction is a strong neoliberal discourse on 
knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self. The implied knowledge claims that 
flow from these constructions rely on the use of “objective” and often depoliticized 
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement. I show how this depoliticization 
is accomplished through a variety of neutralizing strategies, which ultimately serve to 
depoliticize social work itself. I highlight how, by primarily constituting criminalized 
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women as risky, social work necessarily responds to her with individualized service 
delivery aimed at regulating and changing the behavior of individuals. I argue that in its 
reliance on practices of risk management and a preference for micro-level service 
delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices that further neoliberal governance 
(Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).  
Further, I discovered a profound ethical dissonance between social work’s 
engagement with criminalized women and social work values. Specifically, I found that 
social work discourse passively accepts the logic of punishment and supports dominant 
ideology surrounding gender and crime while concurrently attempting to redress the 
consequences of such constructions through social justice values. I conceptualize this as a 
discursive struggle over the meaning and purpose of social work, a struggle that 
embodies some of the most salient historical and contemporary tensions in our field 
related to our professional identity and an increasing drive toward professionalization 
(Reisch, 2013).  
I argue that social work’s growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the 
psychological fortitude of criminalized women relies on broader cultural discourses of 
responsibilization, which reproduce, rather than interrupt, criminalization, and divert 
attention away from the need for social and economic change. My analysis exposes how 
social work is implicated in processes of criminalization, and propels a shift in emphasis 
from individualized service delivery, aimed at changing the behavior of individuals, to 
launching interventions that tackle structural injustice and inequity. Understanding the 
subtle and productive work of power to undermine our “good intentions” and aspirations 
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for social justice requires us to rethink explanations for crime and our understandings 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The last forty years have seen a dramatic increase in the incarceration of women 
worldwide (Carlton & Segrave, 2016). Consequently, the mass incarceration of women 
has become a growing and complex field of scholarly interest. There is a considerable 
amount of research regarding women entangled in the criminal justice system and a range 
of related issues including: “pathways” to criminal justice involvement, experiences in 
prison, treatment options, and the consequences of criminalization for children, families, 
and communities. Scholars have also begun to investigate the lives of women post-
incarceration and the ways in which criminalization extends beyond direct involvement 
with the criminal justice system and intersects with other systems impacting the lives of 
criminalized women, specifically social service systems. Such research has particular 
implications for social work practice and research, yet it is a topic rarely covered in 
schools of social work and marginally discussed in the literature. Therefore, it is difficult 
to intuitively understand where social work stands in relation to issues of criminalized 
women and what useful practice and research look like in this area.  
The study that lies in these pages is a Critical Discourse Analysis of how 
criminalized women are discursively constructed in social work high impact journals. 
The aim was to make visible the current constructions of criminalized women in social 
work, to understand the knowledge that is produced through such constructions, and to 
explore how that knowledge supports/shapes certain kinds of research and practice with 
criminalized women. This chapter is an introduction to the study and the organization of 
the dissertation. First, I provide a discussion of my own background and what brought me 
to this topic. Then I discuss the rationale, approach, and significance of the research. The 
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last section provides an overview of how the dissertation is structured and what to expect 
in each chapter.  
Background and Interest in the Topic 
Though my professional experience and academic studies have included a range 
of seemingly disparate topics, a consistent interest and focus has included various aspects 
of the increasing criminalization of women in the United States and other industrialized 
nations. I first became aware of the issues facing criminalized women in 2004, while 
interning at a mentoring program for youth with incarcerated parents. Concurrently, I was 
attending an MSW program and learning more about the socio-political realities that 
shape people’s lives. I was learning to think about the power relations embedded in the 
helping relationship and to ultimately re-think everything I thought I knew about the 
world and the way in which I imagined myself as a social worker. This presented 
problems for me in the “real world” of social work practice.  
The work at the mentoring program, like that of many social work agencies, relied 
on narratives of blame and responsibility. The agency viewed the children of incarcerated 
parents as victims, not of an unjust system or structural inequality, but of irresponsible 
and “deviant” parents. Mothers were held particularly accountable. Because of their 
deviations from the gendered expectations placed on motherhood, incarcerated mothers 
were seen as being doubly deviant and especially at fault for their child’s predicament. 
Thus, the mentoring agency further stigmatized the mothers for not conforming to 
societal norms of motherhood and womanhood.  
Alongside my experience at the mentoring program, I was learning about the 
structural factors that often lead people to commit “crime” and about the racism deeply 
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embedded within the criminal justice system. I was coming to see that crime and 
imprisonment have more to do with social failings than individual failings. The culture 
within the mentoring agency was driven by neoliberal discourse and ideology centered on 
the myth of meritocracy, which saw people as responsible for their own positioning in the 
world. I could not make sense of the contradictions between what I was learning in my 
master’s program and the way these social workers practicing in the “real world” 
engaged in their work. As a dewy eyed MSW student, I did not understand at the time 
that this was, in fact, the norm; an MSW student intern who hung around and questioned 
the agency’s entrenched narratives was not exactly a welcome entity. I felt alienated and 
unsettled by the space between my education and the practice inside this agency. 
Needless to say, my internship there was short lived. I moved on to placements that were 
a better fit with my politics and values, and I was able to regain a certain sense of security 
in social work. Still, the issue of incarcerated women had captured my attention and I 
continued to explore this as a topic of study while in my MSW program.  
I graduated from that program so excited and proud to be a social worker. Even 
now, writing those words brings tears to my eyes. It’s disheartening to think about the 
eager hopefulness embedded in my social work education and the almost immediate fall 
from grace that came upon entering the world of doing social work as a job. I think of my 
own students and the way I teach them to think about the world, their clients, and their 
roles as social workers, and I wonder if I am doing them a disservice. Is it only a matter 
of time before progressively minded students meet disillusionment and isolation in real 
world social work practice? How do I prepare them for the dilemmas and contradictions 
they will inevitably face? 
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In the first draft of my proposal for this dissertation, my chair commented that I 
did not leave much space for social work to interrupt the process of reifying neoliberal 
ideology. I struggle with this because my initial education in social work is what brought 
me to the place of even being able to notice, analyze, and ultimately challenge such 
processes. I think about the keen optimism my education brought me and I wonder: when 
did I become so cynical about social work? After much reflection, I do not think the 
cynicism is completely unwarranted. My practice experience has taught me that social 
workers often label, diagnose, and police clients “for their own good.” The conditions 
that shape the lives of those same clients are rarely considered. Instead, practice strategies 
are deployed which focus on the assessment and management of risk, all the while 
claiming that that’s what is best for the client, or as Margolin (1997) puts it, “under the 
cover of kindness.”  
Upon entering my doctoral program, I wanted to resume studies regarding 
incarcerated women, but I also needed to find a way to make sense of what I was seeing 
in my own practice experience. It was from this that I became particularly interested in 
the ways in which criminalization extends beyond the criminal justice system and the role 
of social services in the expanding net of carceral control. It is here that feminist and 
post-structural scholarship reinvigorated my intellectual life. 
Governmentality and Social Work 
Though I was not familiar with this term at the time, I realize now that much of 
what I was struggling with in my own practice experience was trying to find my place in 
what Foucault (1991) calls the web of governmentality in which social work participates. 
Foucault conceptualized governmentality as a regime of power that permeates the fabric 
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of society and dictates norms for behavior. Grounded in post-structural understandings of 
power, governmentality rests on the assumption that power and knowledge join to create 
discourse, and through discourse we come to accept reality. Discourse leads to shared 
ideas, images, and representations that become dominant, or as Gramsci (1971) dubbed 
them, hegemonic. Power, then, operates both structurally and ideologically and “is 
exercised and relational rather than merely oppressive or repressive” (Strega, 2005, p. 
225). It is everywhere and everything. 
As Foucault saw it, the knowledge claims and practices of the social sciences play 
a large role in governmentality by legitimizing notions of what is normal and healthy 
(Parton, 1998). Individuals then internalize and act on these criteria for normalization and 
go on to regulate their own behavior and the behavior of others based on such criteria. 
According to Foucault, notions of power as being solely centralized are misleading and 
incomplete (Rose, 2000). Rather, he saw power as diffuse and spread throughout society 
and centered the idea that power does not just act on subjects, but also constitutes their 
roles in society and their subjectivities (Larner, 2000).  
Drawing on such analyses, Rossiter (2001) discusses governmentality in relation 
to the discourses of helper and helped, which she sees as constituting social work’s 
identity and practice. She states that “civilizing missions produce the Other in need of 
help, thereby sustaining the identity of the helper as good, innocent, and helpful” (para. 
6). She goes on to highlight how power relations between helper and helped are then 
obscured while sustaining a singular identity and role for each. She argues that what we 
think of as “doing social work is an identity position that facilitates governmentality” 
(para. 16). Such analyses raise many questions regarding the “problem of helping,” 
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questions related to who has the power to define what help is or looks like, who gets to 
decide what is best for another, what constitutes outcomes or success, and ultimately, 
whose knowledge is privileged. Such questions weigh on me when I consider the nature 
of social work practice. Orlie (1997) labels the deployment of expert knowledge as a 
potential trespass, not for any malicious intent, but rather for what it leaves out. Social 
workers manage and control the conduct of others through “common sense” (and I would 
add that this common sense is often classed, racialized, and gendered) expectations for 
behavior, which leave out many other explanations for behavior. For example, Pollack 
(2013) demonstrates how women’s post-prison experiences and identities are shaped 
through their relationships with mental health professionals and parole officers. The 
women in her study highlight the ways in which discourses of risk are embedded in these 
interactions. They speak of how professional narratives of risk often reign at the expense 
of how they understood their own experiences and needs. Pollack contends that how we 
are known and how we come to know ourselves through the discourses of those in power 
are epistemic concerns. Her discussion highlights how professional discourse becomes 
imbued with truth. In her study, mental health professionals had the power to decide how 
a woman’s situation would/should be understood and what knowledge regarding a 
woman’s identity would be considered valid. Therefore, the deployment of expert 
knowledge has the potential to be not only an act of trespass, as seen by Orlie, but also an 
act of epistemic violence (Pollack, 2013).  
Governmentality analyses are not new to social work and have inspired much 
discussion and debate on neoliberal evolutions in the welfare state and other forms of 
governance (Parton, 1998; Pollack, 2008; Rossiter, 2000; Webb, 2003). Scholars have 
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made the case that with the rise of privatization, managerialism, and professionalization, 
social work is inevitably involved in processes of governmentality. Further, 
governmentality scholars posit that social services and punishment are inextricably linked 
under a neoliberal political framework and that “mechanisms of discipline” are not 
confined solely within the boundaries of the criminal justice system (Garland, 2004; 
Rivest & Moreau, 2015). For example, Green (2007) examined how risk plays out in 
community-based services for adults. Drawing on Webb’s (2006) and Kemshall’s (2002) 
analyses which linked the rise of risk societies in late modernity to a narrow focus on 
individual choice, freedom, and responsibility in social policy and social work practice, 
Green illustrated how various layers of risk thinking infiltrate the practice of social 
workers so much that the pressure placed on practitioners to assess and manage risk is the 
most influential force shaping their practice. He explains that as the obligations of social 
workers become entrenched with the fulfillment of stringent regulations and procedures, 
the demand placed upon them to assess and manage risk moves social workers away from 
being in partnership with clients and toward governing them.  
Similarly, scholars have noted that neoliberal processes and demands have moved 
social work away from a commitment to social justice and macro level work toward a 
preference for individual level service delivery (Gray & McDonald, 2006; Webb, 2001). 
Gutierrez, Parsons, and Cox (1998) illustrate this point in their content analysis of the use 
of empowerment in social work journals. They found that most articles claiming 
empowerment focused on micro-level, individualized understandings of the concept. 
Furthermore, they contend that the focus on self-control, autonomy, and choice strips 
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empowerment of its political meaning rooted in raising consciousness in order to promote 
collective action toward alleviating oppression. 
Defining Criminalized Women 
Before moving forward, it is important to discuss how I conceptualize the 
criminalization of women. These conceptualizations anchor the rationale for this 
research. Similar to governmentality scholars, feminist scholars have noted that the 
meaning of women’s criminalization is “not to be found within official legal or penal 
rhetoric, rather it [can] be located within the practices, conventions, and discourses of the 
wider aspects of social life and social control” (Barton, 2005, p. 8). Social control occurs 
at the micro and macro levels, through both overt and covert mechanisms such as the use 
of force, ideology, socialization, and resource distribution. Foucault (1995) said, “In its 
function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating” 
(p.303). In line with this sentiment, I define the criminalization of women less in terms of 
criminal behavior and more in terms of the social control of gender.  
Rafter (1990) defines social control as “the mechanisms by which powerful 
groups consciously or unconsciously attempt to restrain and to induce conformity, even 
assent, among less powerful but nonetheless threatening segments of society” (p. 157). 
Criminalization, then, refers to the selective application of criminal law to social behavior 
and involves regulation of such behavior through surveillance, policing, and punishment 
(Danner, 1996). The criminalization of women does so in uniquely gendered ways by 
making certain acts that are more likely to be committed by women, such as sex work, 
drug use while pregnant, low-level drug involvement, and certain crimes of poverty a 
crime.  
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Here, it is prudent to pause and discuss some problems with the category 
“woman.” Scholars of color, lesbians, and working class feminists have critiqued feminist 
scholarship that neglects attention to race, class, sexuality, and other dimensions of 
difference when examining the experiences of women (Collins, 1990; Rubin, 1986; 
Steedman, 1986). They argue that using gender as the only or primary analytic category 
creates essentialized definitions of women and universalizes women’s experiences and 
needs. Crenshaw (1991) and others highlight the importance of utilizing an intersectional 
framework that examines how interlocking oppressions and intersecting identities shape 
gendered experiences. An intersectional framework acknowledges that the meanings of 
gender and women’s experiences are not universal, but rather bound up in other identities 
such as race, class, and sexuality. While I acknowledge gender’s significance and utilize 
the word “woman” throughout this dissertation, I also rely on an intersectional 
framework that considers gender in relation to other identities. Because not all women are 
criminalized in the same way or for the same things, and because women are subject to 
social control based not on gender alone, but on how their multiple identities intersect, an 
intersectional analysis is necessary in order to more fully understand how interlocking 
oppressions and intersecting identities shape the gendered experiences of criminalized 
women. 
Feminist scholars have been at the forefront of challenging and interrogating the 
social construction of crime, as well as the ways in which dominant discourses 
individualize and pathologize women’s “criminality” (Boyd, 2006; Comack & Balfour, 
2004; Faith, 1993; Laberge, 1991; Pollack, 2007). These scholars make the case that, 
contrary to dominant ideology, criminal behavior and “crime” itself are defined more by 
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policy and the prevailing socio-political and economic climate than by faults and 
deficiencies located within the individual. From this analytic viewpoint, common labels 
used to identify criminalized women, such as “criminal,” “female offender,” “woman in 
conflict with the law,” and “woman in trouble,” obscure the structural factors (i.e., 
poverty) related to the context of law breaking. Further, such labels dehumanize those 
entangled in disciplinary arrangements. 
Laberge illustrates specific concerns with the category “criminal”: 
 
Firstly, the notion reinforces the impression that crime is the manifestation of a 
personal essence. By now, a large literature has developed around the recognition 
that crime is an historical construct. There is no consensus on what constitutes 
‘crime’, nor is the term itself neutral. Once this is recognized, it is impossible to 
maintain that ‘crime’ is a fundamental characteristic of a given individual. 
Secondly, what we study is a social product, the outcome of interactions between 
women and state agencies. The nature of the correspondence between the ‘dark 
figure’ of criminality and the official volume of criminality is unknown to 
us….Thirdly, the designation of ‘criminal’ elicits powerful and usually very 
negative images…..Even a summary examination of the criminality generated by 
women very clearly reveals the non-dangerous nature of women’s infractions 
(1991, p. 50). 
Like Foucault (1995), Laberge situates her argument in the recognition of crime as a 
social and historical construct. Highlighting the diverse meanings of “crime” across time 
and space disrupts the belief that crime is a natural phenomenon occurring within 
problematic individuals. 
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The terms “criminalized women” and “women’s criminality” have very different 
meanings and allow different pictures to unfold concerning what/who is problematic. In 
the latter, the concern is on the behavior of an individual woman. In the former, the 
concern is on how women are constructed as “criminal” and how they are regulated 
because of that construction. Furthermore, the ways in which multiple identities and 
social locations intersect to prescribe meaning and construct a woman as “criminal” are 
crucial to understanding the underlying systems of oppression and inequality inherent in 
the criminal justice system. As Neve and Pate (2005) state, “it is clear that it is the law 
that is increasingly coming into conflict with people, especially poor, racialized, and 
disabled women, rather than women who are coming into conflict with the law” (p. 27).  
A sketch of the incarcerated female population helps bring these points into focus. 
Women involved in the criminal justice system are disproportionately from economically 
disadvantaged groups, with women of color being vastly overrepresented (Carson, 2018; 
Kajstura, 2018). Nationally, the likelihood of being incarcerated is 1 in 118 for White 
women, as compared to 1 in 45 for Hispanic women, and 1 in 19 for Black women 
(Sentencing Project, 2018). The element of racism is so prevalent that Michelle 
Alexander (2012) refers to mass incarceration as the most pressing racial justice issue of 
our time. Women are increasingly (and mostly) incarcerated for drug offenses, property 
crimes, and public order offenses1 (Carson, 2018; Kajstura, 2018). The violent crimes for 
which women are typically incarcerated are largely in relation to defense or the murder of 
an abusive partner (Comack, 2014). Constructions of incarcerated women (and I would 
																																								 																				
1 Public order offenses are comprised of violations that are seen to interfere with public life. Prostitution, 
public drunkenness, and loitering are examples of public order offenses. 
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say most incarcerated populations) as dangerous and a risk to public safety are 
inaccurate; they are based on anomalies and sensationalized media representations, which 
shape commonsense understandings (i.e. dominant discourses) of crime and what defines 
a “criminal” (Comack, 2014).  
A more accurate picture shows that women are primarily convicted for crimes of 
poverty that reflect systemic inequalities and discrimination based on their gendered, 
racialized, and classed social locations. Understanding the characteristics of who is likely 
to be criminalized, and for what, highlights the role that race and poverty play in the lives 
of criminalized women. When we are able to understand the nature and extent of 
women’s law breaking as well as the context in which that law breaking takes place, we 
can conceptualize that women are criminalized more than they are actual criminals.  
Transcarceration as a Form of Governmentality 
As discussed previously, institutions of governmentality that serve to regulate and 
discipline behavior already exist; however, I would argue that once someone is 
criminalized, the forms of governmentality that shape their life take on a different nature 
and are largely responsible for contributing to “success” or reinforcing criminalization 
(Maidment, 2006). Researchers have documented that criminalized women come into 
contact with and are adversely impacted by various institutions of governmentality before 
and long after incarceration (Carlton & Segrave, 2016; Maidment, 2006; Richie, 2001; 
Shantz, Kilty, & Frigon, 2009). These institutions include child welfare, education, 
health, and welfare: all spheres in which social work plays an obvious role. Bhattacharjee 
(2002) discusses how such agencies are becoming infiltrated with a “culture of law 
enforcement” increasingly serving policing and surveillance functions. For example, 
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some scholars note how mandated workfare programs and increasingly stringent 
eligibility criteria for welfare recipients mirror the techniques of surveillance, regulation, 
and control embodied in the criminal justice system (McCorkel, 2004; Pollack, 2010). 
Further, Parton (1998) highlights how penal risk management practices have become 
ubiquitously taken up in child protective services through the use of risk assessments. 
With the power to discursively define what appropriate behavior and “success” look like, 
as well as to bestow needed resources, these institutions have taken a central role, right 
alongside criminal justice, in maintaining dominant notions of social order2 (Johnson, 
1996). In fact, researchers document that when people are no longer institutionalized, 
other less visible social, legal, and medical structures step in more subtly to provide 
regulation and control (Maidment, 2006). For example, community based programs (such 
as mental health courts, mandated drug treatment programs, and house arrest, among 
others) are utilized as less punitive “alternatives” to incarceration but still target and 
regulate behaviors that would typically be criminalized. Scholars label this widening of 
the net of social control as “transcarceration” (Lowman & Menzies, 1986; Maidment, 
2006). 
Transcarceration is a way of conceptualizing criminalization outside the 
immediate context of the prison; it suggests that the primary mechanisms of control have 
moved beyond institutionalization and into the community and home. Transcarceration 
attends to the “shifting conceptual frontiers between social control and coercive control” 
(Lowman, Menzies, & Palys, 1987, p. 2) and the blurring of boundaries between the two. 
																																								 																				




Building on Cohen’s (1985) conceptualizations of social control as inclusive (institutional 
settings) and exclusive (community settings), transcarceration asserts a view of formal 
social control that is broader than incarceration and institutionalization (Lowman & 
Menzies, 1986). Shaped by white, middle class assumptions of normality, transcarceral 
controls are also inherently gendered and racialized and include ideology and strategies 
pertaining to welfare, reproduction, education, and health (Davis & Faith, 1987; 
Maidment, 2006). Maidment (2006) expounds on this when she says,  
Transcarceration, then, looks to cross-institutional arrangements between the 
systems of criminal justice, mental health, and social welfare, in which ‘clients’ of 
the criminal justice system are shuffled from one section of the help-control 
continuum to another. By managing ‘clients’ in or outside the institutional setting, 
the correctional machinery expands to encompass health, welfare, social services, 
child protection, education, and housing—all of which translates into 
decentralized control and increasingly entails the fitting together of subsystems 
rather than the consolidation of one agency in isolation from its alternatives (p. 
269). 
In other words, social control is broader, less visible, and more effective (Davis & 
Faith, 1987). Or as Balfour (2006) posits, punishment is relocated into the community. In 
an analysis of a community-based electronic monitoring program, Maidment (2002) 
illustrates how community corrections serve as a regulating force in women’s lives with 
explicitly gendered outcomes. In her study, she traced the differences in the way men and 
women experienced the program. She found that for men, the program was useful and a 
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welcome change to life in prison; they had adequate amounts of support and usually lived 
with women (mothers or partners) who would take care of their children and daily 
household needs. For women, who often had sole responsibility for their homes and 
children (and were also under supervision of child welfare), the electronic monitoring 
proved to be a burden that was not always a welcome alternative to incarceration. The 
women in her study were expected to be fully engaged mothers, but the restrictions 
placed on their mobility through the electronic monitoring interfered with their ability to 
adequately fulfill their responsibilities as heads of households and as mothers. Further, 
whereas men’s relationships with women were often deemed a protective factor in that 
they provided a solid support network to prevent parole violations and recidivism, 
women’s relationships with men, especially if there had been a history of domestic 
violence, were far more likely to be deemed as a risk factor for recidivism, thereby 
increasing restrictions and monitoring. This is a stark example of the discursive and 
material effects that come from conflating victimization with risk for women on parole. 
The conflation constructs the woman as “risky,” which then prompts increased 
restrictions and monitoring. Increased restrictions further limit her freedom and her 
ability to meet the various mandates of the agencies she is bound up in, thereby evoking 
more ill suited constructions of her identity (i.e. risky, dangerous, neglectful mother, 
criminal) which prompt further regulation and intrusion into her life. The cycle goes on. 
“Risk thinking” (which I will discuss more in depth later in this dissertation) normalizes 
notions of appropriate conduct, thereby creating a “risky” other who then needs to be 
further surveilled under the gaze of the “expert.” 
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In this way, while women may avoid a return to prison, they seldom break free of 
legal, medical, and “psy” professions. Social work plays a notable role here in relation to 
being the managers of child welfare requirements, the gatekeepers for social assistance 
provisions, and the deliverers of many mandated substance abuse and mental health 
treatment programs. Intrusion into women’s lives is taken up by regulatory rather than 
criminalizing processes, by community agencies that receive governmental funding. As 
Balfour (2006) states, the “social control networks of surveillance and observation within 
the community have expanded the gaze of the state” (p. 170). Thus, criminalization 
extends beyond the context of the criminal justice system and includes transcarceral 
mechanisms of control such as community supervision, behavioral restrictions, and 
mandated treatment (Maidment, 2006). Transcarceration, as I see it, is a specifically 
criminalized form of governmentality.  
Social Work Responses 
As others have noted, social work occupies a significant space in deploying 
regulatory practices that further neoliberal governance (Carton, 2014; Parton, 2008; 
Pollack, 2008). In particular, social work’s increased focus on the assessment and 
management of risk and growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the 
psychological fortitude of individuals give it its increasing foothold in neoliberal 
governance. Given the diffuse systems of social control that structure the lives of 
criminalized women upon release from prison (as conceptualized by governmentality and 
transcarceration), I believe it is necessary to turn our gaze toward the professional 
systems that play a role in regulating the lives of criminalized women (Davis & Shaylor, 
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2001). From the lens of governmentality, it is these professionals who play a role in 
reinforcing or interrupting processes of criminalization. 
Social work has historically been situated in a positivist school of criminological 
thought regarding practice with “offenders” and crime prevention (Roberts & Springer, 
2007; Wilson, 2010). The characteristics of positivist criminological thought include an 
attempt to explain and predict criminal behavior and, thus, modify it through 
individualized intervention. In an attempt to predict criminality, risk assessments are used 
to identify and target people who are “at-risk” of certain behaviors. In other words, social 
work, despite its embrace of an ecological model, has historically assumed a view that 
crime and criminal behavior are caused by individual factors, such as mental illness 
(Wilson, 2010). This is problematic because it frames women’s involvement in crime as 
merely psychological in nature (Pollack, 2008) and lends itself to individualized 
responses and interventions, which erase the link between inequality and criminality 
(Donohue & Moore 2009; Kendall, 2004; Shaw & Hannah-Moffat, 2004). Still, as I will 
show in this dissertation, individualized treatments (which focus on individual choice and 
even empowerment) have become the dominant model of service delivery in social work 
with criminalized women. They are deeply gendered and aimed at changing women’s 
thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors (Balfour, 2006; McKim, 2008; Pollack, 2007).  
For example, in an examination of the reintegration experiences of women 
released from prison, Pollack (2010) illustrates how therapeutic programming with 
criminalized women works in specifically gendered ways. She emphasizes the role that 
the assessment and management of risk in social work practice plays in shaping women’s 
subjectivities upon release from prison. Grounded in assumptions that criminal behavior 
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in women is linked to low self-esteem, social work efforts to rehabilitate them focus on 
reducing women’s risk by raising their self-esteem. The logic goes that greater self-
esteem will empower women to make better decisions. Yet, as Pollack points out, this 
logic ignores the reality that choice is constrained by social and power relations, and that 
the choices people makes are not always the result of poor self-esteem, but rather the 
result of the options and opportunities (or lack thereof) available to them.  
Similarly, Goodkind (2009) illustrates how individualized framings are deeply 
embedded in residential treatment programs for young women involved in the criminal 
justice system. She found that programs, which professed a feminist approach to their 
work with young women, operationalized their feminism by way of empowerment groups 
which sought to build self-esteem and enhance confidence among the young women. Her 
interviews with program staff revealed the underlying assumption that the enhancement 
of self-esteem and independence was necessary to mitigating poor decision making and 
reducing risk for recidivism. Goodkind contends that the focus on self-esteem is 
ultimately disempowering because it ignores how one’s power to act is shaped by larger 
social conditions and relations. Additionally, she points out that the available evidence 
does not support a causal link between low self-esteem and delinquent behavior, which 
further problematizes empowerment as a strategy for risk management.  
These examples highlight how efforts to build self-esteem in order to reduce 
deviant behavior miss the mark in that they conflate freedom and agency, and construct 
the self as contained within the personal rather than as a product of larger social relations 
(Hannah-Moffat, 2004). In effect, self-esteem based practices reify neoliberal discourse 
and intensify patterns of transcarceration. Cruikshank (1993) explicitly links the 
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bolstering of an individual’s self-esteem and self-determination to processes of 
governmentality. She states, “Self-esteem is a technology of citizenship and self-
government for evaluating and acting upon ourselves so that the police, the guards, and 
the doctors do not have to” (p. 330). By internalizing notions of normalization, people 
can then become sensible managers of their own risk. Further, Pollack (2010) discusses 
how a woman’s ability to attain things such as parole, welfare, housing, and custody of 
her children hinges on her willingness to cooperate with efforts to normalize them. 
In the context of mass incarceration and transcarceration, it is inevitable that 
criminalized women will be answerable to and come in contact with many different 
human service professionals, particularly social workers, in their daily lives. In turn, 
many social workers can expect to work with criminalized populations. As stated in an 
NASW report on the state of criminal justice social work in the United States: 
There are many thousands of social workers working in criminal justice settings, 
working with criminal justice populations, or both. It is likely that most criminal 
justice social workers also practice in the areas of behavioral health and case 
management (Wilson, 2010, p. 2).  
The life experiences of many criminalized women include poverty, racism, severe 
trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems (Chesney-Lind, 2002; Franklin, 
2008; Sokoloff, 2005). This creates a set of complex needs and challenges for 
criminalized women, particularly when re-entering a community after incarceration, 
while under community-based supervision, or while trying to access needed services 
(Richie, 2001; Spjeldnes & Goodkind, 2009). The pressures and demands of child 
welfare and criminal justice systems can be overwhelming, yet negotiating the 
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complexities of these systems is central to their lives and crucial to their “success.” 
Recognizing this, an National Association of Social Workers (2009) criminal justice 
briefing makes the following recommendations: 
• Address issues surrounding and leading to disproportionate rates of incarceration 
for individuals of racial or ethnic minorities, juveniles, women, and 
undocumented individuals.  
• Increase participation of professional forensic social workers and other mental 
health providers to assure culturally competent treatment and intervention for the 
growing population of incarcerated individuals, including mental health and 
substance abuse services. 
• Assure safe, humane, and equitable treatment for all incarcerated individuals. 
• Increase access to health care, educational, and vocational opportunities to assist 
incarcerated individuals with transitioning back to their communities. (p. 331-
332) 
Providers, immersed in their own area of practice, may not be adequately 
informed of these complex issues and, thus, may be ill prepared to effectively meet the 
needs of their criminal justice involved clientele or to assist them in navigating the terrain 
(Roberts & Springer, 2007). Indeed, recent research and an NASW policy statement on 
Social Work in the Criminal Justice System highlight the fact that despite increased 
exposure to and practice with criminalized populations, it is a topic inadequately covered 
in the social work curriculum and scantly addressed in the literature (Epperson et al., 
2013; Jemal & Graham, 2017; Wheeler & McClain, 2015). Still, instructors in schools of 
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social work often rely on the scholarly literature as an important pedagogical tool. Given 
the prominence of high impact journals, it is not unreasonable to assume that instructors 
may, though perhaps not exclusively, rely on them on a regular basis. Thus, it is prudent 
to explore how/if criminalized women and attendant issues are represented within that 
literature.  
Research Questions 
As such, I focused my dissertation research on a critical examination of the 
constructions of criminalized women that permeate the social work high impact journals. 
Further, I examined the implications these constructions have for shaping social work 
practice and research. Specifically, this dissertation examines social work high impact 
journals as a form of social work discourse. Discourse here is defined as “a way of 
knowing or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: A cluster of 
ideas, images, or practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and 
conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society” 
(Hall, 1997, p. 5). Further, discourse is an “institutionalized way of talking that regulates 
and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 35). The role of 
discourse is paramount in constructing and creating meaning, attitudes, and knowledge 
about people. My analysis focused on interpretations of discursive practices: 
constructions and representations of criminalized women, how criminalized women are 
positioned and discussed in the texts, the knowledge that emerges from these 
constructions, and how social work(ers) is positioned and discussed in relation to 
criminalized women.  
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Using a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology, I investigated the following 
questions: 
1. How do social work high impact journals construct and represent criminalized 
women? 
2. What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized women 
are made through these constructions?  
3. What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social 
work practice and research with criminalized women? 
Research Approach 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was particularly well suited to address these 
questions for a number of reasons. Firstly, CDA addresses the way power and inequality 
are enacted and reproduced in text (van Dijk, 2001). Additionally, it has the researcher 
take an explicit political position by exposing and, ultimately, resisting dominance and 
inequality. Further, rooted in Foucault’s theories of power and discourse, CDA begins 
with the assertion that power and knowledge(s) emerge from discursive practices 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). CDA aims to identify knowledge(s) embedded in 
discourse and to examine how such knowledge is then materialized and embodied in 
social practices, how it creates subjects, and how it regulates conduct (Jäger & Maier, 
2009). In other words, how knowledge is connected to power. Suffice it to say at this 
point that this kind of critical exploration on discourse and knowledge has important 
structural implications for the future of social work. 
While framing criminalization as a social rather than individual problem, I used 
CDA to explore how criminalized women are represented in social work high impact 
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journals and the discursive effects these representations have on research and practice 
with criminalized women. Further, I was interested in understanding how/if social work 
participates in the criminalization/transcarceration of certain women as evidenced by this 
literature.  
Multiracial feminism, post-structural notions of discourse, and Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality anchored this research and provided the theoretical and analytical lens 
through which I explored the research questions. Situated within both critical and post-
structural meta-theoretical frameworks, this structure provided a platform for attending to 
issues related to material reality as well as the social constructions of power and identity. 
Melding such distinct perspectives into a broader theoretical framework is not without its 
tensions. Pease (2002) asks, “If we argue that power is widely diffused through networks 
of social relations does it dissolve the critical theorists’ claim that dominant groups 
possess power over subordinate groups?” (pg. 139). He thinks not, and goes on to assert 
that Foucault’s view of power is not entirely incompatible with critical theory; 
acknowledging that power is diffuse does not require an acknowledgment that power is 
distributed, or used, equally among social actors. Further, Daly (1997) suggests that 
“working the boundary between ‘the discursive’ and ‘the real world’ out there” (p. 42) is 
not only possible, but also preferable. She contends that “working the boundary” provides 
fuller analyses of the social world and opens theoretical space for methodological 
innovation in the social sciences. 
I agree with the assertions of Pease and Daly, and believe that the use of both 
critical and post-structuralist perspectives allows me to reject essentialism while still 
recognizing the very real ways subjectivities are constructed and confined by and within 
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institutions. Denzin (2002) states that “everyday life represents a site where power, 
ideology, gender and social class circulate and shape one another” (p. 27). From a critical 
perspective, the intersections of sexism, racism, and classism shape how crime is 
constructed, who is viewed as worthy and unworthy, innocent and guilty, how individuals 
come into contact with the system, and the way the system responds to them once they 
are there (Chesney-Lind, 2006). From a post-structural perspective, the articulation of 
power plays out in the way language constructs subjectivities (Daley, 2010); 
constructions of deviance and crime are used to control those who defy standards for 
normality and to prescribe sanctions through which their conduct is regulated. Post-
structuralism acknowledges gender and crime as social constructions, and therefore 
allowed me to attend to the ways in which these constructions emerge to shape 
knowledge about individuals as well as social work practice with them.  
More specifically, my research focuses on the ways in which written language 
prescribes meaning and how such meanings shape the manner in which social workers 
intervene. This is more than just a semantic issue. Language is the primary vehicle 
through which knowledge is embodied and legitimized, shaping what it is possible to 
know in any given historical context (Foucault, 1972). Language sets the stage for the 
development of identities and subject positions: both the “criminal” and the “expert” 
identity/role. I pose these important discussions in the framing of my research as I wade 
through the terrain of social work scholarship in relation to criminalized women.  
As previously discussed, I utilized CDA to explore the language used to construct 
images, representations, and knowledge about criminalized women in social work 
discourse. The ultimate goal of my project was to make visible the current constructions 
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of criminalized women in social work, what knowledge is produced through such 
constructions, and how such knowledge sanctions certain kinds of research and practice 
with criminalized women, for the purpose of opening spaces of possibility for alternative 
discourses prescribing social work practice to emerge.   
The implications of this research are significant. Social control/regulatory 
practices operate across spheres and institutions to criminalize women, and social work is 
likely to be one of these spheres. The need for this research is thus situated in a society 
where women are increasingly subject to punitive sanctions for decidedly non-criminal 
acts and where punishments continue to be inflicted long after women have been 
incarcerated and released. As Bosworth and Flavin (2007) assert, “we create a climate 
where the person’s debt to society is never paid. We are, in effect, permanently 
disenfranchising an entire class of people and jeopardizing their survival” (p.218). 
Therefore, I hope my analysis provides useful insights and tools for thinking differently 
about criminalized women and the role of social work in relation to them.  
Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter 2 explains and contextualizes the criminalization of women using two 
distinct yet compatible frameworks of analysis: multiracial feminism and Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality. Used in conjunction, multiracial feminism and 
governmentality offer a conceptual framework for exploring the construction of 
criminalization of women in contemporary social work discourse. These major 
theoretical models have informed my understanding of the issue and shaped my research 
questions. Drawing on Foucault’s idea of governmentality, I outline how women are 
uniquely regulated and criminalized by diffuse networks of power through neoliberal 
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policy and ideology. Multiracial feminism helps explain how gender, race, class, 
sexuality, and other categories determine which women are criminalized, what they are 
criminalized for, and the severity of their criminalization. Together, they provide a 
platform for analyzing the globalized political and economic realities that impact women 
and lead to criminalization. These perspectives make it possible to dispute dominant 
discourses concerning women’s offending which individualize and pathologize women; 
they allow me to shift the focus away from individuals and onto the systems of social 
control that serve to define and confine “normality” and “deviance.” In Chapter 2, each 
theory is first explained and then analyzed in relation to the issue at hand. Though a bit 
out of the ordinary, I believe that presenting theory before the literature review will give 
readers a necessary lens through which to more fully understand my engagement with the 
contemporary and historical context. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the relevant literature. Here, I more fully 
locate the issue of criminalization within a broader sociopolitical context. This review 
explores the experiences of criminalized women in relation to the power regimes in 
which they are situated. I review historical and contemporary trends in order to trace the 
major ideological threads that shape current day penal policy and contemporary social 
service interventions. This is important because, by highlighting the various approaches 
to dealing with criminal behavior across time, we can see that ideas of crime and “the 
criminal” are socially constructed. Discourse both shapes and is shaped by social 
practices (van Dijk, 2001), as such social work interventions can be seen as taking an 
active role in constructing an “other” to be managed and “helped.” After all, in order for 
there to be a deviant, there must be a normal; and in order to be a helped there must be a 
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helper. Therefore, in the process of labeling and diagnosing clients, social work also 
comes to define itself. Yet such distinctions are neither straightforward nor natural, as 
such value-laden concepts are not impartial and are constituted in the discourses of those 
in power. When the construction of something goes unquestioned, its significance 
becomes naturalized and taken for granted (Juhila, Poso, Hall, & Parton, 2003). 
Therefore, Chapter 3 (and this entire dissertation) is an attempt to disrupt taken-for-
granted assumptions that drive research and practice.  
Chapter 4 includes an overview of the methodology and research design. Tightly 
wound with the chosen methodology of CDA are theories related to language, power, and 
truth. Thus, in addition to a discussion of research pragmatics (methods and analysis), 
this chapter includes an extended discussion of ontology, epistemology, and the 
theoretical concepts framing CDA methodology. In closing Chapter 4, I review the 
limitations of my research, evaluative criteria, and ethical considerations. 
Chapter 5 presents the study findings and provides an analytic discussion 
addressing the research questions. I discuss a number of co-existing constructions present 
in the data, focusing heavily on the overriding construction of risk. I trace the manner in 
which the construction of risk both relies on and reinscribes a strong neoliberal discourse 
on knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self.	I then show how depoliticized 
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement emerge through these 
constructions.	I argue that these depoliticized knowledge claims serve to effectively 
depoliticize social work itself and foster a larger discursive struggle over the meaning and 
purpose of the profession. I end by highlighting how the construction of risk lends itself 
to individualized responses and interventions aimed at regulating and changing the 
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behavior of individuals.	I argue that in its reliance on practices of risk management and a 
preference toward micro-level service delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices 
that further neoliberal governance (Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).	 
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the analysis and implications of this study 
and speak to the possibilities for future directions in social work research, practice, and 
education. A central aspect of this discussion encourages an ongoing critique of risk 
discourses and the ways in which hegemonic practice scripts within social work 
contribute to processes of criminalization and the expansion of the carceral state. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Influences 
This chapter discusses the theoretical influences that form the conceptual 
framework of this research. As stated previously, multiracial feminism and Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality have informed my conceptualization of the criminalization of 
women as well as the development of my research questions. Specifically, they have 
helped me connect women’s criminalization to the social, political, and economic 
concerns generated by neoliberal globalization and to conceptualize how power functions 
within social work practice. Together, they allow me to see how interlocking structural 
inequalities interface with micro-level interactions to construct policy and ideology. This 
conceptual framework attends to the role of discourse in shaping subjectivities and power 
relations.  
Multiracial Feminism 
Unable to locate themselves within theories resting primarily on the lives of white 
middle class women, women of color have articulated intersectional theories for 
analyzing gender (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991; Mehrotra, 2010; Phoenix & 
Pattynama, 2006). One such theory, multiracial feminism, was conceived by women of 
color as a response to the tendency within mainstream feminism to universalize 
experiences of gender. Multiracial feminism centers race as a pervasive structuring 
category but also recognizes how “race shapes and is shaped by a variety of other social 
relations” (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996, p. 325). The cornerstone of multiracial feminism 
is its focus on power relations inherent in difference. It focuses on how privilege and 
oppression shape individual opportunity and experience as well as larger cultural norms 
and ideology.  
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The following concepts distinguish multiracial feminism from other feminisms. 
First, gender constructions and relations are based upon other intersecting and 
interlocking identities (Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). In other 
words, people are gendered in relation to other locations such as race, class, sexuality, 
age, ability, etc. Additionally, people are socially situated within systems of power and 
privilege. Patricia Hill Collins (1990) refers to systems of inequality that are interlocking, 
not additive, which work together to shape identity and status as the “Matrix of 
Domination.” Within this framework, systems and identities work through each other, 
and people experience their identities in different ways depending on their intersecting 
subjectivities within social structures.  
Second, systems of power are seen to occur and intersect at all levels of society. 
For instance, gender, race, class, and sexuality play out in micro-level social interactions, 
cultural ideology, standards set for normality, and macro-level social policy (Burgess-
Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). Systems of power operate together to create 
privilege as well as oppression; systems of race, class, and gender work simultaneously to 
create disadvantages for some, and opportunity and advantage for others. Individuals can 
be both oppressed and privileged simultaneously. In this way, multiracial feminism 
applies not only to racialized women, but also to white women and people of various 
genders3, classes, and sexualities (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996).   
Third, multiracial feminism highlights the relational nature of power. Power 
relations structure women’s differences; differences are thought to be connected in 
structured, systematic ways. (Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). 
																																								 																				
3 A caveat being that multiracial feminism does not explicitly address the gender binary. 
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Further, dominance and subordination mutually influence one another. In other words, 
some women are privileged precisely because other women are disadvantaged and vice 
versa. In this way, multiracial feminism avoids essentialism of the category “woman.”  
Lastly, multiracial feminism attends to social structure as well as human agency 
(Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996) in its recognition of how structured 
systems of race, class, gender, etc. shape opportunity and available choices. In other 
words, we make choices (exert agency) based on the conditions that shape our lives and 
the opportunities available to us, which are largely shaped by our identities and social 
locations.  
By “underscoring race as a power system that interacts with other structured 
inequalities to shape genders” (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996, p. 324), multiracial feminism 
highlights the fact that race affects all women but in different ways, namely by 
privileging some and disadvantaging others. This is particularly crucial in an analysis of 
the criminalization of women because of how Whiteness works to construct idealized 
notions of femininity and “appropriate” behavior, which then become held up as the norm 
for all women.  
Intersections of identity, social locations, and “crime.” As multiracial 
feminism purports, social identities shape how we interact with our environment and how 
we are constructed by society (Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996). Social identities reflect not 
only how individuals experience themselves in the world, but also how the world 
responds to them (Shields, 2008; Winker & Degele, 2011). Women are qualitatively as 
well as quantitatively criminalized in different ways based on their social locations. 
Intersecting identities define and shape how behavior is labeled as normal or deviant, 
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who is more likely to be criminalized, and how woman are criminalized. Therefore, 
interlocking systems of oppression contribute to what constitutes crime, who is defined as 
“criminal,” and how those individuals are dealt with within systems of power. 
Conceptions of crime, who is deemed as “criminal,” and the behaviors that are 
constituted as “criminal” are based on dominant political, economic, and social 
ideologies of any given time (Abramovitz, 1997). In Gregg Barak’s (2004) words: 
To begin with, we regard the criminal justice system as a culturally powerful, 
label conferring institution that has evolved in relation to the changing definitions 
of ‘crime’ over time. Additionally, we view the defining of ‘crime’ and 
‘criminals’ as a product of moral agents, social movements, political interests, and 
media dissemination. In other words, what becomes a ‘crime’ and who becomes a 
‘criminal’ are politically, economically, and socially constructed phenomena 
reproduced daily through various discussions in the streets, the home, the school, 
the church, the government, the courts, the airwaves, and other cultural bodies (p. 
8). 
The ways in which intersecting identities construct a woman as normal or deviant, 
and by extension, a “criminal,” are crucial to understanding the underlying systems of 
oppression and inequality inherent in the criminal justice system. As I will illustrate in 
the next chapter, women have traditionally been judged based on concepts of 
“appropriate” female behavior and ideological myths of womanhood. Women’s 
involvement with the criminal justice system, in particular, has been fashioned by 
historical notions of femininity, which in turn have been shaped by race, class, and 
sexuality, among other categories. Dominant notions of femininity evolved in relation to 
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white, heterosexual, and privileged class contexts. Simultaneously, racism, heterosexism, 
and classism work to deny access to gender norms for certain groups of women. 
Furthermore, women who do not or cannot meet idealized notions of femininity are 
subject to various forms of suspicion, surveillance, and punitive measures. For instance, 
Theodore Roosevelt once asserted that white women who did not, or refused to have, 
large families were criminals against their race (Abramovitz, 1994).  
Dominant notions of femininity not only color definitions of female criminality, 
but also shape how women are judged and treated when they come into contact with the 
law, both as victims and as perpetrators. For instance, Crenshaw (1989) discussed how 
Black women have historically fallen outside the protection of rape statutes as courts 
have instructed juries not to assume the chastity of Black women in the same way they do 
for White women. Certain women, based on their intersecting identities, are more likely 
to be labeled risky or deviant. This extends to social service systems as well. For 
example, in a study of the child protection system, Reich (2005) illuminated how the risk 
assessment of a mother’s likelihood to harm her child often involved the mother’s ability 
to exhibit a readiness to put the needs of her children before her own. 
While recognizing that criminalization is just one mechanism through which 
privilege and inequality are maintained, the ways in which the criminal justice system 
enacts and reinforces structural oppression are profound (Travis, 2002). The 
disproportionate rates of incarceration among poor women and women of color are, in 
and of themselves, telling. Yet they also reflect larger systems of discrimination and 
structural sources of inequality. As Laberge (1991) said, “The combination of sex, race 
and social class creates specific groups who vary in their capacity to elude penal 
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treatment, or, if in contact with penal agencies, to neutralize its negative effects” (p. 51). 
Surveillance and policing are concentrated in communities of color (Pewewardy & 
Severson, 2003) and sentencing policies tend to be more punitive for people from 
marginalized social locations (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008). For instance, white-collar 
crimes, which have a devastating impact on society and are more likely to be committed 
by privileged classed individuals, are less likely than other types of crimes to be noticed 
and prosecuted; when they do garner attention, they are often dealt with in a much less 
punitive manner than other types of crimes (Pewewardy & Severson, 2003). Further, 
when people from more privileged positions do come into contact with the law, they are 
less likely to be perceived at threatening or “risky” by the authorities and more likely to 
have greater access to needed resources, such as quality defense attorneys. This allows 
privileged individuals to subvert some of the more punitive sanctions that are readily 
applied to those who occupy marginalized social locations (Sanchez, 2007).  
Feminists are increasingly advocating for an intersectional approach to analyzing 
the criminalization of women (Chesney-Lind, 2006; Ogle & Batton, 2009; Shields, 
2008). Multiracial feminism is particularly useful in such an analysis because it shifts our 
gaze from micro to macro, from individual behaviors to positions in society, which are 
shaped by interlocking identities and “isms.” For example, Richie (1996) shows how 
intersecting systems of gender, race, and class are correlated to the criminal offenses 
committed by Black women who experience interpersonal violence. In her analysis, 
Richie explains how “some women are forced or coerced into crime by their culturally 
expected gender roles, the violence in their intimate relationships, and their social 
position in the broader society” (p. 133).  
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Multiracial feminism’s emphasis on race and interlocking oppressions that shape 
opportunity and experience is particularly salient in relation to Foucault’s idea of 
governmentality and its corresponding interrogation of neoliberalism. Viewed through 
the conceptual lens of governmentality, government is re-conceptualized more broadly as 
actions and interventions that influence, structure, or regulate conduct and is not limited 
to the actions of the state, but also includes various institutions of socialization including 
school, medicine, the family, and various helping professions, like social work. These 
ideas are explained further in the following section. 
Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Criminalization 
Governmentality. Toward the end of his life, Foucault articulated the notion of 
governmentality, which built on his previous ideas of power/knowledge and how they 
join to create discourse through which we come to accept reality. According to Foucault, 
notions of power as being solely centralized are misleading and incomplete (Rose, 2000). 
Rather, power is diffuse and spread throughout society and centers the idea that “political 
power does not just act on political subjects, but constructs them in particular ways” 
(Larner, 2000, p. 19). Consequently, governmentality has inspired much discussion and 
debate on neoliberal evolutions in the welfare state and other forms of governance. 
Emerging out of increasing globalization and deindustrialization, neoliberal ideology 
rests on the central tenets of individualism, choice and responsibility, market driven 
economics, laissez faire, and minimal government (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Comack, 
2006; Mallory, 2006; Pollack, 2008). This set of values has driven shifts in policy 
agendas from a Keynesian approach, which saw government as necessary to ensure the 
basic social wellbeing of all, to one of deregulation and privatization (Larner, 2000). 
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Neoliberal ideology eroded government commitment to social welfare and brought forth 
the evisceration of health, education, and social services in favor of policies that focus on 
individual responsibility and market based rationalities (Comack, 2006; Neve & Pate, 
2005). The dismantling of state responsibility for public good has brought with it a hyper 
focus on the individual as both the cause of and the solution to social problems. With this 
we see an increased reliance on disciplinary measures to manage social ills (Fisher & 
Reese, 2010). In other words, the expansion of neoliberal policies involved a rolling back 
of the welfare state and a rolling out of the carceral state. The consequences of this are 
staggering: high rates of unemployment, inadequate tax structures, and subsequent cuts in 
social, welfare, educational, and medical spending. The depletion of a strong social safety 
net has thus resulted in high rates of poverty, homelessness, substance abuse, violence, 
and inequality (Sudbury, 2002).  
Furthermore, viewed from the conceptual lens of governmentality, 
neoliberalism’s decree for less government does not equate to less governance, but rather 
shifting forms of governance (Carton, 2014). According to the ideas of governmentality, 
neoliberalism can be seen as “shaping both political programs and individual 
subjectivities” (Larner, 2000, p. 9) which in turn creates a populace of individual actors, 
groups, communities, and agencies that regulate society because they have internalized 
and adopted neoliberal notions of security and responsibilization; what Pollack and 
Rossiter (2010) refer to as the “entrepreneurial subject.” Governmentality is described by 
Sanchez (2007) as the “tactics, technologies, and institutions that constitute governance 
through populations” (p. 169). In essence, larger geographical spaces and operations of 
social control based on neoliberal ideology are created and diffused throughout society. 
 37 
Rose (2000) points out that under neoliberal strategies of rule, people and places 
are governed not from above (the state) but through diverse and diffuse technologies of 
government, which include ideologies and practices, infused into the very fabric of 
existence. Everyday places such as the workplace, educational institutions, and health and 
welfare agencies become mechanisms for surveillance, regulation, and control of 
conduct. Technologies of government congeal so as to become commonplace and 
invisible (Sanchez, 2007). Under this framework, non-conformity, rather than illegal acts, 
implicitly becomes the focus of governance. Like the critique provided by multiracial 
feminism, governmentality highlights a system of power in which individuals become 
governed by themselves and their social interactions through the production, 
internalization, and regulation of norms, rather than just through the application of law.  
Rose (2000) portrays neoliberal societies as designed for inclusion and exclusion. 
Inclusive spaces are created to ensure security and keep outsiders out. Insider and 
outsider status are shaped by social locations, which are structured into society across 
lines of race, class, and gender. People from marginalized social locations tend to occupy 
spaces of “exclusion” and are subject to multiple forms of risk management, such as 
surveillance and policing, to which those from more privileged positions are not. In 
addition, social and penal policies tend to be more punitive for people from marginalized 
social locations (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Travis, 2002). Larner 
(2000) states that “neo-liberalism is both a political discourse about the nature of rule and 
a set of practices that facilitate the governing of individuals from a distance” (p. 6). As 
such, understanding contemporary neoliberal strategies as a form of governmentality 
provides a practical method of exploring the criminalization of women in contemporary 
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society; criminalized women often occupy multiple zones of exclusion, and these 
theoretical understandings can help shed light on why and how women are being 
criminalized and punished in increasing numbers. 
Social work and discourses of risk. As stated previously, neoliberalism has 
brought forth a slew of political rationalities and governmental technologies that enable 
shifting forms of governance. That is, governance is no longer limited to actions of the 
state. Increasingly, non-state actors are stepping in to prescribe and regulate a politics of 
conduct that ultimately aligns with governmental interests. Social work figures 
prominently in this space and the last 40 years have seen a drastic reconfiguration in the 
role of social work. A push toward managerialism4 and professionalization alongside 
obligations to funders that value efficiency over effectiveness, adherence to evidence-
based practice interventions, and documentation of measurable outcomes has transformed 
social work in a number of ways. Social work has seen an increasing emphasis on 
resource management and individual level service delivery over community organizing 
and macro-level analysis/change. Subsequently, the assessment and management of risk 
has supplanted a more holistic approach to meeting client needs. Such changes reflect the 
neoliberal political climate and align social work with penal institutions in troubling 
ways.  
Pollack (2013) contends that the narrow definitions of “success” that flow out of 
evidence-based practices limit practitioners’ ability to engage effectively with 
																																								 																				
4 Managerialism emphasizes a reliance on economic efficiency and calls for accountability marked by 
superficial counts of contacts, time in service, targets, etc. It is argued that the social democratic goals of 
social work are undermined as the administration of social services increasingly reflects management 
practices typical of the private sector (Harlow, 2003; Rogowski, 2011).	
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criminalized women and take away women’s ability to define their experience and needs 
for themselves. For instance, in qualitative studies, peer counseling and support has been 
found effective in helping women successfully reintegrate into the community upon 
release from prison (Richie, 2001; Sowards et al., 2006). However, stringent rules applied 
to women after they have been criminalized (by both welfare systems and penal systems) 
often hinge their success on staying out of contact with peers (Pollack, 2013). This is 
premised on a logic embedded in “risk thinking” that sees interactions with other 
offenders as a risk factor rather than a resilience factor. Therefore, an aspect of 
reintegration that women view as helpful toward meeting their goals not only goes 
unrecognized, but is also penalized. Pollack (2013) further argues that the underlying 
philosophy of risk reduction strategies is problematic because it embeds social work 
practice in a framework of risk rather than welfare.  
Feminist scholars label risk management strategies, which define needs in terms 
of risk, as “risk thinking,” and view it as a product of neoliberal governing (Pollack, 
2008). Risk thinking has a long history in penal systems (Hannah-Moffat, 2006) and has 
increasingly become ubiquitous in social work practice (Parton, 1998). A central element 
of risk thinking involves predicting the likelihood of harm to self, others, or society. 
Individual level interventions based on notions of empowerment and choice are closely 
aligned with risk thinking. Such interventions not only reinforce notions of an individual 
needing to be fixed (Donohue & Moore, 2009; Maidment, 2007; Pollack, 2008), but in 
their reliance on “self-surveillance” and “self-regulation” also serve as another form of 
governmentality. Risk based interventions often emphasize empowerment, “healthy” 
choices, and the development of self-esteem and self-management skills. Such 
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interventions function to create subjects who can act upon themselves so the authorities 
do not have to. Women who internalize discourses of choice and responsibility are more 
likely to be seen as lower risk and therefore have increased eligibility for parole and other 
leniencies. 
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, placing emphasis on the 
management and regulation of individual risk obscures structural factors, such as poverty, 
addiction, unemployment, homelessness, and inadequate social assistance that bring 
women into contact with the criminal justice system (Hannah-Moffat, 2006; Pollack, 
2008). Second, practices built on risk thinking consequently pathologize women’s coping 
skills and resistance to poverty and violence. After all, it is often social exclusion that 
propels many women to engage in strategies of survival that become branded as 
“criminal.” Rather than examining factors such as poverty, exposure to violence, 
unemployment, and lack of childcare as structural factors needing to be remedied, risk 
thinking turns the consequences of social exclusion and oppression into individual issues 
that should then be effectively managed and resolved through therapy and empowerment 
(Pollack, 2008). Within this framework, men who use violence and forms of institutional 
violence are not considered to be the risk in need of intervention. This issue is 
exemplified in violence prevention programming that relies on educating girls and 
women about healthy relationships and strategies to keep themselves safe. Though a 
necessary component to violence prevention work, the practice reifies the dominant 
discourse that holds girls and women responsible for the violence they experience. 
Lastly, thinking in terms of risk is a powerful normalization mechanism and relies 
on universalized notions of “woman.” For women, issues of normality and risk are bound 
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up in dominant notions of femininity. When one is deemed to fall outside of what is 
considered a universal “normal,” actions are then taken to change the character, self-
esteem, or thinking patterns of the “risky” person (Pollack, 2008). Further, within 
neoliberal rationalities, risk-avoiding behavior is seen as a moral imperative as it involves 
issues of self-control, responsibility, and self-improvement (Lupton, 1999).  
Neoliberalism would have us believe that “crime” is a result of a failure of a 
defective individual. A Foucauldian analysis, on the other hand, recognizes crime as a 
historical construct situated in time and space (Laberge, 1991; Rose, 2000). The 
construction of risk is no different. Pollack (2008) states, 
The many biases inherent within risk assessments have been clearly illustrated. It 
has been argued that risk assessments themselves play a large role in constituting 
what is defined as risk. Risk assessments have also been found to be highly 
subjective and moralistic enterprises (p. 1274). 
Hannah-Moffat (2006) asserts that interpreting social exclusion, victimization, and needs 
as risk essentializes differences among women, neglects attention to structural 
disadvantages, and imposes normative criteria for success that are often based on white 
middle class values. As such, strategies of risk management and “preventative” 
community programs can be said to expand, rather than displace, the reach of the 
criminal justice system. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed multiracial feminism and governmentality as theoretical 
lenses through which to further explore the construction of criminalization of women in 
contemporary social work discourse. These theoretical perspectives examine the 
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relationship between criminalization, structural inequality, and neoliberal globalization. 
They help me conceptualize power as not only repressive, but also productive in terms of 
shaping subjectivities. Through this conceptual framework, one can see how the role of 
social work(er) is reconfigured under a neoliberal climate so as to function as a part of the 
widening net of transcarceral control. The next chapter provides an overview of the 
relevant literature in order to examine the lager sociopolitical and historical context 











Chapter 3: Contextualizing the Research 
This chapter surveys the relevant literature related to the criminalization of 
women in order to provide a larger context to locate this study of how criminalized 
women are constructed in the social work academic literature. Having a detailed review 
of the broader socio-political and historical context on hand is necessary for my project 
because CDA requires multiple dimensions of analysis. CDA requires the analyst to 
move between text and context in order to focus on what the discourse says, what it does, 
and the conditions that make the discourse possible. Text analysis alone can take one 
only so far; texts need to be analyzed, not in isolation, but rather as situated within their 
larger contexts.  
This review of the literature discusses (1) the sociopolitical context that has given 
rise to mass incarceration and increased criminalization of women; (2) the consequences 
of increased criminalization and mass incarceration; and (3) historical and more 
contemporary perspectives on, and interventions with, criminalized women. It is my hope 
that the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapter provides the basis for a 
deeper understanding of the elements discussed in this literature review. 
Sociopolitical Context 
The 1970s marked a period of systematic mass imprisonment and heavy reliance 
on formal social controls targeted primarily at marginalized populations (Sokoloff, 2005). 
Since the mid-seventies, the war on drugs and the rise of the prison industrial complex 
has spawned a dramatic increase in the incarceration of women worldwide (Bagley & 
Merlo, 1995; Chandler, 2003; Sokoloff, 2005). Poor women and women of color 
disproportionately fill the space in prisons, jails, and community corrections and the 
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majority are incarcerated for non-violent crimes5 (Sentencing Project, 2018b). The United 
States, in particular, has the fastest growing rate and the highest number of incarcerated 
women in the world (Chandler, 2003). Between 1950 and1980, the United States opened 
two to three new state and federal facilities for women every ten years. Beginning in the 
1980s, women began to be criminalized and incarcerated at unprecedented rates; in 1970 
there were 5,600 women in jails and prisons, by 1995 there were 75,000 (Sudbury, 2002), 
in 2016 there were 213,722 (Carson, 2018). To accommodate these sharp increases, 34 
new facilities for women were opened in the U.S. during the 1980s alone (Chesney-Lind, 
2002). 
It is important to note that the population of imprisoned men (particularly men of 
color) also grew dramatically during the same time. Although women have always, and 
still do, reflect a smaller proportion of the imprisoned population, their rates of 
imprisonment have far outpaced that of men’s (Sentencing Project, 2018b; Sudbury, 
2002). While the number of incarcerated men doubled between 1985 and 1995, the 
number of women tripled (Sudbury, 2002). Currently 1.2 million women are under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system, including prison, jail, probation, and parole 
(Sentencing Project, 2018). Community supervision (parole and probation) accounts for 
the largest proportion at just fewer than 1.1 million. This latter number is significant 
because, as Angela Davis reminds us, mass incarceration is not just about physical bodies 
that are celled, but also about all the people who are doing time on the outside (Praxis 
Center, 2018). Furthermore, community supervision mechanisms, despite professed 
intentions of diversion, often function as a back door to incarceration. 
																																								 																				
5 Disproportionate to white, privilege classed women. 
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Dramatic increases in criminalization are largely attributed to punitive social 
policies and sentencing enhancements that have emerged in the later part of the 20th 
century, such as “three strikes you’re out,” mandatory minimums, and truth in sentencing 
(Franklin, 2008; Mauer & King, 2007; Sentencing Project, 2018b). Sentencing 
enhancements have been adopted on both the federal and state level and have been driven 
largely by the “war on drugs” (Zhang et al., 2009). Mandatory minimum sentencing 
guidelines have replaced treatment and community service options when drugs are 
involved and reflect a policy choice to treat substance use and addiction as a criminal 
issue rather than a public health problem (Mauer & King, 2007). Mandatory minimums 
increase not only the number of people being sentenced to prison but also the time they 
spend there, causing rates of incarceration and overcrowding to increase dramatically 
(Mascharka, 2000; Pallone & Henessey, 2003; Zhang et.al,. 2009). 
Sentencing enhancements frame incarceration as the intervention best suited to 
deal with the problem of “crime” (Drake, Aos & Miller, 2009; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007; 
Tripodi et. al., 2011). However, research has shown that the widespread belief that 
incarceration, as well as the threat of longer-term sentences acts as a deterrent, is 
inaccurate (JFA Institute, 2007; Mascharka, 2000; Mauer, 2011; Oregon Criminal Justice 
Commission, 2011). In order for the deterrence argument to hold water, one must have 
some understanding of the consequences of an action before committing said action and 
one must also actively think about those consequences before committing an act. 
However, studies have shown that offenders in general, and ones under the influence in 
particular, are less likely to think about the consequences of their actions in the moment 
of committing them (JFA Institute, 2007; Mauer, 2011). Further, scholars note that many 
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people who commit crimes do not have prior knowledge of sentencing laws necessary in 
order to be deterred from their consequences (JFA Institute, 2007; Mascharka, 2000; 
Mauer, 2011). Overall, increased sentencing has not been shown to have a deterrent 
effect and research does not support the use of increased sentencing as an effective drug 
control strategy (Greene, 2004; Pew, 2009).  
In fact, as documented in their meta-analysis of correctional rehabilitation, Lipsey 
and Cullen (2007) show that incarceration actually works to increase recidivism. 
Likewise, research on mandatory minimum sentencing policies has shown that they are 
ineffective at reducing crime and result in increased incarceration rates and criminal 
justice spending (Gill, 2008; Vincent & Hofer, 1994). For instance, Oregon enacted its 
first mandatory minimum (Measure 11) in 1995, increasing the prison population by 66% 
in the first year (Greene, 2004; Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 2011). To 
accommodate these increases, Oregon’s correctional budget has since increased more 
than 250% to spending that is currently at about $1.4 billion dollars per year (Oregon 
Legislative Fiscal Office, 2011). Sentencing expert Michael Tonry states, “As 
instruments of public policy, mandatory minimums do little good and much harm” (as 
quoted in Gill, 2008, p. 56). 
Advocates of strict sentencing guidelines posit that removing discretion in the 
sentencing process creates uniformity in sentencing and counteracts racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Comack, 2006). What these 
proponents fail to account for is the myriad ways in which discretion based on 
discrimination occurs before a defendant even steps foot in court, including surveillance, 
policing, and prosecution (Small, 2001). For instance, though judges are bound by 
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sentencing guidelines, prosecutors can still use their discretion in determining the charge 
a defendant faces. Further, police routinely use their discretion, which many (myself 
included) would argue is shaped by cultural bias, in law enforcement practices. Thus, 
discretion is not removed but transferred (Mascharka, 2000; Tonry, 2007; Zhang et al., 
2009). Additionally, instead of judiciary discretion, prosecutors are afforded more 
leverage when in the plea bargaining process (Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, 
2011). Prosecutors decide the charge and the charge decides the sentence. This is 
problematic for many reasons.  
First, prosecutorial decisions and plea-bargaining take place behind closed doors; 
therefore they are not subject to public scrutiny in the same way judicial decision-making 
may be (Mascharka, 2000; Tonry, 2006). Tonry (2006) states, “the resulting hypocrisy 
and lack of transparency compound the problems of unjust sentences and stark 
disparities” (p. 46). By removing accountability, the justice system is ultimately 
counterproductive toward the goal of uniformity in sentencing.  
Second, research shows that in the plea bargaining process, higher-level drug 
dealers are more likely to give information for reduced sentences (Mascharka, 2000; 
Zhang et al., 2009). They often exchange the names of others, lower in the drug trade, for 
reduced charges. As a result, unintended populations, without the valuable information 
needed to plea, are brought into the court’s grasp. So, although mandatory minimums 
intend to target high-level dealers in the drug trade, the plea-bargaining process instead 
criminalizes many others who hold only minor roles in the drug trade. Furthermore, it has 
been noted that high-level drug dealers are rarely caught with large amounts of drugs; 
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they often employ couriers or “mules” who, if caught, often have no information to offer 
in exchange for a plea (Tonry, 2006).  
Lastly, it has been noted that the plea-bargaining process uniquely and 
differentially impacts women (Allen et al., 2010; Balfour, 2006; Jefferson Smith & 
Young, 2003). Women are the most likely to be low-level foot soldiers in the drug trade, 
working for, or with, people they will not or cannot willingly hand over to the authorities. 
Therefore, women are also the most vulnerable to arrest and punishment (Sudbury, 2002; 
Toscano, 2005). In this manner, the war on drugs has criminalized alarmingly more 
women than men (Balfour 2006; Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005). In 2016, 25% of 
females in state prisons and 56% in federal prisons were convicted of a drug offense, 
compared to 14% and 47% of male prisoners respectively (Carson, 2018).  
Social and economic neoliberalism. Mass incarceration and increased 
criminalization also reflect neoliberal social and economic changes within an already 
stratified society. Neoliberal transformations in the economy have contributed to 
women’s poverty across the globe and have brought an increasing number of women into 
contact with the criminal justice system (Pollack, 2008). Increases in imprisonment rates 
have occurred concurrently with decreased spending in the areas of social services, 
education, and health. Research has shown that women’s economic disadvantage coupled 
with the divestment of health and social services may increase their involvement in 
property crimes (Chesney-Lind, 2002). Indeed, it becomes clear that punitive changes in 
welfare and sentencing policies have contributed to women’s lack of opportunity and 
subsequent increased criminalization.  
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Here, I must draw attention to the fact that although all women are susceptible to 
the negative impacts of neoliberalism, poor women, trans women, and women of color 
are more adversely affected than white and privileged classed women (Chandler, 2003; 
Neve & Pate, 2005). For instance, pregnant women of color are disproportionately 
subjected to discriminatory drug testing from the medical profession (Sudbury, 2002; 
Toscano, 2005). Although research proves no serious health effects for infants whose 
mothers used drugs without other confounding factors such as poverty and lack of 
prenatal care and nutrition, prenatal drug use is sanctioned in many states as a measure of 
child abuse or neglect and medical professionals are required to report suspected use of 
drugs during pregnancy to Child Protective Services (Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005). 
Women who are pregnant and found using drugs may then be indicted on charges of 
manslaughter or child abuse and have their parental rights terminated (Bosworth, 2007; 
Chesney-Lind, 2002; Solinger et al., 2010). Punitive policies such as these have not been 
found to act as a deterrent to substance use, but they have been shown to act as a 
deterrent to accessing prenatal care which could mitigate or prevent any serious health 
effects of substance use for both mothers and infants (Stengel, 2014; Young, 1994).  
Furthermore, current drug sentencing policies systematically imprison poor 
women of color because they target women and communities of color in specific and 
unique ways—so much so that some refer to the war on drugs as the “war on poor Black 
women” (Sokoloff, 2005). People of color are disproportionately impacted by punitive 
drug polices, particularly in the case of crack, for which the punishment is 100 times 
harsher than for that of powder cocaine (Pewewardy & Severson, 2003). According to 
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records, although only 34% of crack users are African American, in 1994 they 
represented 90% of those charged with federal crack offenses (Pewewardy & Severson, 
2003). Further, as women of color are most likely to be the low level foot soldiers within 
the transnational drug trade, they are also the most susceptible to arrest and punishment 
(Sudbury, 2002; Toscano, 2005).  
Many scholars note that the policy and funding changes which came about with 
the war on drugs and welfare reform are aimed at restricting upward mobility of the poor 
and blaming them for their plight (Bagley & Merlo, 1995; Bosworth, 2007; Chesney-
Lind, 2002; Franklin, 2008; Sheldon, 2008; Sokoloff, 2005; Solinger et al., 2010). Fine 
and Weis (2000) centralize the discourse around structural violence: 
While crime and violence are central concerns for poor and working-class 
women, building more and more prisons accelerates the undermining of poor and 
working class communities, and disrupts the lives of children who are then 
exported through the foster care system (p. 1144).  
By decreasing funding for services for the poor and increasing funding for prisons, 
poverty is perversely criminalized. In other words, there is a direct relationship between 
neoliberal policies and the increased criminalization of poor women of color (Neve & 
Pate, 2005).  
The impact of neoliberal penal practices has had a profound effect on immigration 
policy as well. Gripped by anti-immigration sentiments, the U.S. has produced new 
regulations creating an increase in the incarceration of immigrant women (Bosworth, 
2007; Solinger et al., 2010). Currently, the targets of these policies are primarily Latina 
women. What’s unique to the past two or three decades are the ways in which prison 
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building businesses are involved in creating and lobbying for punitive immigration 
policies. Now dubbed the “prison industrial complex,” criminal justice is increasingly 
being farmed out by the state to for-profit industries (Chandler, 2003; Mallory, 2006; 
Neve & Pate, 2005). The prison industrial complex describes the relationship among 
criminal justice, corporations, and policymakers, which serves the financial interests of 
the elite and results in the mass incarceration of marginalized populations. Fisher and 
Reece (2010) describe the prison industrial complex as “the broad range of powerful 
interests benefiting from and promoting incarceration” (p.5). Scholars and activists 
critical of the prison industrial complex are increasingly responding to it as an inherently 
racist system that is used as an inadequate response to social problems caused by 
globalization and neoliberalism (Sudbury, 2002). For the purpose of bolstering profit, the 
prison industrial complex has been proven to be a driving force for punitive immigration 
policy (Bosworth, 2007; Solinger et al., 2010). New for-profit detention centers are being 
built to accommodate solely immigrant women and children (Bosworth, 2007; Solinger et 
al., 2010). The long-reaching effects of neoliberal policies are compounded when 
collateral consequences, which serve to limit the opportunities and citizenship rights of 
those incarcerated and formerly incarcerated, are imposed at state and federal levels 
(Travis, 2002). 
Collateral consequences. In addition to the visible embodiment of punishment 
experienced through incarceration and community corrections, there are also a plethora of 
less visible sanctions, called collateral consequences (Balfour, 2006; Travis, 2002). 
Collateral consequences refer to the “laws and regulations that serve to diminish the 
rights and privileges of those convicted of crimes” (Travis, 2002, p. 16). This relatively 
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invisible punishment, unlike expansion of the prison and criminal justice system, goes 
largely unnoticed by society at large. Policies in child welfare, social assistance, voting, 
employment, education, and housing, to name a few, intersect in complex ways to exert 
social control and social exclusion before, during, and after contact with the law 
(Bosworth & Flavin, 2007; Comack, 2006; Travis, 2002).  
Collateral consequences are molded out of regulatory policies, enacted on the 
federal, state, and sometimes local level. They provide sanctions to those with 
convictions that extend beyond the prison walls. To name but a few: individuals 
convicted of a felony are permanently denied access to many of the rights of citizenship 
such as the right to vote, to own guns, and to hold public office (Travis, 2002). Those 
with felony convictions are denied access to federal student loans (Travis, 2002). In many 
states, those convicted of drug offenses can have their driver’s license suspended and be 
denied access to public assistance (welfare), public housing, and food stamps (Travis, 
2002). With expanded access to criminal background checks, many employers and rental 
agencies/landlords can deny jobs and housing based on past offenses (Brewer & Heitzeg, 
2008). These examples are particularly problematic since the conditions of 
probation/parole often include securing employment; likewise, welfare reform of 1996 
requires that individuals work a certain number of hours in order to receive public 
assistance. All this becomes more and more unattainable for those convicted of felonies. 
In effect, collateral sanctions serve to restrict the mobility of “offenders,” limit options 
for survival, and reinforce their status as criminalized. They undermine the goals of 
reintegration and increase recidivism rates.  
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Further, such regulatory policies have uniquely gendered impacts. For instance, 
many women in prison are mothers who had primary care of the children before 
incarceration (Bosworth, 2007; Chesney-Lind, 2002; Solinger et al., 2010). The passage 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 initiates mandatory termination 
of parental rights after 15 months of a child’s placement in foster care, thus serving as a 
double punishment for women with drug offenses whose sentences may start at 15 
months as dictated by mandatory minimums (Bosworth, 2007; Chesney-Lind, 2002; 
Solinger et al., 2010). Additionally, child welfare requirements often include the ability to 
secure and maintain stable housing. However, the potential to be denied housing based on 
past convictions creates extra barriers for women who are trying to regain custody of 
their children. These examples highlight the gendered impact of intersecting punitive 
criminal justice and social/child welfare policies. Furthermore, given that women from 
marginalized social locations are more likely to be criminalized, it follows that 
marginalized communities will be differentially impacted by collateral sanctions. In this 
manner, criminalization serves to reinforce and perpetuate larger societal inequalities. 
Brewer and Heitzeg (2008) profoundly state:  
The scale, scope, and extremes of negative consequences—both direct and 
collateral—for communities of color are new, especially for women, but the role 
of criminal justice in policing, prosecuting, imprisoning, and executing people of 
color has deep historical roots. What is not new is the racist and classist economic 
and political agenda that is foundational. The paradigms shift from essentialist to 
color blind and the practices of oppression are refined and renamed, but the 
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resulting inequality remains much the same. The law and its attendant machinery 
were, and still are, enforcers of both White supremacy and capitalist interests (p. 
630).  
As I have shown, the consequences of criminalizing women do not begin or end 
with the criminal justice system. Ultimately, research shows that punitive sanctions and 
policies, in or out of prison, serve to further isolate and exclude already marginalized 
members of society (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007; Pollack, 2005), and “fail to challenge the 
logic of punishment as a response to social problems” (Sudbury, 2000, p. 137). Felony 
disenfranchisement is yet another thread in the transcarceral net of control.  
Historical Context  
Mary Bosworth (2000) calls for the examination of the beliefs and social 
institutions of a society in a given time in order to accurately analyze women’s 
criminalization. This is important because the current trends in criminalization reflect 
historical patterns of oppression and injustice across lines of gender, race, and class. 
Feminist historians highlight how the intersections of race, class, sexuality, and gender 
have “shaped not only which women were incarcerated, but also how they were treated 
inside” (Bosworth, 2000, p. 267). Today, these intersections also shape how they are 
treated once they return to their communities. In essence, female criminality cannot be 
explained, examined, or defined without including the historical context of gender 
constructions and unequal power relations in society at large. Therefore, the historical 
review that follows is an attempt to trace the emergence of discourses regarding sexuality 
and femininity that serve as the basis for criminalizing women who fall outside of 
dominant norms and expectations. In order to discuss differential treatment among 
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various groups of women and to highlight the role that race, class, and sexuality play in 
shaping women’s lives and the justifications for punishment, it is necessary to first set the 
stage by explaining larger dominant ideologies regarding gender and the forces that have 
established gender norms. I offer this as a caveat to the reader in order to make explicit 
that these dominant ideologies are built on standards to which not all women can 
conform. This historical review allows for a more thorough understanding of the 
development of the various approaches to explaining and penalizing female criminality as 
well as the role of social work in responding to the plight of criminalized women and 
shaping interventions for them.  
The “Cult of True Womanhood.” Prior to the 18th century, gender norms did 
not serve to define femininity in the same ways as in later times. This is largely attributed 
to the agrarian economy of the time, in which economic production took place within 
households. The 19th century brought forth a shift in market relations and the 
development of a middle class (Colvin, 1997; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008; Young & 
Spencer, 2007). With the rise of a market economy, economic production was taken out 
of the household and the role of the “woman” began to change. No longer needed for 
economic production, women were relegated to roles of childbearing, nurturing, and daily 
household chores. This shift marked the introduction of a separate “women’s sphere” in 
which home came to be seen as the realm of women, and work the domain of men 
(Colvin, 1997; Pollock, 1995). These material changes to economic and social life 
brought discursive changes to the ideology regarding femininity. The development of a 
“women’s sphere” ushered forth notions of women’s morality and sexual purity that did 
not exist in public discourse prior to the 19th century (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995).  
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Ideas of “True Womanhood” which asserted that a woman’s true nature is pure, 
selfless, asexual, and weak began to shape the lives of women (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 
1981; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008). Some women could conform to this new role more 
easily than others, but for those who could not or would not, deviations were met with 
disapproval and punishment (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983; 
Sheldon, 2008; Young & Spencer, 2007). Women had historically been punished for 
moral crimes and crimes of poverty, but these crimes now took on a new meaning based 
on a woman’s social location. As Zedner (1991) remarks, “The female criminal, the 
prostitute, and the female drunk were held up as the very negation of the feminine ideal, a 
warning to other women to conform” (p. 320). Women who committed crimes were 
viewed in one of two ways, both based on the ideal of true womanhood. They were 
considered either 1) inherently different from most women, morally depraved, and 
unredeemable; or 2) “pure” women who were simply the victims of male lust. The former 
was the predominant view prior to the Civil War. In 1833, Francis Leiber stated, “A 
woman, when she commits a crime, acts more in contradiction to her whole moral 
organization, i.e., must be more depraved, must have sunk already deeper than a man” 
(Rafter, 1983, p. 138). It was thought that women, as the moral gatekeepers for society, 
injured society more through their criminality than men through theirs. Moreover, women 
were seen as responsible for men’s immoral behavior (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; 
Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008).  
The latter perspective, which purported a view of female criminality that held 
men responsible for the moral downfall of women, came out of the Female Reform 
Societies, largely led by feminists and social workers of the time, and had the greatest 
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impact on policy during the late 19th century (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 
1995; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). The approach of the Reform Societies marks a 
discursive distinction from viewing women who committed crimes as dangerous to 
viewing them as risky and at-risk (Lupton, 1999). The Reform Societies saw women as 
“civilizers of male society” and in need of rehabilitation as opposed to punishment. 
However, the reformers had little impact on treatment of criminal women until the rise of 
the reformatories in the progressive era. In Antebellum America, female offenders were 
often referred to as “fallen women.” The times epitomized the Madonna/whore duality in 
which women were viewed as “virginal, pure, asexual, and an uplifting influence. Yet, at 
the same time, women were also seen as Eve-like, both corrupt and corrupting” (Zedner, 
1991, p. 320). However, this view of femininity did not apply to all women. Poor women 
and Black women were more likely than their White counterparts to be incarcerated and 
were viewed as especially heinous and beyond redemption (Young & Spencer, 2007).  
The mid 19th century marked an increase in the criminalization of poverty among 
women. Women were displaced from factory work by immigration, and poverty among 
single women began to grow. During this time there was a decline in reform efforts 
among feminists and social reformers and an increase in charitable work, the emergence 
of which fit with larger societal beliefs of the time that held the poor responsible for their 
plight (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Sheldon, 2008). Later, in the 1860s, the sphere of 
the woman once again expanded in response to the needs of a civil war (Colvin, 1997; 
Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). Increasing numbers of privileged classed, 
White women capitalized on society’s belief in maternal nature embedded in the ideal of 
true womanhood to gain work and assist in the war effort.  
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Social feminism. Estelle Freedman (1979) describes the social feminism 
embedded in the Progressive Era as “an era of separate female organization and 
institution building” (p. 517). After the Civil War, middle and upper class women were 
increasingly being educated and seeking ways to use their newfound skills in a male 
dominated world that systematically excluded women from professions. Notably, women 
entered the field6 of social work in high numbers during this time (Abrams & Curran, 
2000). These women turned their attention, once again, to social reform efforts. They 
were “imbued with the mission of bringing their female values to bear on the entire 
society” (Freedman, 1979, p. 518). Unlike radical feminists of the time, social feminists 
sought to mitigate oppressive social conditions, not change them. They embraced and 
bolstered assumptions about gender and femininity by introducing sexist sentiments into 
public policy (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983). Freedman states,  
Like the separate but equal racial ideology, however, social feminist strategy 
rested on a contradictory definition of equality. The 19th century prison reformers 
did seek to expand women’s rights when they argued for greater authority over 
public policy and improved treatment for women prisoners. But at the heart of 
their program was the principle of innate sexual difference, not sexual equality 
(1981, p. 47). 
Though perhaps well intended, these efforts shaped and continue to shape the gender 
norms that form the foundation of criminal justice and social work practice with 
criminalized women today. 
																																								 																				
6 Field is a broader term than profession or discipline and is used throughout this document to account for 
those without formal training/education in social work, as well as both academics and practitioners. 
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Social reformers, including social workers from Settlement Houses, focused their 
energies on many areas of reform targeted specifically at women, including women’s 
prison reform efforts (Abrams & Curran, 2000; Freedman, 1981; Sheldon, 2008). 
Scholars note that the social reform movements of the time involved mostly middle class 
White women, who participated in a “variety of reforms aimed at improving the lot of the 
dependent and defective classes” (Rafter, 1983, p. 153). Reformers purported a belief in 
women’s superior morality and saw the prison as a source of impurity. Their mission, 
then, was to protect and reform women. They advocated for complete segregation by age, 
gender, and degree of crime. Treatment/intervention was then dictated in accordance with 
women’s “true nature” and was to be provided by feminine women. The reformatory 
model was deemed suitable for this purpose. 
Rise of the Reformatories. In 1870 the American Prison Association held its first 
annual convention in Cincinnati and established the American Correctional Association’s 
Initial Declaration of Principles, consisting of 37 principles, which lay the foundation of 
some of the disparate treatment in criminal justice that we see today. Among other things, 
these principles called for: separate institutions for women; indeterminate sentencing; and 
training and education for inmates (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993; 
Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). Historians note that these principles moved penology from 
taking an environmental approach, which looked at societal causes for crime, to a more 
medical approach, which attempted to correct flaws and rehabilitate the wayward 
(Colvin, 1997; Friedman, 1993; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008). 
By melding the Declaration of Principles with ideas about what it means to be 
feminine (and a staunch belief regarding fundamental differences between the sexes), 
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women reformers were instrumental in shifting the discourse about women’s penology 
(Rafter, 1983). Indeterminate sentences dictated by this new approach to penology 
explicated a “three-year law” specifically for women, based not on the severity of a crime 
but on the need to “reform.” The three-year law declared that women could serve up to 
three year sentences for misdemeanors such as “disorderly conduct, vagrancy, lewd 
behavior.” These types of offenses were often used as a stand-in for suspected 
prostitution (Colvin, 1997, p. 157).  
Meanwhile, men commonly served much shorter sentences or simply received a 
fine for similar offenses, continuing a longstanding gendered pattern of differential 
sentencing. Differential sentencing was upheld on the grounds that more time was needed 
for the reform of the “fallen” woman, while men’s behavior was seen as “normal” and 
not in need of rehabilitation. In 1865 an annual report of the Indiana Reformatory 
Institution stated that they aimed to reform women so that they could “occupy the 
position assigned to them by God, viz., wives, mothers and educators of children” 
(Colvin, 1997, p. 163). Thus began a legacy of a double standard, which promoted and 
enforced stereotypes of femininity that did not and do not apply to men.  
After the convention, widespread establishment of the female reformatory was set 
in motion. The reformatory was conceived by Elizabeth Fry as a “notion of prison 
exclusively for women, administered by women, in which inmates would receive moral 
and domestic training” (Rafter, 1983, p. 146). During this time there was also a societal 
shift in the discourse regarding “fallen” women; they came to be seen as childlike and led 
astray, not depraved and beyond redemption (Agonito, 1977; Freedman, 1979; Freedman, 
1981; Rafter, 1983). Reformatories primarily housed White women convicted of 
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misdemeanors, as they were thought to be capable of salvation and reform7 (Freedman, 
1981; Rafter, 1983). Women of color, however, were excluded from reformatories as 
they were seen as less worthy of effort, not capable of “true femininity,” and less capable 
of reform; consequently they were primarily sentenced to harsher custodial institutions 
(Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995). Women reformers saw themselves as 
protectors of morality, and the goal of the reformatory was to create “good” women. In 
her historical analysis regarding the incarceration of women, Nicole Rafter (1983) notes 
that the reformatory model was primarily based on already established institutions for 
children. Women were governed in a maternal fashion and disciplined like children. A 
point system, in which women lost points for un-ladylike behavior (talking loudly, 
pouting) was utilized.  
The reformatories were run by middle and upper class women and focused on 
training women for domestic duties (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; 
Rafter, 1983). The “rehabilitation” consisted of training defined in “gender-specific” 
terms:  
Instructions were tailored to what was considered the childlike, domestic, and 
asexual nature of the true woman. In the course of establishing prisons that would, 
proponents hoped, transform fallen women into true women, reformatory 
advocates institutionalized the double standard. From today’s perspective, their 
efforts to save seemed to have condemned their charges both to narrow programs 
																																								 																				
7 It is important to note that such offenses were either not recognized as offenses in men or men were 
simply fined and/or served brief sentences (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983). 
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and to care which, because it assumed adult women were childlike, was often 
infantilizing (Rafter, 1983, p.150). 
Reformers insisted on an all women staff for a variety of reasons: they sought to 
eliminate sexual exploitation by male guards; they assumed that middle/upper-class 
women could serve as positive role models for “fallen” women; and they believed 
women were more able to understand the needs and concerns of other women. Given the 
differences in class and social status between matrons and their charges, the idea of 
“understanding role models” is questionable (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 
1983). Rafter states: 
It is not clear that these administrators were well prepared to understand the 
inmates’ problems, particularly those that related to social class, work and 
independence. On the contrary, it was in part the failure of the founders of 
reformatories to tolerate sexual and other mildly deviant behaviors of working 
class women, which led to the founding of reformatories in the first place (1983, 
pp. 159-160).  
With an increase in antagonism toward the poor during the close of the 19th century, 
reformatories were used to restore “true womanhood” and overcome what were thought 
of as inherent defects of the poor. While intended to protect women from harsh treatment 
in the custodial institutions, the invention of the reformatory also served as an expansion 
of the state’s control over women. In line with a Foucauldian analysis, the reformatories’ 
approach to rehabilitation and treatment represents new forms of punishment and 
governance, rather than alternatives to it. Social work’s role in these reform efforts 
highlights an historical legacy of the profession that is firmly rooted in social control. As 
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opposed to challenging the social oppression of women, the reformers, in fact, kept 
women in their “proper place” by encouraging “propriety but certainly not upward 
mobility” (Rafter, 1983, p. 160).  
Reconstruction and the South. At the same time that White women in the north 
were being sentenced to reformatories, the racial composition of the prison population in 
the South underwent radical changes. After the Civil War, with the “official” end of 
slavery, the South was in shambles and in need of a new source of labor. Now that 
slavery was illegal and unconstitutional, the South sought to ensure a captive labor force 
by redefining crime. Black Codes, vagrancy laws, and the convict lease system were all 
used to ensure a system of forced labor (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007; Schneider, 2003). 
African Americans were no longer slaves but they were certainly not free. The Black 
Codes, which made unemployment for African Americans a crime, used the criminal 
justice system to restrict adult mobility and prevent African Americans from leaving the 
plantation (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). This reintroduced involuntary servitude.  
Further, felony laws began to change. During slavery, Black people were not 
readily imprisoned because they were treated as a commodity. Punishment was dealt with 
primarily by slave owners (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007; Rafter, 1983; Young & Spencer, 
2007). After reconstruction, Black people were imprisoned for minor offenses and the 
prison population began to swell. Convict leasing, a practice in which states leased 
prisoners through a contractor for work, was then deployed to provide the South with an 
involuntary workforce (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). When convict leasing went out of 
fashion, forced labor laws remained intact through the implementation of prison/state run 
public works projects for prisoners. For example, during WWI and WWII the South 
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implemented “fight or work” programs. These programs applied vagrancy laws to 
African American women in order to compensate for labor shortages. Black women, like 
White women, worked in their homes taking care of their families. However, despite 
working unpaid in their homes, Black women were forced to either get jobs or be charged 
with vagrancy laws and sentenced to work, while White women in similar circumstances 
were not held to the same expectation (Chowdhry & Beeman, 2007). Herein lies another 
example of how Black women have historically not had access to the dominant norms 
established for femininity. Feminist analyses of “separate spheres”8 are not necessarily 
relevant to the lives of Black women (Crenshaw, 1991). Historically, Black women were 
not relegated to the realm of the home in the same way that White women were; in fact, 
they were forced into economic production outside the home. In this way, racism creates 
conflicts with their ability to access established dominant gender norms. The history of 
racism embedded in the criminal justice system continues to shape the lives of women of 
color and to justify the ways in which they are criminalized today. 
Social purity crusades. Toward the end of the 19th century, the discourse in 
penology began to include medicalized explanations, seeing the biology of offenders as 
the source of criminality. In this, offenders were seen as abnormal and defective. 
Immigrants and people of color were especially harmed by this atavistic approach. And 
as Zedner (1991) notes, the shift in relation to women was more vivid than that of men. 
Women “criminals” were seen as “more depraved and hardened than the male” (Rafter, 
1983, p. 138) because, in order to offend, they must have strayed further from their “true” 
																																								 																				
8 Feminist concerns with women’s exclusion from the workplace excludes the racial issues present in the 
lives of Black women and essentializes the experiences of women. 
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nature. It was thought that as the moral gatekeepers for society, women injured society 
more through their criminality than men through theirs. Moreover, they were seen as 
responsible for men’s immoral behavior (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Pollack, 1995; 
Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 2008).  
Historians note an overall increase in the criminal convictions of women during 
the latter part of the 19th century (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 1983). Not 
unlike how the policy changes emerging out of neoliberalism and the war on drugs have 
caused increased incarceration rates in contemporary times, the increase in criminal 
convictions at the close of the 19th century is largely attributed to emerging anti-
prostitution and anti-abortion laws. For much of the 1800s, many states lacked laws that 
explicitly criminalized prostitution (Friedman, 1993, p. 224). However, by the late 19th 
century, the Social Purity Crusades initiated changes in both policy and public opinion 
regarding prostitution (Wahab, 2002). The Social Purists consisted of female reform 
leaders, including social workers from a casework orientation, whose goals were overtly 
geared toward the social control of dangerous classes as opposed to the betterment of 
conditions for moral uplift (Abrams & Curran, 2000; Rafter, 1983). The Social Purity 
Movement was driven by a newfound belief in the medical model and in scientific 
understanding as a way to propel the human race forward (Abrams & Curran, 2000). 
“Impelled by anxieties about alcoholism, immigration, prostitution, urbanization, 
venereal disease, and the like, the social purity movement generally sought to reaffirm 
and bolster traditional Anglo-Saxon standards” (Rafter, 1983, p. 154). The Social Purity 
Crusades succeeded in condemning prostitution as a public health problem in addition to 
a moral one (Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993; Pollock, 1995; Sheldon, 2008). 
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Abortion laws also changed drastically in the late 19th century (Colvin, 1997; 
Freedman, 1981; Friedman, 1993). Prior to this time, many states did not regulate 
abortion and the legislation that did exist was loosely enforced. In the 1860s abortion 
laws tightened and grew. More than 40 new abortion laws were passed in the latter half 
of the 1800s (Friedman, 1993). In 1864 Oregon law declared abortion manslaughter and 
sentenced women to 1–45 years for getting an abortion (Myers, 1995). Since marriage 
and motherhood were viewed as a woman’s primary purpose and ultimate calling in life, 
abortion was seen as a crime against women’s “true nature.” The anti-abortion sentiment 
was also a reaction to anxieties around immigration and an attempt to bolster and purify 
the native born population (Friedman, 1993). 
Further, the sexual double standard for criminality persisted. Women continued to 
be convicted of crimes against chastity (which included adultery, common night walkers, 
fornication, lewd co-habitation, or lewdness) and crimes against the public order 
(drunkenness, idle and disorderly behavior, and stubbornness). In 1895, of the 336 
women incarcerated in a Massachusetts women’s institution, 39 were for crimes against 
persons and property (26 of which were larceny); 83 were for crimes again chastity; and 
the rest were for crimes against public order (Friedman, 1993). During the same time 
period only three men were committed for crimes against chastity (Friedman, 1993). 
Women sent to reformatories during this time continued to be of a certain type: primarily 
white and convicted of misdemeanors rather than serious felonies. In addition, many of 
the women now being placed in the reformatories were of the “new woman” and 
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“working girl” type ushered in by urbanization (Freedman, 1981; Pollock, 1995; Rafter, 
1983).  
The Mann Act, also known as the White Slavery Act, was passed in 1910, and 
stipulated “felony penalties for any person who in any way knowingly aided or enticed a 
woman or girl to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or 
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” (Colvin, 1997, p. 175). The ambiguous 
language of the act allowed for selective prosecutions and discrimination toward 
minorities and immigrants. The Mann Act also established special courts to detain and 
confine women on moral charges and, thus, brought many more women into contact with 
the criminal justice system (Colvin, 1997).  
Around the same time that the Mann Act was passed, eugenics theories entered 
reformatories. Those who prescribed to eugenics argued that sentences in reformatories 
should be indefinite so that “genetically inferior women could be removed from sexual 
circulation” (Rafter, 1983, p. 162). Josephine Shaw Lowell was a prominent figure in 
women’s prison reform and an early leader in eugenics. She thought that promiscuous 
women were depraved and immoral and therefore produced undesirables. 
“Feebleminded” women, including poor, immigrant, and/or Black women and prostitutes, 
did not go to the “gentler” reformatories; instead, they were sent to custodial institutions 
because they were thought to be beyond reform (Colvin, 1997; Rafter, 1983). Lowell 
advocated for long term commitments for women under thirty who were convicted of 
misdemeanors and/or gave birth to illegitimate children. Notions of propriety became 
institutionalized in the reformatory and “fallen women were removed from sexual 
circulation” (Rafter, 1983, p. 154). 
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As ideas of “White Slavery” came into vogue, the social purists sought to 
eradicate prostitution with renewed fervor (Colvin, 1997; Rafter, 1983). Eugenics gave 
reformatories a new purpose, to “segregate prostitutes and identify those who were 
mentally defective” (Colvin, 1997, p. 180). Eugenicists claimed a relationship between 
deviance and low IQ. Under the leadership of the likes of Lowell, reformatories began to 
routinely administer biased IQ tests, based on White middle class American norms, to all 
women who entered. Women with low scores were sent to custodial institutions and 
committed for life to keep them from breeding. They were often sterilized while in 
confinement (Colvin, 1997; Flavin, 2007; Rafter, 1983).  
World War I marked another dramatic shift in the discourse on women’s 
criminality, as prostitution became the scapegoat for dramatic outbreaks of venereal 
disease among soldiers (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981). Prostitutes were blamed not 
only for venereal disease but also for drunkenness in soldiers, and were charged with 
threatening the war effort. This excited a lot of societal loathing for prostitutes and any 
woman even resembling a prostitute. Myers (1995) states that “the inseparable 
association of prostitutes with venereal disease caused the public to fear the fallen woman 
it had once seen as a victim” (p. 125). Society began to view men as pure and women as 
depraved seducers responsible for men’s transgressions and ill health.  
The Commission of Training Camp Activities (CTCA) implemented broad anti-
prostitution policies which resulted in a mass increase in arrests and incarceration of 
prostitutes (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981). Additionally, venereal disease in women was 
seen as proof of prostitution and, thus, grounds for incarceration. Men with venereal 
disease were viewed as victims and thus educated and provided treatment. Colvin (1997) 
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states that the “purpose of imprisoning women was no longer to provide for their 
protection and reformation, but to promote societal protection through punishment” (p. 
181). The increasing numbers of female inmates brought about by CTCA policies 
necessitated expansion of women’s reformatories and prisons. These new institutions 
were justified in terms of cost-benefit because it was cheaper to lock up women as a 
preventative measure than to treat a soldier for venereal disease (Freedman, 1981; 
Sheldon, 2008). 
Driven by eugenics and an emerging disdain for women, the reformatories began 
to collapse during WWI and take on a more custodial model (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 
1981; Rafter, 1983). Reformatories now held all women prisoners for all offenses, 
instituted heightened surveillance and security, and practiced harsh punishments and 
sterilizations. By the 1920s, eugenics had successfully supplanted the idea of 
rehabilitation (Colvin, 1997). Largely due to a practical and economic need for the 
penitentiary, a series of policies that would eventually result in the complete demise of 
the reformatory took hold after the war. In 1919, State v. Heitman, a Kansas decision, 
“permitted separate sentencing policies for each sex” and legally recognized femininity 
as different from masculinity and in need of “special considerations” (Freedman, 1981, p. 
148). These special considerations included longer sentences for reform, separate 
institutions, and increased training in domestic homemaking (Freedman, 1981, p. 149). 
Historians note that this decision marked the beginning of the centralization of hundreds 
of women into one institution (Colvin, 1997; Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983; Sheldon, 
2008). The first federal prison for women, thus, emerged in 1927 (Colvin, 1997; 
Friedman, 1993):  
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The initial impetus for the federal institution came in the years immediately after 
WWI, when the number of women imprisoned for federal offenses more than 
doubled as a result of the Harrison Act (1914), which outlawed narcotics; the 
Volstead Act (1919), which implemented prohibition; and the Jones-Miller Act 
(1922), which made automobile theft a federal offense (Freedman, 1981, p. 145).  
These new punitive laws changed the composition of women in reformatories and 
created conditions of overcrowding and sub-par conditions. Reformatories were no 
longer utilized for their original purpose and no longer adequate to house the growing 
population of prisoners (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983). The 1930s saw the almost 
complete demise of reformatories (Freedman, 1981; Rafter, 1983).  
Contemporary Institutional Responses 
During the middle decades of the 20th century, attitudes regarding women’s 
criminality still focused on individual deficiencies but with renewed interest in 
rehabilitation and treatment. Due to the focus on treatment and the availability of social 
services, the female “criminal” population was relatively stable during this time. Hostile 
attitudes and stereotypes remained and “treatments” were questionable. The 1950s 
brought with it a rise in psychiatric commitments for “deviancy” in which electroshock, 
psychotropic and experimental drugs, and lobotomies were all common (Chesney-Lind, 
2002; Colvin, 1997; Sheldon, 2008). Out of these practices grew many current models for 
“treatment” of criminalized women today that emphasize the role of choice in their 
decision-making processes. Some refer to current day psychological interventions as 
“thera-punitive” (Pollack, 2008). 
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Psy-professions take hold. Feminists once again entered the dialogue concerning 
the criminalization of women in the 70s and 80s. By attending to life stories and 
narratives they began to see patterns of violence and victimization among women 
involved with the law. The larger social movement of the time, problematizing violence 
against women, allowed feminists to make links and draw attention to women’s 
victimization and their contact with the law (Chesney-Lind, 1997; Comack, 2006). 
Although limited by a tendency to construct women solely as victims, these attempts 
began to locate women’s “criminal” activity within a broader context and made claims 
that women’s “choices” are largely influenced by the conditions that shape their lives. 
The victimization discourse led the way to a general “pathways” approach to looking 
at/explaining crime. Proponents of a pathways approach critiqued the “add women and 
stir” approach to criminological and therapeutic interventions that had been dominant for 
much of the 20th century. Looking at pathways requires attending to difference. Many 
criminologists now recognize that women have different “pathways” into crime and 
subsequently different needs along the way.  
From the pathways approach emerged a focus on “gender sensitivity” and “gender 
responsive” programming for criminalized women, a trend that has gained a lot of 
traction in Canadian and U.S. treatment contexts. Gender responsive programming 
echoes the ideology of the reformatory and has been critiqued for its tendency to focus on 
the psychological effects of gender oppression. The gender-responsive focus is troubling 
because it strips gender of its social, political, and economic significance and relies on 
essentialized notions of “women” (Pollack, 2006). As with the pathways approach, 
gender responsiveness is limited because it does not address how and why certain 
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behaviors by certain people become constituted as crimes. The focus of gender 
responsivity remains on correcting individual flaws and managing risk, rather than 
ameliorating the social and economic underpinnings of crime. Furthermore, feminists 
have documented that the activities, expectations, and the implementation of gender 
responsive programming are premised heavily on stereotypical gendered and racialized 
notions of criminality and femininity (Goodkind & Miller, 2006; McKim, 2008).  
For instance, Goodkind and Miller’s (2006) study of an art therapy program for 
young women involved in the criminal justice system reveals how the program’s policies 
and practices reinforced gendered notions of appropriateness. While the young men in 
this residential facility engaged in other kinds of treatment and education programs, the 
art therapy was only for the females. The program also relied on traditionally feminized 
undertakings, such as crafting identity dolls, and centered activities on gendered themes, 
such as building self-esteem. When participants tried to exert agency and engage in 
activities that felt more meaningful to them, they were sanctioned for being inappropriate. 
Goodkind and Miller (2006) assert that “in this way, the art therapy program creates and 
enacts meanings of gender through determining what is, and what is not, appropriate” (p. 
57). Gender responsive programming echoes sentiments about femininity embedded in 
the reformatory movement. Like the reformatories, the program described by Goodkind 
and Miller was arranged so as to mold the young women into idealized versions of 
femininity with little reference to race and class.  
Much of the therapeutic programming for criminalized women in contemporary 
times is aimed at reducing substance use, alleviating mental health symptoms, and 
assuaging the negative impacts of trauma; all of which are assumed to lead to improved 
 73 
“functioning” and consequently decreased “criminal behavior.” Subsequently, outcomes 
for criminalized women in treatment programs are typically measured in terms of 
psychological indicators and recidivism rates, and progress in treatment is largely 
monitored in relation to a woman’s ability/willingness to internalize treatment discourses 
and thereby fulfill the function of self-governance.  
Pollack (2013) asserts that the current “truth regime” guiding what can be known 
within human services and correctional practice is rooted in evidence-based research and 
practice. For instance, cognitive and dialectical behavioral therapies (CBT/DBT) are 
advocated for strongly as “evidence-based” policy options for reducing crime (Drake, 
Aos & Miller, 2009; Tripodi, et. al., 2011). Similarly, risk assessments have become a 
dominant “evidence-based” tool in both criminal justice and human services. Both CBT 
and risk assessments (when used to identify appropriate interventions) have been found 
effective in reducing recidivism, particularly with female offenders (Andrews & Dowden, 
2006). However, feminist scholars (Goodkind & Miller, 2006; Maidment, 2002; Pollack, 
2004) dispute and trouble the claims regarding the “effectiveness” of such practices for a 
number of reasons. 
First, dependence on recidivism rates, as a measure of success, neglects other 
possible and preferable outcomes, such as gainful employment, safe housing, and 
reunification with children, to name but a few. Further, reliance on recidivism rates as a 
measure of success ignores the reality that despite not “reoffending,” many women who 
have been criminalized continue to live in conditions of abject poverty and social 
exclusion (Kendall, 2004).  
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Second, as Shaw and Hannah-Moffat (2004) argue, the current use of risk/needs 
assessments has “resulted in the reconceptualization of needs and certain social structural 
barriers as risk factors” (p. 94). Thus, women in crisis are judged as “risky” rather than as 
vulnerable or in need. In order to manage the “risky,” punitive strategies are deployed, 
funneling women deeper into the criminal justice system.  
Last, individualizing treatment discourses pathologizes individual women’s 
choices while neglecting the structural factors that lead to crime and criminalization. As 
discussed previously, factors such as poverty and violence play a large role in the nature 
and extent of women’s involvement in crime. Therefore, such factors need to be 
addressed in order to provide women with a meaningful range of life choices that could 
potentially lead to a reduction in crime and recidivism rates. As Kendall (2004) states, 
when criminalization is seen as a structural problem, reliance on “what works” is “weak 
and problematic” (p. 77). This is because “what works” is typically rooted in “what 
works” for individual psychological change, not what works to provide more 
social/economic opportunity and mobility.  
Conclusion 
Current trends in the confinement and rehabilitation of women have developed 
out of a long history of shifting discourses related to crime and feminine morality. 
Although the past forty years have marked a stark increase in the criminalization of 
women in the United States, many feminist criminologists point out that, with the 
exception of drugs, the nature of women’s “crime” has not changed (Chesney-Lind, 
2006; Comack, 2006; Jacobsen, 2008). Women are still criminalized primarily for non-
violent crimes and crimes of poverty. What has changed is neoliberalism’s intersection 
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with criminalization through the increased evisceration of a social safety net, the 
increased use of punitive responses to deal with the social problems, which have been 
exacerbated by the erosion of social welfare9, and the ways in which social 
control/regulatory practices operate across institutions to punish/regulate women.  
Historically, the female offender has been judged primarily as an “inappropriate” 
woman. Concepts of “appropriate” female behavior have been and are now known to 
construct definitions of female criminality. Societal responses to female “criminality” are 
largely based on gender norms, and a look at history illustrates that traditional roles and 
gender norms are not natural or innate, do not apply to all women, and emerged from the 
changes in economic production of the 18th century. Bosworth (2000) suggests that 
historically and currently, the incarceration of women has been central to more 
generalized strategies of social control. She states: 
Ideas of gender are apparent in the reasons used to justify the confinement of 
many women, and in the tasks given to them during their incarceration. Both the 
early modern and the modern periods undertook to control and punish particular 
types of women though incarceration. Unwanted wives, pregnant or sexually 
active girls, prostitutes, thieves and others, were punished by confinement from 
the 17th century on. Given the types of women incarcerated, it seems that the 
prison was used to control gender as often as it was used to control crime (p. 277). 
																																								 																				
9 For instance, women are increasingly arrested when calling the police for help in domestic violence 
situations (Neve & Pate, 2005; Jacobsen, 2008). Zero tolerance policies and domestic violence mandatory 
arrest policies that have emerged within the last 25 years with the passage of the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA) fail to consider the construction of women’s violence. Thus, women are often criminalized 
“because of their efforts to resist victimization” (Ogle & Batton, 2009, p. 162).  
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Although the concept of true womanhood has been largely discarded, the gender 
norms established and certain laws based on them10 remain with us today. “True 
womanhood” is an ideology that has served to criminalize women and blame them for 
larger social problems (Abramovitz, 1997). As Zedner (1991) remarks, “moral concepts 
of ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ women underpin modern analysis” (p. 309). Female deviance 
continues to be explained in terms of gendered stereotypes that are grounded in outdated 
and racialized understandings of women’s “true” nature. This holds true beyond simply 
explaining and regulating “deviance.” Moral concepts and essentialized notions of gender 
also underpin a broad range of social control mechanisms that play out in everyday and 
interpersonal interactions to shape the experience of women. History also reveals how 
criminality is defined largely based on the norms and political/economic context of the 
time. The preceding historical review gives stark examples of how “new” crimes are 
increasingly legislated into existence and, thus, reveals the social construction of crime. 
Still, few contemporary interventions call into question the problematic category of 
“crime” and, thus, they seek to intervene on the level of what to do about “crime” as 
opposed to what to do about policies that create crime. 
A look at the nature and extent of women’s involvement in “crime” begins to 
paint a picture of how gender, race, and class inequalities shape who is likely to be 
criminalized. This is important because it allows us to better locate criminalization within 
the context of systemic inequality, which is a major force contributing to women’s 
																																								 																				
10 Examples include public order offenses such as anti-prostitution laws that criminalize behavior that 
defies conventional social norms. However, the maintenance of social/public order is not relegated solely to 
the criminal justice system, and transcarceral control mechanisms are regularly deployed for such offenses 
in order to manage behavior and people that are deemed a threat to social stability.   
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involvement in illegal behavior. However, mainstream attempts at explaining and dealing 
with women’s “criminality” neglect attention to such contexts and rely primarily on the 
individualizing discourses of the “psy” professions (Pollack, 2008).  
Indeed, much of the literature regarding interventions and institutional responses 
related to criminalized women is rooted in an individualistic, often pathologizing, 
analysis of women who are involved with the criminal justice system. Subsequently, 
many dominant interventions involving criminalized women are aimed solely at changing 
women’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors, thereby locating the problem within the 
individual woman. McCorkel (2004) argues that such interventions form the basis for 
therapeutic governance in that they systematically attempt to create citizens who can 
police themselves so that the authorities do not have to. Because systems of governance 
function through discourse, it is important to consider the discourses that shape social 
work’s understanding of criminalized women. Therefore, the next chapter presents 
Critical Discourse Analysis Methodology and the research design. It will illustrate my 
understanding of the heavy conceptual nature of Critical Discourse Analysis and will link 










Chapter 4: Research Design 
This chapter discusses Critical Discourse Analysis methodology (CDA) and the 
research design. My study is grounded in a feminist post-structural epistemology, thereby 
merging both critical and post-structural understanding of power and knowledge. Staller 
(2013) explains that a researcher’s choice of methods makes sense only when firmly 
anchored in their understanding of what constitutes reality (ontology) and how they 
believe we can come to know that reality (epistemology), thus presenting an overarching 
philosophical positioning for the research, or methodology. In other words, it is necessary 
to discuss the theoretical considerations that serve as the basis for the development of 
methods. Accordingly, this chapter presents the methodology of the research and is 
divided into three primary sections: (1) ontology and epistemology; (2) Critical Discourse 
Analysis methodology; and (3) methods and analysis.  
Ontology and Epistemology 
To illustrate the ontological foundations grounding this research, I borrow the 
words of Susan Strega (2005): “Reality is about the meaning that people create in the 
course of their social interactions; the world is not about facts but about the meaning 
attached to facts, and people negotiate and create meaning” (p. 206). Though CDA does 
not present a unifying theoretical framework, it does have fundamental ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Ontology raises questions about the nature of reality, the 
nature of human beings in the world, and what constitutes truth. To begin, discourse is 
seen not only as a part of reality, but also as what constitutes it. Reality is seen as 
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subjective and contextual, changing in time and place. Truth and knowledge are not seen 
as existing outside the discontinuity of historical processes.  
Social reality (practices, labels, knowledge) then exists only in a discursive sense: 
it exists and means something only because we attach meaning to it. As Potts and Brown 
(2005) say, “truth does not exist, it is made. Therefore, we are not looking for a ‘truth’; 
we are looking for meaning, for understanding, for the power to change.” (p. 261). 
Knowledge is tentative at best.  
Epistemology is concerned with how we know what we know. Susan Strega 
(2005) makes the case that “the epistemological foundation of methodology prescribes 
what good research involves, justifies why research is done, gives a value base to 
research, and provides ethical principles for conducting research” (p. 211). Thus, all vital 
aspects of a research endeavor are forged from epistemological assumptions and 
commitments (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). My epistemological allegiances in this project 
rest in both feminisms and post-structuralism. 
The theoretical foundations of feminist post-structuralism are transdisciplinary in 
origin and have relevant application to social work research and practice (Strega, 2005). 
Post-structuralism, as an umbrella theoretical perspective, has a variety of definitions and 
is informed by the work of many scholars. There exist a range of applications for post-
structural analyses, from apolitical deconstructions to the examination of the discursive 
dimensions of power and inequality. A common element of post-structural analysis is 
language (Meyer & Wodak, 2009). Language, in post-structuralism, is the place where 
reality is created and also the place where reality may be deconstructed and challenged. 
The deconstructive strategies associated with post-structuralism are helpful in naming 
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power relations and debunking the taken-for-granted assumptions of dominant 
discourses. Foucault, for instance, explored discourses in order to unsettle disciplines and 
disciplinary knowledge and practices. In doing so he exposed the historical and 
discursive processes through which things come to be seen as normal and natural. 
Through such exploration, aspects of social life, which are typically seen as stable and 
enduring (that which is taken to be “truth”), can be disrupted. 
Whereas post-structuralism may not necessarily be political, feminist 
epistemologies are explicitly political and have a specific agenda toward social change 
(Fonow & Cook, 2005; Gringeri, Wahab, & Anderson-Nathe, 2010; Olesen, 2005). Post-
structural understandings of power as diffuse and discursive can complement and deepen 
feminist critiques of structural power and dominance. A feminist, post-structural 
epistemology therefore can be seen as “a mode of knowledge production which uses 
post-structuralist theories of language, subjectivity, social processes and institutions to 
understand existing power relations and to identify areas and strategies for change” 
(Weedon, 1997, p. 40-41). In other words, feminist post-structuralism provides a lens 
through which to problematize the taken-for-granted truths embedded in social work 
academic journals and the constructions of criminalized women within their pages. 
Additionally, in line with a feminist post-structural epistemology, CDA requires 
researchers to examine their own values, social locations, and subjectivities and to make 
those visible in the research (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). I embrace subjectivity and do not 
strive for a bias free analysis (which I think is impossible) but rather a more “critical 
subjectivity” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) which aligns well with CDA as the researcher is 
required to bring their own knowledge and context to bear in analysis.  
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These ontological and epistemological commitments are central to CDA for three 
reasons: (1) Notions of absolute truth and a quest for objectivity are irrelevant in any 
CDA research endeavor. With roots in both discourse theory and critical theory, CDA 
starts from the assumption that reality is socially constructed and changing; at the same 
time the impact of material conditions and how they shape people’s lives is 
acknowledged. Therefore, while accepting subjectivity, issues concerning oppression, 
power, and social inequality are always central to any CDA endeavor (Fairclough et al., 
2013). (2) The interpretation of texts stems from the theoretical assumption that social 
practices are discursive. In other words, discourse shapes the way people understand their 
experiences and the way they act in the world. This is important to keep in mind when 
considering question three11 of my research because much of the interpretative work 
toward highlighting implications stems from the assertion that discourse is both socially 
constitutive and socially conditioned12 (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). It is also important to 
note that the researcher, who is constructed and shaped by discourses, does the 
interpretation of texts. Thus, interpretation is open to constant interrogation, as it does not 
sit outside the influence of discourse. (3) Unlike objectivist epistemologies, CDA does 
not require the researcher to erase herself from the process. Rather, CDA requires that 
researchers make their own positions and interests explicit and visible. Further, the 
																																								 																				
11 Q3: What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social work practice and 
research with criminalized women? 
 
12 It is constitutive in the sense that it constitutes (shapes or gives meaning to) people, situations, objects of 
knowledge, social identities and relationships, etc. 
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theoretical assumptions CDA is premised on hold true for the research process as well13. 
Since it is theoretically understood that discourses are historical, discourses must then be 
analyzed with reference to context in order to be fully understood. Therefore, the 
historical and contextual knowledge I bring to bear regarding criminalized women and 
social work shaped the lens through which I approached analysis and served as an 
important analytic tool.  
Critical Discourse Analysis Methodology 
CDA has its roots in the humanities and was born out of a critique of 
Enlightenment epistemologies (Wodak, 2013). Within the literature there is much 
diversity regarding what constitutes the core aspects of CDA. Depending on conceptual 
and theoretical framework utilized, CDA can mean very different things. Here I outline 
how I conceptualize CDA within the framework of this research and elucidate some key 
concepts and the ways I draw on them in this study.  
Unlike more traditional discourse analyses established in linguistics, CDA is not 
exclusively concerned with the minutiae of linguistic units or the structure of grammar, 
but rather with the construction of larger social phenomena. CDA has been described as 
the study of language as a social practice with an intention toward social critique and 
social change (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDA starts from the assumption that reality is 
socially constructed through discourse. Concepts of discourse, power, and knowledge are 
central to CDA.  
																																								 																				
13 The research process is recognized as a discursive social practice in and of itself; in other words, the 
process of interpretation and analysis are also subject to the rules of discourse.	
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Discourse. Foucault used the concept of an episteme to refer to the structure of 
knowing that dominates and governs a certain period of time. An episteme differs from a 
thinker, theory, or concept because it is not isolated to one person, genre, or discipline. 
Rather, it cuts across disciplines and refers to how we collectively comprise the world. In 
other words, it is spread through society and constitutes what is normative for a given 
time period. An episteme constrains what can be known and creates the rules of 
formation and exclusion in society. Epistemes are made up of and defined by discourses, 
or practices that shape reality. Foucault saw language as a primary vehicle through which 
knowledge gets embodied, shaping an episteme. He believed that meaning and reality 
cannot be separated from how we classify things and that the ideas and attitudes we hold 
are shaped by the larger episteme in which they are situated. 
For the purpose of this project, discourse is defined as “an institutionalized way of 
talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Link, 1983, as 
cited in Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 35). In other words, discourse refers to context specific 
frameworks of meaning-making that inform action and (re)create the limits of what can 
be known (Fairclough, 2009, p. 162). It is through discourse that we give the world 
meaning. Social practices constitute and are constituted by discourse. Therefore, 
discourse itself is understood as a social practice. 
Discourse defines, allows, and limits what can be known, what can be done and 
said, and how people can behave. Discourses actually construct, not just reflect, reality 
(objects, people, and events). Therefore, discourse enables and constrains what can be 
known. Discourses are culturally and historically situated. Dominant discourses privilege 
certain subject positions and notions of social reality, and become “commonsense” 
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notions of the world. Dominant discourses become so taken for granted that we can’t see 
other ways of doing/thinking about things. Multiple dominant discourses of gender, race, 
crime, and poverty, to name a few, shape criminalized women. In turn, analyses that seek 
to unearth how/if these discourses are normalized, reinforced, or disrupted in social work 
are useful toward understanding how power relations play out within the field. 
Power and knowledge. Theorists from post-structural traditions have explored 
the power of discourse in creating social reality. They stress the ways in which language 
and thought are tied together, thereby producing knowledge of social reality that in turn 
shapes our thinking and being (Arrigo, 1997). The relationship between discourse and 
social life is therefore a dialectical one. As previously discussed, discourses do not just 
reflect reality but also actively create it. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by 
subjects, social practices, and institutions. It is through discourse that meaning is applied 
to material and social reality. Therefore, written and spoken language can be seen as an 
act of meaning-making which contributes to “reproducing and/or transforming society 
and culture, including power relations” (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 370). This highlights 
the way language, knowledge, and power are intertwined. Therein lies the power of texts 
to shape reality and reproduce or disrupt the reproduction of power and inequality. As 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997) state: 
Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it constitutes 
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships 
between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it 
helps sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to 
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transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to 
important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological 
effects—that is they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations 
between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural 
majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and 
position people (as quoted in Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 6). 
Further, discourses are also entangled with institutional practices. For instance, becoming 
“the client” in a social work discourse means that one becomes an object of interest to 
social workers and may thus be identified and formed in the process of intervention as 
part of the practice of social work. In this sense, there are subject positions that are 
created out of these institutional practices, for both the worker and the client.  
Subject positions. Discourse brings with it particular understandings which 
construct subjects. Therefore, in a Foucauldian sense, discourse defines and creates 
subjectivities. Subjects are then positioned in society in relation to these understandings 
and definitions. We position ourselves and come to understand ourselves within 
discourses. Through discourse we create our sense of ourselves as well as our sense of the 
“other.” This is important because how subjects and problems are seen and defined 
shapes how they are interacted with in the world.  
Under a CDA framework, discourse is explicitly related to power in a number of 
ways. First, the context of discourse (i.e. education, media, politics) can be a power 
resource. Second, discourse has the power to influence and shape people’s minds. 
Further, it is believed that cognition and social representations influence action and 
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behavior. Thus, discourse indirectly forms our actions and behavior through knowledge. 
Knowledge is therefore power because of its discursive effects. In other words, 
knowledge is power because it directly shapes behavior and action. Thus, the discursive 
nature of reality is typically seen as a starting assumption for studying social phenomena. 
Finally, those with access and control over the most contextually influential discourse 
will have the most power in terms of influencing the thoughts and actions of others. 
There are different ways to represent criminalized women. According to discourse theory 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2009), those representations will shape how other people think of and 
interact with them. This includes social workers and their subsequent practice and 
research with criminalized women.  
Methods and Analysis 
This study draws on the framework proposed by Jäger and Maier (2009) for 
performing a Foucauldian inspired CDA. I emphasize inspired because although this 
approach draws on aspects of how Foucault conceptualized discourse and the workings of 
power (as outlined above), it is not in the strictest sense a Foucauldian discourse analysis 
(such as an in depth genealogy or archaeology of knowledge). Jäger and Maier’s (2009) 
framework builds on the work of Jurgen Link (1982) and focuses on: 
• Analysis of current discourses and their power effects; 
• Uncovering collective symbolism (which has, of course, been guided by 
discourses themselves); and 
• The function of discourse in legitimizing and securing dominance. 
 87 
I found this framework useful for my project as it draws on the theoretical 
propositions discussed thus far concerning discourse, power, and knowledge and offers a 
concrete platform for attending to their linguistic expressions (i.e. metaphors, references, 
symbolism, style, presuppositions, implied meaning, argumentation strategies). Further, it 
provided a practical structure and procedure to engage in complex theoretical analysis. 
Structure of discourse. To begin the discussion of specific methods and analysis, 
Jäger and Maier (2009) offer a useful breakdown of the structure of discourse, which 
makes it amenable to analysis. In this section, I describe this structure and characterize 
each aspect in relation to the study. I then provide a more in-depth discussion offering 
justification for the chosen study material.  
Special discourse and interdiscourse. Jäger and Maier (2009) differentiate 
between “special discourses” and “inter-discourse” whereas special discourses refer to 
discourses situated in the sciences that feed continuously into inter-discourse, which 
constitutes non-scientific discourses. From this position, social work as an academic field 
firmly rooted in the social sciences (at least in a North American context) would be 
considered a special discourse.  
Discourse strands and discourse fragments. Simply stated, discourse strands are 
streams of discourse centered on a shared topic. Discourse strands can be thought of as 
the concrete manifestation of the more abstract concept of discourse. Jäger and Maier 
(2009) describe them as “performances located on the surface of texts” (p. 46). Put more 
simply, discourse strands can be thought of as general themes that one is exploring—for 
instance, criminalization. Discourse strands have diachronic (concerning elements 
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through time and history) and synchronic (concerning a particular point in time) aspects. 
A synchronic analysis examines that which is said and sayable in any given moment. In 
order to analyze texts that represent the current socio-political and economic context, I 
conducted a synchronic analysis of the discourse strand of criminalized women in social 
work. Specifically, my analysis focused on articles that were published in the 21st 
century14. Furthermore, discourse strands are made up of multiple discourse fragments. 
Discourse fragments are texts, or parts of texts, that form a discourse strand. In my 
analysis, specific journal articles, or parts of articles, that deal with the topic of 
criminalized women constituted the discourse fragments.  
Discourse planes and discourse sectors. Discourse planes are the “social 
locations from which speaking takes place” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 48). This study 
investigated how the discourse strand of criminalized women operates on/in the discourse 
plane of social work. Discourse planes do not operate in isolation; they influence and are 
influenced by, interact with, and sometimes merge with other discourse planes. For 
instance, within the social work plane, I found that discourse fragments from the special 
discourses of psychology and criminal justice were often taken up to influence the 
discourse on criminalized women in social work.  
Discourse planes are composed of various discourse sectors. These sectors take up 
different angles and positions but, nonetheless, can be considered a major aspect of a 
discourse plane. For this project, I explored the discourse sector of the academic literature 
																																								 																				
14	Further justification of the chosen texts under examination is provided in the later discussion of my 
sample selection.  
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in the discourse plane of social work. Social work constitutes a unique discourse plane 
and the academic journals constitute an important sector therein. 
Sample: Academic literature and high impact social work journals. 
Fairclough (2009) defines texts as a “point of entry” into discourse analysis. According to 
Jäger and Maier (2009), it is necessary to provide justification for the chosen texts 
because from a Foucauldian perspective all texts have a discursive function. Therefore, it 
is essential to emphasize the explicit role and function of an analyst’s chosen texts. As 
previously stated, the primary data used for this project came from the discourse sector of 
academic journals within the discourse plane of social work.  
The importance of published academic literature in establishing professional 
discourse cannot be overstated. Indeed, journals serve as an authority guiding research, 
education, and practice (Barretti, 2015; Lindsey & Kirk, 1992; Tsang, 2001). Thus, the 
discursive (re)constitution of subjects within the published literature is worthy of 
investigation because as Weiler (2006) states, “this is where power is exercised” (p.18). 
Therefore, I see the social work academic literature as an important site of engagement 
for this project.  
A scholar’s work is legitimized through the publication process and thus endowed 
with a level of “specialness” and authority; this gives published literature an undeniably 
influential position in the process of knowledge production. Indeed, the context of such 
authority and its persuasive power to shape mental representations and social practices is 
at the theoretical core of CDA, as it represents how discourse is involved in dominance 
(van Dijk, 2001). The published academic literature in social work not only drives the 
research agenda but also shapes policy and interventions in the field. Additionally, the 
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published academic literature is used as primary learning material in academia, which 
then influences conceptualizations practitioners bring with them into the field. As Tsang 
(2001) states, the selection of academic literature, though “obviously not representative 
of the totality of the social work discourse, can be taken as reflective of some of its major 
structures” (p. 232). 
Van Dijk (2001) underlines the relevance of “mind control” within a CDA 
framework. Critical Discourse Analysis rests on the assumption that discourse influences 
mental models and societal representations. Discursive influence is formed by the context 
as well as the structure and form of texts. For instance, people may be persuaded and 
influenced by argumentation (structure) in and of itself, but are more likely to be 
influenced by argumentation from sources they see as authoritative or credible, such as 
experts, professionals, and doctors (context). Van Dijk (2001) further highlights the 
powerful influence of academic contexts in the formation and shaping of mental models. 
Therefore, I see social work journals as an important context for exerting influence on the 
mental models of social workers and thus their research and practice behavior.  
It is well accepted that the purpose of scientific inquiry/knowledge production in 
social work is to shape policy and practice in the field (Marsh & Reed, 2016). Thus, 
journal articles are frequently the subject of research in social work. Humble et al. (2012) 
examined the framing of HIV/AIDS in social work journals to ascertain how/if the 
changing knowledge in the field of HIV/AIDS was reflected in the knowledge base of the 
profession. Hardy (2013) assessed social work journals for their coverage of the Black 
Church and African American Christianity. Tsang (2001) explored the role of social work 
journals in constructing ethnicity. All these studies started from the assumption that 
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social work journals are an important and credible source of knowledge within the 
profession and serve a crucial role in shaping the thinking and behavior of practitioners. 
Therefore, the knowledge contained in journals may be representative of some of the 
larger trends in social work. 
Academic journals contain both conceptual and instrumental knowledge. 
Conceptual knowledge shapes the ways problems are considered, solutions/interventions 
are formulated, and understandings of professional context emerge. Instrumental 
knowledge is related to interventions and effectiveness. Despite social work’s increasing 
emphasis on instrumental knowledge, particularly in the form of evidence-based practice 
and competence-based education, a study conducted by Cha, Kuo, and Marsh (2006) 
found that practitioners reported both conceptual and instrumental knowledge as being 
equally useful in helping them make practice decisions. Therefore, both are included in 
my analysis.  
Academic journals serve a primary role in the formation of disciplines and 
professions (Tsang, 2001); they both shape and reflect values, knowledge, and priorities. 
Editors and their selected reviewers serve a gatekeeping function in defining the 
boundaries of knowledge production of a given discipline/profession15. Though social 
workers obviously write in and draw from other (inter)disciplinary sources, it is also 
important to examine disciplinary boundaries themselves for what they signify. There 
may be distinct differences in what is reviewed and accepted in social work journals 
																																								 																				
15 Though I recognize that social work’s status as a discipline and/or profession is and has been debated due 
to its lack of a distinct and specialized body of knowledge, engagement with that debate is outside the 
scope of this dissertation. Despite where one comes down in relation to this debate, it may be amenable to 
both sides to say that social work is a field with discursive limits.  
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versus what is reviewed and accepted in, for example, criminology journals, sociology 
journals, or counseling journals; despite coverage of similar topics, the discourses 
represented may vary. Though there may be shared elements, each discipline/profession 
has its own language, culture, value base, and general orientation to the social world, and 
their journals can be seen as representative of the major elements of a field’s internal 
form and coherence. Therefore, an explicitly social work distinction in my selection of 
journals for this research is important because I am interested in the distinct discourse of 
social work. 
For instance, a dominant theme in the criminological literature is “criminogenic 
need,” which focuses on identifying risk factors for recidivism and tailoring intervention 
programs to address those risks (Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2005). The language of 
“criminogenic need,” though not entirely disregarded by social work, is deficit-based and 
largely neglectful of context with a focus on changing individual behavior. Though 
similar risk frameworks are certainly adopted by social work, one would expect that the 
profession’s values around humanitarianism, strengths-based practice, self-determination, 
and social justice largely impel social work scholars to speak in a different (specific) 
way. Still, despite embracing these values, dominant cultural narratives are likely to seep 
into the work that social work performs. As Tsang (2001) states, “the profession is not 
totally immune to the influences of the dominant discourses of society” (p. 229). For 
example, in a Critical Discourse Analysis regarding social work’s role in immigration, 
Park and Kemp (2006) show that social work discourse supports dominant ideology 
surrounding immigration while simultaneously attempting to redress the consequences of 
such ideology and discourses. This has profound consequences for how we work with 
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people who inhabit liminal spaces, such as women on community supervision who dwell 
in a world between “free” and “not free.” 
Further, though critical analyses of the construction of criminalized women have 
been done in relation to criminological and penal literature, I am unaware of any in depth 
explorations as to how criminalized women are constructed in the social work literature. 
Indeed, compared to the larger body of work coming out of criminology, law, and 
psychology, social work appears to pay scant attention to criminalized women (Wheeler 
& McClain, 2015).  
I selected social work high impact journals (journals that are read and cited more 
frequently) because they represent an array of political and professional priorities and 
may possibly provide a spectrum of representations within the field. Additionally, the 
high citation rates of these journals illustrate their conferred legitimacy and acceptance as 
a source of information and knowledge within social work (Jäger & Maier, 2009). 
Though imperfect, high impact journals have been recognized as serving an influential 
role in disseminating information and, over time, shaping practice behavior (Lindsey & 
Kirk, 1992; Marsh & Reed, 2015). Though many practitioners do not have easy access to 
these journals, I argue that the ideas and ways of thinking embedded in “high impact” 
research filter to practice both indirectly, through students who eventually become 
practitioners, and directly, through funding agencies which allot funding for “evidence-
based practices” that are often tested and legitimized through academic scholarship. 
Though high impact journals represent only one tendril of academic scholarship, 
neoliberal forces and values influence researchers and organizations in such a way so as 
to elevate and hold high impact journals to a greater esteem.  
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Further, high impact journals impart legitimacy and authority to social work 
researchers and scholars often regarded as “experts.” In this, I believe high impact 
journals can provide an understanding of the kind of scholarship that shapes social work 
discourse and vice versa. Still, I want to be clear that my choice of using high impact 
journals as my sample is not linked with assumptions regarding the quality of a journal or 
publication. Rather, it is linked to an assumption of influence. 
Limitations of high impact journals. Despite the practical and theoretical reasons 
for using a sample consisting of high impact journals, it is worth noting some inherent 
limitations with this approach. Flaws and biases within citation indexing databases have 
been widely recognized (Bornmann et al., 2012; Kurmis, 2003). A range of factors other 
than quality or actual influence can influence impact scores, including ease of journal 
access, publication frequency, and type of material published by a journal. Impact scores 
for a journal are generally calculated by dividing the number of times articles published 
in a two-year period were cited by the total number of “citable” articles16. Therefore, only 
a small proportion of its articles may influence the impact factor of a journal. 
Furthermore, a large percentage of published articles never get cited, which could 
exclude articles from my sample that may be representative but not widely known.  
Additionally, citation-indexing systems do not include all journals in any given 
field (regardless of number of times their articles have been cited) and the criteria for 
inclusion remains unclear. This can present problems when assuming influence. For 
																																								 																				
16 Not all items published in journals (such as editorial and news articles) get factored into the impact 
factor. 
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instance, it has been noted that publications not included in the Scientific Citation Index 
Database sometimes have more citations than those that are included (Kurmis, 2003).  
Lastly, authors who are cited frequently are more likely to be known in a field and 
to publish work that is easily recognizable and sought after by other scholars. Therefore, 
the use of the impact factor in this research may have contributed to encountering the 
same authors and types of work again and again, which is more representative of 
institutionally reinforced popularity rather than the discourse of the field at large. In this 
sense, the use of high impact journals may have potentially made my sample more 
homogenous than desired. However, given that I drew my sample from a range of the 
listed high impact journals, rather than just the top five or ten, I found a good amount of 
variability within the sample.   
Sample selection. I identified high impact social work journals using Eigenfactor. 
Eigenfactor is a project established through the University of Washington which 
evaluates the importance of scholarly journals and provides a searchable database of the 
most influential journals by ISI subject category17. Though Eigenfactor scores are 
calculated a bit differently than the more well-known ISI Impact Factor, Eigenfactor is 
freely available and is considered a good proxy for the Impact Factor (Davis, 2008). The 
journal citation data for Eigenfactor comes from the Journal Citation Reports (which is 
the proprietary database for ISI Impact Factors). Therefore, all of the journals that appear 
in Eigenfactor are also listed in Journal Citation Reports. Eigenfactor uses a five-year 
																																								 																				
17 Institute for Scientific Information subject categories are generally interpreted as providing a disciplinary 
structure of science.  
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citation average rather than the two-year period for ISI Impact Factors18. Eigenfactor also 
provides a weighted citation count, which takes into account the size of the journal, rather 
than just a raw citation count as provided by the ISI Impact Factor.  
Eigenfactor helped me identify high impact journals that are categorized under the 
“social work” ISI subject category. However, not all of them were explicitly social work 
journals, so I did some elimination. Eigenfactor generated an initial list (latest calculation 
from 2015) of 41 journals. I excluded those that were not in English (2) and those that 
would not be expected to have articles of relevance to the North American context19. Of 
the remaining 37 journals, 13 were researched further to ensure that they were explicitly 
social work identified. I eliminated multi-disciplinary/interdisciplinary journals, unless 
their editorial board was made up of social workers, which resulted in the exclusion of 12 
more journals, for a remaining total of 25 social work journals. Appendix A shows the 
remaining 25 journals from which the sample was drawn. 
I utilized the list of journals generated by Eigenfactor and searched the Web of 
Science with topic/keywords AND [journal title] as publication name. I did separate 
searches for each journal in order to keep things organized. Key words included: 
criminal/ criminalization/ criminality/ prison/ incarceration/ criminal justice/ corrections/ 
reentry/ diversion/ offender / offense/ re-offense/ recidivism/ parole/ probation AND 
women/ woman/ female/ mother AND date range [2000-2017]. The above key words are 
those that are commonly found in the literature regarding women involved in the criminal 
																																								 																				
18 Calculating averages over longer periods of time results in less variability and provides more of an 
enduring sense of the journal’s influence. 
 
19 Though research could certainly look at the discourse generated in a larger global social work context, 
my project is explicitly framed within a U.S socio-political context. Therefore, I include articles only of 
relevance to or generated in relation to such a context.	
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justice system and include women who may be currently and formerly incarcerated. 
Furthermore, because children of incarcerated parents are a growing topic of interest to 
social workers, mother/motherhood was included in addition to women/woman/female as 
keywords in the sample.  
Only articles dealing explicitly with criminalized women were selected. To 
account for the diversity and difference among women necessitated by both multiracial 
feminism and post-structuralism, “woman” was defined broadly and included trans 
women. Initial selection was made mainly on the basis of abstracts; I scanned abstracts to 
ensure that a primary focus in the article included criminalized women (using the key 
words offered above). Searching journal articles through key words also allowed me to 
see and look for discursive entanglements with other discourse strands.  
In order to conduct a synchronic analysis of texts that represent the current socio-
political and economic context, my sample was comprised of articles that were published 
in the 21st century. This time frame provided a lens through which to view the long-range 
impacts of punitive sentencing policies that emerged in the latter part of the 20th century 
and early part of the 21st century. As I previously discussed, such policies have caused an 
increase in criminalization and incarceration, and the effects are reverberating today. 
Further, because the topic of criminalized women is not always treated extensively, it 
made sense to evaluate journal articles from this longer period of time in order to ensure 
that the qualitative nature and variety of the discourse strand became apparent. 
My initial search revealed 273 citations. Next, I reviewed article titles to eliminate 
those that clearly did not fit within the inclusion criteria of the study. Such eliminations 
included articles focused on issues such as juvenile justice, foster care, women as victims 
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of crime, and other completely unrelated topics. Next, I reviewed abstracts and looked 
more closely (reviewing full texts when necessary) at articles focused on children of 
incarcerated parents, domestic violence, child abuse, and those about criminal justice but 
ambiguous about a gender focus to ensure that they fit parameters for the study. Applying 
exclusion criteria (e.g. outside of a U.S. context, book reviews, criminalized women not 
an explicit focus) resulted in 51 citations. I retrieved the full text for each of these 
citations. During the course of my initial read through of all the articles, two additional 
articles were removed from the sample because the focus was not ultimately on 
criminalized women. My final sample consisted of 49 articles from 12 journals, which I 
think is telling in and of itself; in almost two decades of scholarship in the context of 
mass incarceration, with women being the fastest growing correctional population, only 
49 articles on this issue come out of the profession’s quote un-quote most influential 
journals. Appendix B provides a list of the articles included in the dataset. It is also 
notable that of the 25 journals I searched, my final sample came from only half (n=12) of 
the original list. The other half did not contain articles meeting inclusion criteria from the 
specified time period. Appendix C provides a breakdown of the number of articles per 
journal included in the dataset. 
Analysis process. A synchronic analysis investigates what is sayable20 within any 
given context at a certain point in time. In other words, it identifies the current state of a 
particular discourse and the knowledge embedded therein. This study drew on an analysis 
plan offered by Jäger and Maier (2009). Analysis occurred on two levels consisting of 1) 
																																								 																				
20 Different from what is said in that what is sayable refers to what is even possible to say or think within a 
given context. 
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a structural analysis on the discourse strand; and 2) a detailed analysis on smaller text 
units. These two levels of analysis led to an overall synoptic analysis, or final assessment 
of the overall state of the discourse on criminalized women in social work. According to 
Jäger and Maier (2009), the researcher can expect to go through several cycles of analysis 
in order to discover connections and to develop and strengthen interpretations. As such, 
the articles in my sample were subjected to repeated analysis involving iterative 
“coding"21 utilizing Jäger and Maier’s analytical guidelines described below. Ultimately, 
CDA requires a particular orientation when engaging with texts; for me, this meant that I 
was consistently looking at how meaning was constructed in the texts, questioning what 
was implied through the texts as well as what was missing or left out (Jäger & Maier, 
2009; Wood & Kroger, 2000). Janks (1997) explains that CDA necessitates that analysts 
deliberately partake in an “estranged reader” position; that is, “reading against a text” in 
order to resist its “apparent naturalness” (p. 331). However, Janks warns that 
“estrangement without engagement is a refusal to leave the confines of one’s own 
subjectivity, a refusal to allow otherness to enter” (p. 331). Therefore, it is important to 
also “read with a text” in order to decipher the intended meanings and dominant readings 
																																								 																				
21 In CDA, traditional notions of ‘coding’ are not typically used. Rather, there is a close focus on how 
meaning is constructed in texts, which requires analysts to make sense of the function of various textual 
features. For instance, the discourse analyst may focus on lexical choices and the ways such choices mark 
particular assumptions or imply particular meanings. At times, I attempted to employ traditional coding 
strategies for ease of organization and extracting examples from the data. However, this proved challenging 
because coding in this manner pulled the data out of its larger context and thus interfered with interpreting 
its meaning. Instead, I annotated as I read, grouped articles according to particular discursive themes and 
patterns that emerged in the structural analysis, and worked with data analysis templates. When it came 
time to isolate examples during the writing process, I would then revisit a text in its entirety, along with its 
annotations and completed data analysis templates. This required me to think and re-think, analyze and re-
analyze as I wrote. In this way, writing became an integral part of the inquiry process.  
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of a text. For this reason, I considered the idealized reader perspective22 in my analysis. 
Huckin (1995) describes the idealized reader as one who is looking for the general picture 
of the text without trying to deconstruct it. An idealized reader framework considers the 
intended meanings of a text as well as aspects of the text that a “typical reader” would be 
likely to focus on. In relation to academic journal articles, the idealized reader might be a 
busy scholar, or perhaps student or practitioner, who reads for a gist or to support their 
own work; someone who may not have either the time to spend or the effort to exert on 
analyzing the text beyond skimming the title, abstract, introduction, and conclusions. As 
such, these aspects of the texts were given extra thought in my analysis due to the 
likelihood that many readers may be exposed only to them. The idealized reader 
perspective helped me consider the power of a text and its effect within the process of 
knowledge production and dissemination. I continued analysis until I reached 
“completeness” or saturation (Jäger & Maier, 2009). Completeness was identified when 
themes and interpretations began to repeat themselves.  
Structural analysis. The structural analysis included multiple readings which helped 
me identify broad discursive themes and specific pieces for detailed analysis (Wood & 
Kroger, 2000). In the structural analysis, I essentially searched for what was typical 
within the sample and identified discourse positions. Jäger and Maier (2009) contend that 
within any discourse plane or sector, dominant discourses as well as counter-discourses 
may emerge. This proved true and served as a launching point for understanding the 
discursive limits of the discourse strand.  
																																								 																				
22 Similar to Derrida’s analytic strategy of ‘double reading.’ 
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The structural analysis consisted of a broad overall analysis of the texts that made 
up the discourse strand and consisted of the following steps. First, I compiled a list of all 
relevant articles and their identifying characteristics. This included bibliographic 
information, information related to the journal, basic information on the authors, and 
general notes on what the articles covered. I began the structural analysis by reading all 
of the articles in alphabetical order. As I read, I annotated the articles and kept memos 
and notes in a reflexive audit trail. It soon became apparent that different authors and 
themes emerged from and coalesced in different journals. At this point, I created a 
detailed breakdown of articles per journal (see Appendix D). I then re-read all of the 
articles in a different order, this time based on journal. After this reading, I noted the 
major themes and trends coming from each journal.  
Next, I worked with Jäger and Maier’s (2009) outline for the structural analysis to 
capture the overall characteristics of each article. This included the topics and subtopics 
covered, use of collective symbols (cultural stereotypes or topoi), arguments that were 
made, vocabulary that was used, and attitudes that emerged. As I continued to read and 
re-read through the articles, I adapted this outline to capture other points of interest that 
emerged in the initial readings (these included reliance on risk, use of social justice 
values, binaries and contradictions, strategies for staying neutral, and textual silences) 
and created a structural analysis data template (See Appendix E). I then read through 
each article again, using the structural data analysis template. This process helped me 
identify what was typical in the sample (typical arguments, positions, vocabulary, etc.) 
and helped identify discourse fragments (i.e. articles and parts of articles) for detailed 
analysis.  
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Moving through the structural analysis also helped me to refine which aspects of 
grammar would be most fruitful to examine more in depth in the detailed analysis. For 
example, I began to notice that the vocabulary and word choice identified throughout an 
article would often reveal the overall discourse position or discursive pattern of an article. 
So later in the detailed analysis, taking a closer look at nouns, verbs, and adjectives 
helped shed light on the sort of logic the text implied and what judgments the text passed 
on certain groups. For instance, risk emerged as a defining feature of the discourse strand. 
However, there were distinct ways that risk was portrayed and framed through the use of 
language. The strongest framing of risk occurred through the use of criminogenic 
language, which invoked images of criminal women. Riskiness was also portrayed 
through the language of psychology. Observing this distinction led me to wonder if there 
was a distinct psychologized construction of risk that is more about the “fallen” or pitiful 
women in need of help and treatment, rather than the dangerous or criminal woman in 
need of containment and surveillance (Rafter, 1983). At first, I did not make a distinction 
between different invocations of risk. However, upon closer examination of the lexical 
choices I saw that, though both constructions (psychologized and criminogenic) imply 
individualized notions of choice and individualized understandings of crime and 
women’s involvement in the criminal justice system, they do so in different ways. The 
language of psychology focused on women’s individual psyches and called for treatment 
in order to promote healing, whereas the use of criminogenic language focused on 
neoliberal notions of responsibility and called for treatment in order to reduce risk and 
increase surveillance. This led to the creation of distinct categories for the construction of 
risk: the risky woman and the vulnerable woman/object of pity.  
 103 
In the structural analysis I also identified discursive entanglements. Texts often 
reference various topics and discourse strands. An analysis of discursive entanglements 
looks at how different discourse strands are entangled, in other words, the associations 
between different concepts. For instance, I found that the discourse of child welfare was 
often entangled with the discourse of criminal justice, the discourse of social services was 
often entangled with discourses of psychology, and the discourse of trauma was often 
entangled with the discourse of attachment. Locating discursive entanglements allowed 
me to further discover the discourse position within a given text. A discourse position is 
“the ideological position from which subjects, including individuals, groups, and 
institutions, participate in and evaluate discourse” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 49). 
Discourse positions are essentially overarching worldviews that are developed from being 
immersed in various discourse strands.   
Lastly, I summarized the topics and subtopics of the sample into groups. The 
frequency with which the subtopics appeared (those that were focused on more heavily 
and those that were marginal) was noted. Further, any subtopics/issues that were 
conspicuously absent were also noted. I kept memos to include descriptions of these 
groups, within-group trends, and the significance of each grouping within the context of 
the sample. This helped me further articulate discursive themes within the entire sample.  
Detailed analysis of typical discourse fragments. To further analyze discourse 
positions and their effects, discourse fragments that were typical or representative of a 
specific discourse position were subjected to detailed analysis. Analysis at this level 
involved establishing connections between language form, function, and context. In my 
analysis, specific journal articles (and parts of articles) that embodied key discursive 
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themes found in the structural analysis constituted the discourse fragments. Jäger and 
Maier (2009) organize the detailed analysis under the following headings: 
1. Context of Text. Analysis of the context considers aspects regarding the text 
production such as who wrote it, the journal it was published in, and under what 
conditions. The context in which a text is produced gives many clues to its status, 
legitimacy, and degree of power (Jäger & Maier, 2009). The surrounding socio-
political context within which the text is written and framed should also be 
considered in order to more fully understand what is said or left out of the text. 
Here, I consistently kept in mind the overarching place high impact journals hold 
in the enterprise of knowledge production. I also thought about how the larger 
socio-political context was reflected in, or left out of, the texts and how it 
informed the arguments being made.  
2. Surface of Text. An analysis of the surface of a text looks at what is actually 
present in the text. This includes the layout, graphs, how the text is organized into 
units of meaning, and the topics covered. Such factors frame the meaning of a text 
and are therefore considered in analysis. In terms of topics, I looked at the key 
themes that were communicated about a topic and the general statements that 
could be derived from these themes. In line with the expectations of the discourse 
sector of academic journal articles, the general structure of the articles in my 
sample was relatively stable, showing little variability in organization and layout. 
Therefore, what became fruitful for me in terms of examining the layout of these 
texts was considering the role that the tile, abstract, introduction, and conclusion 
had in the overall scheme of things. Given that these components of academic 
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journal articles are more prominent in terms of usage, I spent extra time analyzing 
them as specific sites of power. 
3. Rhetorical Means. Analysis of rhetorical means looks at the argumentation, 
collective symbolism, how subjects are constructed, use of lexical choices (choice 
of vocabulary), and other grammar features. Rhetoric, or rather how something is 
said, is important because it can signal certain value orientations and serves to 
shape the ideological implications and discourse positions present in a text. Here, 
I found that also looking at the use of evidentialities helped illuminate not only 
the overarching tone of an article, but also how the text would “naturalize” certain 
statements as common sense. I also spent time looking at intertextuality, or the 
references made to other sources, and the function and use that certain sources 
served in shaping the overall argument. 
4. Content and Ideological Statements. An analysis of content and ideological 
statements attends to the overall worldview portrayed by a text. Here, I looked at 
how the ideology was framed and justified in the texts. For instance, depoliticized 
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement were actively produced 
through a mode of reasoning that decontextualized representations of women’s 
behaviors and situations. Another key aspect of this analysis included what was 
excluded, or only implied in the text. 
5. Other peculiarities of the article and the overall discourse position and message.  
Jäger and Maier (2009) offer a detailed outline of specific questions to guide each 
aspect of the detailed analysis, which served as a useful heuristic device in my analysis 
(p. 55). As suggested by Jäger and Maier, I used their questions as “sensitizing concepts” 
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rather than constructs that were applied mechanically. I adapted their outline to 
conceptually align with my study, and with what I was learning in the structural phase of 
analysis. Table 1 shows the adapted version of Jäger and Maier’s framework for detailed 
analysis. Appendix F includes an illustration of both phases of analysis (structural and 
detailed) on the same article. Jäger and Maier (2009) highlight that meaning is always 
emergent and analysis will not always move directly from one level of analysis to the 
next. I found this to be true in my own process and sometimes found myself moving 
through detailed analysis while simultaneously engaged with structural analysis.  
 107 
Table 1. Jäger and Maier’s (2009) Adapted Framework for Detailed Analysis 
1. Context 
a. Why was the article selected for detailed analysis? Why is it typical? 
b. Who is the author? What is their position and status within social work? What is their 
area of expertise, and so on? 
c. In which section of the journal does the article appear? What kind of article is it? 
(empirical, conceptual?) Is the article a part of a special issue? 
d. What year was the article written? Any significance of time? 
e. What meaning does the text attribute to other sources? Does it imply knowledge of 
another subject matter? 
 
2. Surface of the Text 
a. What is emphasized in the title and abstract? Introduction/conclusion? 
b. What are the headings and subheadings? How is the article structured into units of 
meaning? 
c. What topics are touched upon in the article?  
d. How do the topics relate to each other and overlap? (discursive entanglements) 
 
3. Rhetorical Means23 
a. What kind and form of argumentation does the article follow? What argumentation 
strategy is used? What logic underlies the composition of the article? 
b. What implications and allusions does the article contain? 
c. What collective symbolism is used?  
d. What idioms, metaphors, sayings, and clichés are used? 
e. What are the vocabulary and style? (lexical choices, coded language, modality, 
evidentialities, binaries) 
f. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed?  
g. What references are made? (e.g. cultural references, references to other 
disciplines/professions, media or policy referenced, does the text imply knowledge 
from other sources?) 
 
4. Content and Ideological Statements 
a. What concepts of social work does the article presuppose and convey? 
b. What concepts of “client” does the article presuppose and convey? 
c. What concepts of crime, criminality, and punishment does the article presuppose and 
convey? 
d. What explanations for criminalization are given? Where does the problem for a 
woman’s crime/criminalization lie? (i.e. individual? structural? socially constructed? a 
pathology?) Who/what needs to change? 
e. What concepts of practice and intervention does the article presuppose and convey? 
What is deemed as “effective” practice? How are outcomes defined?  
f. What frameworks of thought/rationalities are these practices embedded in? (i.e. Risk? 
Welfare? Morality?) 
g. How are gender, race, and class discussed, explained, and exposed? 
h. What content or background is missing? 
 
5. Discourse Position and Overall Message of the Article. 
																																								 																				
23 To supplement these questions, I generated a list of categories during the structural analysis which served 
as a guide for things to be on the lookout for, at the level of language (see Appendix G) 
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Synoptic analysis and final assessment. Synoptic analysis is typically the final 
step of CDA and consists of analyzing the structural analysis and detailed analysis in 
relation to each other and comparing and contrasting the findings to gain an overall 
assessment of the discourse position(s). Throughout their discussion of analysis, Jäger 
and Maier (2009) are clear that analysis is an iterative process with ongoing 
interpretations and revisions. I originally envisioned moving cleanly from one step of the 
analysis to the next. However, I found that, in line with the principles of CDA, I needed 
to be much more flexible and creative in building my project and in moving through and 
among the different levels of analysis and interpretation. Rather than the previously 
outlined stages of analysis being discrete, I found a lot of slippage between them. The 
phases of analysis often occurred simultaneously. As I moved back and forth between 
paper copies and electronic versions, oscillating between these different data artifacts, I 
was able to hone in on different details.  
Though I began with some useful heuristic devices, CDA does not consist of 
specific formulas or methods that can be applied across the board to research projects 
(Fairclough, 2009; Jäger & Maier, 2009; Wood & Kroger, 2000). This was initially a 
point of contention for me. As a novice discourse analyst, I found myself wanting to find 
certainty and a procedure that I could follow which would allow me to do things the 
“right” way. This was an ironic anxiety given that the epistemological nature of this study 
lingers in the realms of uncertainty and provisional knowledge. Ultimately, I saw myself 
as experimenting with this methodology using Jäger and Maier’s framework as a helpful 
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starting point and adapting it as I progressed24. After all, as Jäger and Maier (2009) state, 
“the best way to learn CDA is to do CDA” (p. 56).  
Researcher Position 
I positioned myself in this research as a “transformative intellectual” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005). I find the notion of transformative intellectual to be most in line with my 
goals and values. Still, I find this an uneasy alliance. Both words, transformative and 
intellectual, burst forth with such confident claims toward authority. As a first generation 
college student, I often feel displaced in an environment of academic politics and forced 
intellectualism. I struggle to “keep up” but more so to stay engaged and find inspiration. 
Further, as a woman, I have been adequately socialized into a more humble position of 
doubt and uncertainty. Instinctively, I wonder about my ability to do justice to the label 
of “transformative intellectual” and I ask “who am I to claim this role?” But then again, 
as a feminist scholar with a strong allegiance toward social justice claims and toward 
challenging entrenched beliefs about who can be a knower, I also have to ask, “who am I 
not to claim this role?” Therefore, I tentatively embraced the position of transformative 
intellectual within my research. In the next chapters, as I communicate my 
interpretations, I practice centering myself as legitimate while still recognizing the limits 
of my understanding.  
The post-structural concepts I have discussed thus far—discourse, power, 
knowledge, and subject positions—apply to my position in this research as well. I, 
myself, am bound up in the larger discourses of society and the discourses of social work. 
																																								 																				
24 Because of the emergent nature of my project, I kept detailed notes on the research protocol and 
how/why it evolved throughout the process. 
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My own subject position and understandings of the world have been deeply shaped 
through these discourses. This, in part, may have helped me understand implicit 
meanings while engaged in analysis, but it also formed the boundaries of my 
interpretations.   
Evaluative Criteria and Ethical Considerations 
Within CDA there is a marked lack of conversation around quality criteria. 
Common markers of quality criteria in qualitative research include 1) Attention to 
“contexts of production”—including research relationships, the institutional, cultural, and 
historical settings; 2) Attention to representation—including questions related to selection 
of what to tell and what to leave out; 3) Attention to the construction of knowledge—
including “questions of whose version of reality is privileged, who can tell a story and 
who can change it”; and 4) Attention to dissemination (Seale, 2002; Mertens & Ginsberg, 
2008; Gilgun & Abrams, 2002).  
Like others before me, I reject “standard notions of rigor or validity as evaluative 
criteria” (Strega, 2005, p. 228). Judgments of quality that are borne out of an 
Enlightenment epistemology are not useful in work that explicitly rejects notions of truth 
and objectivity (Strega, 2005). Strega (2005) outlines three standards for assessing 
feminist, post-structural research that I find compatible with CDA and with my expressed 
ontological and epistemological assumptions.  
First, assessment is based on the goals of social justice. The research takes 
seriously its usefulness and political implications and should have the capacity to 
instigate progressive change for marginalized people and communities. This research 
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puts the gaze on the profession of social work and seeks to activate a deeper, critical 
analysis of the ways in which we think and talk about the people with whom we work. 
Therefore, a critical analysis of the discourses surrounding criminalized women in social 
work journals has the potential to change the way social workers understand and apply 
academic knowledge in their research and practice and thereby improve the experience of 
criminalized women involved in social work research and services.  
Secondly, the research should consider dissemination that is rooted in an “ethic of 
care and personal responsibility.” Along these lines, van Dijk (2009) proposes 
accessibility as a quality criterion for CDA. Thus, findings should be accessible and 
readable, particularly for those whom the research is “about.” Gilgun and Abrams (2002) 
further highlight the ethical nature of dissemination. In their view, attention to audience 
includes considerations regarding who needs to hear the results as well as accessibility. In 
dissemination lies the potential for the research to “disrupt oppressive social processes” 
(Chase, 2005, p. 667) and reflects larger ethical commitments to social change. Here, I 
could comment on the importance of making sure my work gets published as a 
transgressive act. Certainly social work researchers, educators, and practitioners would 
fall into the category of who needs to hear the results. After all, scholarship that gets 
published is garnered with a certain level of legitimacy, and legitimacy for work that 
seeks to examine and disrupt the status quo propels that disruption forward. Still, there is 
an enormous tension for me here. In this project, I have written a dissertation for a 
specialized audience and I was thus compelled to adhere to the established criteria set for 
this endeavor—whether this is a situational excuse or a cop-out remains to be seen. From 
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here, I will move forward into a career in academia. Though I will no longer be operating 
under the constraints of “student,” my personal advancement will once again rely on my 
ability to meet certain metrics for success, publications being one of these. Academia 
privileges certain ways of speaking and writing. Scholar reputation is not unhinged from 
journal reputation. This raises question about (1) how much I will try to subvert the 
dominant talk of academia and risk not being published; and (2) how much I will attempt 
to bring my work into other venues, where it may have more practical applications, but 
less for career advancement.  
Ultimately, I have many questions regarding the social justice claims that any of 
us in academia make. We are so deeply embedded in an elitist institution that has 
historically been exclusionary. By virtue of our participation, we are to a certain extent 
complicit in that exclusion. Further, for my specific project, I recognize the heady nature 
of much of what is involved in CDA. It is firmly grounded in inaccessible language and 
discussions that emerge out of academic theory and jargon, which is an ironic turn given 
that its goal is to unsettle dominant narratives. I don’t have a good resolution for this 
tension. But every day I am acutely aware that I am participating in something that 
alienates me from my friends and family as well as from the people whom social work 
serves. Therein lies another layer of tension for me. The excitement of passionate inquiry 
is tinged with a shade of isolation and despair.  
Lastly, evaluation can be determined through the extent of critical reflexivity. 
This impels researchers to make themselves, their biases, and their interpretations visible 
in the process as well as acknowledging and addressing the tensions that arise (Finlay, 
2002; Strega, 2005). In other words, dealing with “the politics of reality” (Lal, 1996, p. 
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207). Here, I will say more about power and reflexivity as it is central to ethical research 
as well as quality research. Strega (2005) asserts that “a critical measure by which our 
work needs to be assessed is the extent to which we are complicit with or challenging of 
dominant discourses” (p. 231). Daley (2010) distinguished reflexivity, as reflecting in 
action, from reflection, as reflection on action. In her assessment, the former considers 
power relations in the research process and the latter considers the effects of structural 
arrangements on the research. Thus, reflexivity, as I understand it, goes beyond reflection 
and simply locating oneself in their research. It stretches us to consider seriously the 
ways in which we are complicit in systems of oppression. As a social worker and 
academic myself, I am deeply implicated in (re)creating the power dynamics and 
relations which I seek to unsettle and critique. I do not sit outside of these institutions; 
indeed, I have been intimately shaped by their discourses, perhaps in ways outside of my 
conscious understanding. This is often a troubling space to inhabit and there is a need to 
guard against slippage into neoliberal thinking that is so prominent in both social work 
and academia. Reflexivity, then, was crucial throughout the research process in order to 
recognize and own my privileged position and how it played out in analysis, to either 
challenge or uphold dominant structures and power relations. This is particularly salient 
in work that critically pushes back on a profession with which I actively identify. 
Reflexivity, therefore, makes it known that subjective interpretation is taking place and 
gives the researcher space to not only situate themselves in their interpretations but to 
also put themselves in conversations with their interpretations, which I attempted to make 
visible in my writing.  
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For this project I engaged with reflexivity primarily by keeping a reflexive audit 
trail. This audit trail served as a repository for my understandings and experiences with 
the data that I visited and revisited throughout the research process. In it, I documented 
my processes, thoughts, ideas, and questions, as well as my anxieties and uncertainties 
regarding the problematic of interpretation. These notes helped me track the research 
process and to record concepts and issues that needed further thought and exploration. 
Additionally, I found myself paying attention to places where resistance, existential 
quandaries, and epistemological tensions surfaced during the course of this research. I 
have found that engaging with these more intellectually and emotionally challenging 
aspects of the research allowed for deeper levels of meaning-making to occur—regarding 
both my interpretations of the data and of myself as a researcher and citizen of this world. 
This level of meaning-making is the terrain in which I negotiate my subjectivity as an 
academic who wants her work to be useful and noble.  
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Chapter 5: Findings and Analytical Discussion 
My overarching research question examined how criminalized women are 
constructed in social work high impact journals. There were also two other research 
questions related to knowledge and practice because the aim was to make visible the 
current constructions of criminalized women in social work, to understand the knowledge 
that is produced through those constructions, and to explore how that knowledge 
supports/shapes certain kinds of research and practice. The three research questions are 
shown below: 
1) How do social work high impact journals construct and represent criminalized 
women? 
2) What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized 
women are made through these constructions?  
3) What implications do these constructions and knowledge claims have for social 
work practice and research with criminalized women? 
The purpose of this chapter is to share the study findings and provide an analytical 
discussion to address the research questions. Attempting to articulate the results in this 
manner has been a challenging endeavor. There are certain threads from the data which 
can be neatly reviewed and discussed, but much else remains indistinct and incoherent, 
emerging only through immanent tension and apparent contradictions. I noted multiple 
competing discourses both among and within texts; about criminalized women as well as 
the nature and purpose of social work. What becomes clear through such contestation is 
that in constructing criminalized women, social work also constructs itself.  
Throughout this project, I kept returning to Foucault’s assertion that discourse 
analysis looks not just at what a text says, but also at what it does. This question of doing 
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continually strikes me when examining the data. There’s the doing of individual texts, 
and the doing between and among them. In this way, all of the individual texts, taken 
together, can be read as a larger text doing something different, something more 
substantial, than each individual part. Analyzed from this point of view, what emerges 
from the data is not just a contestation over the construction of criminalized women, but a 
discursive struggle over the very nature and meaning of social work itself. I observe this 
struggle as one of dualities; dualities regarding levels of practice (micro/macro), 
epistemological advantage (positivism/interpretativism), mission (social change/social 
control), and professional identity (professionalization/politicization). Of course, this 
tension is nothing new. Debates regarding the dichotomous nature of social work practice 
have been raging since its inception. As I watched this discursive struggle unfold in my 
analysis, I began to wonder if the contradictions I saw constituted a contradiction at all, 
or if this core tension actually constitutes what social work is. In other words, a struggle 
of dualities not only defines a singular aspect of social work, but also produces the very 
structure of social work and the discursive space in which it exists and is thereby 
recognizable.  
However, thinking in terms of duality, or even the paradox of dualities, seems 
insufficient to explain social work. Derrida (1981) argues that dualisms are always 
already troubled. He invokes the undecidable, something that cannot conform to either 
side of an opposition. An example is the Greek word pharmakon, which means both 
poison and remedy; or a ghost, which is both present and absent. Undecidables contain 
“both contradiction and noncontradiction—and the contradiction and noncontradiction 
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between contradiction and noncontradiction” (Derrida, 1981, p. 221). The undecidable 
disrupts binary logic, displacing either/or dualism with an ambiguity that occupies both 
sides of the dialectic while also destabilizing it from within. Derrida (1981) describes 
undecidables as “the ‘between’, whether it names fusion or separation, that thus carries 
all the force of the operation” (p. 220). I argue that social work acts as such an 
undecidable. 
Derrida (1981) stresses that undecidability contains the presence of an 
“inexhaustible ambivalence.” An ambivalence, which determines that the undecidable 
can always be defined in more than one way. The undecidable cannot be fully decided, 
and it is in this undecidability that the “conditions of possibility for acting and deciding” 
are actually created (Caputo, 1997, p. 137). As such, the dualistic debates that have 
framed social work practice for decades are part of the praxis of the undecidable. For 
instance, social work is neither driven toward micro or macro practice, but 
simultaneously both—each side of the dialectic mutually enabling the other. This links 
Derrida’s work with Foucault’s discussions of power. In Foucauldian terms, power is not 
only repressive, it is also productive. It operates in and through relations to produce 
knowledge and subjectivities. It is within a discursive struggle of dualities that social 
work as an undecidable comes into being, and that we as social workers claim our 
identities and priorities within the profession.  
Undecidability also reveals paradoxes involved in the project of social work, 
where the profession’s conditions of possibility are at the same time its conditions of 
impossibility. For instance, social work upholds aspirational values toward social justice 
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while simultaneously functioning as an agent of social control. Throughout my analysis, I 
watched this specific paradox reveal itself time and time again. Authors in my dataset 
would simultaneously uphold the neoliberal mantel of individualism while clinging to the 
reclamation of a larger social obligation. I was often confused about what was happening 
in a text or where an author stood in relation to the carceral state. I found myself 
wondering about the intent of what I was reading and doubting my own analysis. 
Notwithstanding the problematic of interpretation that is always present, I was knee-deep 
in an ambiguity embedded in the texts related to how they embodied the competing 
interests of the profession. In one moment, I read a text as upholding social justice and in 
the next, undermining it25. I couldn't decide. In Derridean terms, it is the “the ghost of 
undecidability” that marks and constitutes the profession, “for the undecidability is never 
set aside, never over and done with. It hovers over a situation before, during and after the 
decision, like a specter of justice, disturbing it from within, divesting it of absolute self 
assurance” (Caputo, 1997, p. 138). I have found this increasingly difficult to capture 
within the bounds of writing that necessarily needs to be defined and limited. Therefore, I 
foreground the undecidable as the discursive space in which to hold all subsequent 
discussions of results that unfold in the remainder of these pages.  
The discussions in this chapter are organized around the research questions. 
However, while the three questions may appear to be discrete and linear, there is 
																																								 																				
25 Because of the imperative within social work to perform some enactment of social justice (even if it is a 
performance without substance), one reading of this phenomenon could be that authors were simply giving 
lip service to the values of social justice (and, as you will see in the coming pages, it is a reading I have not 
entirely discarded). However, over time I became less and less convinced of this interpretation. It seemed 
like perhaps something less nefarious, less cynical was occurring in the data. I continually had/have to fight 
the urge to grasp at the certainty of the cynical reading, knowing my own subjectivity, being so firmly 
formed by and embedded in the macro side of the micro/macro ambivalence, predisposes me to such an 
analysis. An analysis that, I hold, is important, albeit constrained.  
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considerable overlap in the assumed perspectives of each. The levels of organization and 
analysis are not always distinct and often draw on multiple discourses simultaneously. 
Though I have attempted to organize this chapter around each individual research 
question, they are also so deeply integrated, each operating beyond the confines of 
specific examples to produce knowledge, subjectivities, and social practice (Hook, 2001) 
that analysis should more accurately be viewed as a whole. I offer this as a caveat to the 
reader so they may read with an eye to the conceptual slippage between questions. As for 
comprehensibility, given the heavy theoretical nature of my project, I found it impossible 
(or perhaps incomprehensible) to discuss the findings outside of my sense-making 
process. While I recognize that, traditionally, results are discussed separately from the 
analytical discussion, in this chapter these elements are integrated so as to adhere to the 
epistemological integrity of my project.  
Here, it may also be worth noting the slippery terrain of interpretation. I want to 
stress that this analysis is my own and it is but one reading of a very complicated 
landscape. Throughout my discussion of the results I draw on examples from the dataset. 
This is not to disparage or critique any individual author, but rather to highlight an overall 
trend in the larger discourse that we share. Putting the deepest preoccupations of our lives 
to paper is a vulnerable endeavor. As such, I felt a lot of hesitancy and unease in taking 
the words of other scholars down to the bare bones, making judgments, and naming 
specific authors in my analysis. What if I am wrong? What if they intended something 
totally different than what I think they accomplished? Why is my reading “better” or 
more right than any other? And here again, we revisit the problematic of interpretation: I 
am wrong; and I am not. I make no claims toward objectivity or to “truth.” To do so 
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would be an epistemic fallacy under the umbrella of CDA. My view is inherently partial 
and explicitly political. It is shaped by my own values and interests, by my relationship to 
the profession, and by my desire to more deeply understand how social work participates 
in processes of criminalization. I respect the efforts of the authors whose work has 
enabled my own. The eye of critique here is not on individual scholars; it is turned back 
on social work as a profession and a knowledge producing enterprise. Though it often felt 
like I was analyzing an Other—“those social work scholars”—my critique comes from 
within, from what Patti Lather (2003) calls a “critical intimacy.” As such, I am deeply 
implicated in whatever accusations my critiques levy.  
This chapter begins by identifying the constructions of criminalized women based 
on the vocabulary and framing choices within the dataset. Though I discuss a number of 
co-existing constructions present in the data, there is an overriding construction of 
criminalized women as risky. Embedded in this construction is a strong neoliberal 
discourse on knowing and changing the “responsibilized” self. I go on to provide a 
discussion of the implied knowledge claims that flow from these constructions, focusing 
deeply on the use of “objective” and often depoliticized explanations for crime and 
criminal justice involvement found in the data. I show how this depoliticization is 
accomplished through a variety of what I call neutralizing strategies. These neutralizing 
strategies ultimately serve to depoliticize social work itself. I highlight how by primarily 
constituting criminalized women as risky, social work necessarily responds to her with 
individualized service delivery aimed at regulating and changing the behavior of 
individuals. I argue that in its reliance on practices of risk management and a preference 
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toward micro-level service delivery, social work deploys regulatory practices that further 
neoliberal governance (Parton, 1998; Webb, 2003).  
Despite observing a very clear dominant discourse of risk and responsibility in the 
data, there was also a powerful counter-discourse, both embedded as a contradiction 
within the dominant discourse and encompassed outside of it, in distinct articles. The 
pieces in this counter-discursive thread firmly anchor their analysis in explanations of 
structural inequity, disrupt the underlying construction of crime, and question the logic of 
punishment. Accordingly, they move away from reliance on the criminal justice system 
as a means of dealing with social problems. Though just a small subset of my sample, I 
see these emergent counter-discourses as indicative of the larger discursive struggle 
within the profession and as critical to fostering spaces of hope and possibility. Dominant 
discourses have power because they naturalize their subject matter and make certain 
things seem self-evident (Foucault, 1972). Therefore, a look at the discourses that exist 
on the margins helps us disrupt what comes to be known as normal and natural. As Fadyl, 
Nicholls, and McPherson (2012) state: 
…those practices on the boundaries, which occupy the areas of ‘possible but 
outside the mainstream’, allow an exploration of what could be. Exploring the 
boundaries between what is allowed and not allowed, between what makes sense 
and what seems absurd, highlights those things that are thinkable and doable but 
not self-evident, and thus helps to make current discourse and its material effects 
more visible. (p. 492).  
In other words, by attending to the discursive, we can see how discourse is contested and 
contestable, productive in expanding possibilities for resistance. As such, I close this 
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chapter with a discussion of an emergent counter-discourse. Please note that for purposes 
of clarity, all excerpts from the data that are longer than one line are displayed in single 
spaced block quotes.  
Constructing Criminalized Women 
Question #1: How do social work high impact journals construct and represent 
criminalized women?  
In this section, I outline the main constructions of criminalized women identified 
in the data. Though there are a number of representations found in the data, there is an 
overriding construction of risk. Through a variety of discursive mechanisms, criminalized 
women are framed most often as risky. A less pronounced, yet still significant 
construction is that of vulnerability (fragile/vulnerable/tragic). Though these two 
constructions (risk and vulnerability) may seem disparate, both ultimately mobilize the 
logic of risk management and can be seen as different sides of the same risk/needs coin. 
Through these constructions, criminalized women emerge as a subject of governance for 
social work. I outline how these constructions, rather than offering a unique social work 
construction, parallel the dominant and historical constructions of criminalized women. 
The Construction of Risk. The construction of risk varies in its nature and 
articulation. It shows up both explicitly and implicitly in the dataset26. Explicitly, through 
the repeated use of the word as a descriptor for both women and interventions: “at risk,” 
“risk assessment,” “risk-reduction.” And implicitly, through what has been dubbed risk 
thinking (Rose, 1998). According to Rose (2000), risk thinking is “concerned with 
																																								 																				
26 Though there is a staggering amount of explicit discussion on risk and risk factors, appearing in 42 of the 
49 articles, I also found myriad ways that authors invoke discourses of risk without actually naming it. 
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bringing possible future undesired events into calculations in the present, making their 
avoidance the central object of decision-making processes, and administering individuals, 
institutions, expertise and resources in the service of that ambition” (pg. 332). He goes on 
to assert that risk thinking has become “central to the management of exclusion in post-
welfare strategies of control” (pg. 332). Understood in this way, Green (2007) argues that 
the prediction and management of risk has become a central organizing principle of 
health and welfare programs in a neoliberal context. Based on my analysis of the 
literature in high impact social work journals, I would argue further that the prediction 
and management of risk has also become central to the process of knowledge production 
in social work.  
Many scholars discuss the emergence of risk as a product of modernity (Giddens, 
1990; Beck, 2002; Lupton, 1999). Lupton (1999) explains how with the onset of 
modernity, society moved from thinking about dangerousness to riskiness. Rather than 
attributing danger to fortune, fate, or the gods, as was common in pre-modern times, the 
concept of risk localizes danger in individual choices. As Beck (2002) states, risk 
“presumes decision making. As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’ we are talking about 
calculating the incalculable, colonizing the future” (p. 40). 
Hannah-Moffat (2005) discusses risk thinking in relation to gendered strategies of 
control. She explains that risk thinking emerges through the conflation of women’s needs 
and vulnerabilities with risks, and leads to the framing of women’s involvement in the 
criminal justice system as a result of individual deficits or deviance that need to be 
managed or corrected. In other words, risk thinking is a “narrative that rejects social 
context and privileges attitudinal and psychological factors” (Pollack, 2010, p. 1273). 
 124 
Indeed, throughout the dataset, the individualization of structural concerns emerged as a 
key discursive practice. For example, in the introduction to an article advocating for the 
expansion of gender responsive programming in U.S. prisons, White (2012) states:  
The number of women arrested and incarcerated is at an all-time high. As a result 
of two distinct arms of the War on Drugs (legislative changes and the social 
construction of the drug user as a criminal), women have become more 
vulnerable to arrest for drug crimes than they were in the past. Add to this a group 
of conspiracy laws used to prosecute women who are acquainted with a drug 
dealer, and the numbers escalate even more (Merolla, 2008). Poverty and a lack of 
education often lead women to make poor choices and engage in high-risk 
behavior [emphasis added] (pg. 284).  
 
This is a typical discursive move made in the literature I examined. White clearly 
acknowledges the impact that social policy has on increasing the number of women in 
prison. However, the author immediately reframes it as an issue related to “poor choices” 
and “high-risk behavior.” In this way, structural risks, such as poverty, are recast as 
personal risks. Despite naming “legislative changes and the social construction of the 
drug user as criminal” in the introduction, the author marginalizes these points 
throughout the remainder of the article in favor of a focus on individual choices and high 
risk behavior. Similarly, Salina et al. (2011) state: 
 ....when they return home, most have not developed more positive coping skills, 
have not received training, and have not been offered referrals and/or other 
resources or the opportunity to make any positive changes. For example, poor 
housing status, limited social support, lack of drug treatment, and poor services 
utilization all are associated with post release relapse into drug or alcohol abuse 
(Healey, 1999). As a result, many return to the criminal justice system. Thus, 
programming must focus on developing the skills necessary to keep women from 
returning to high-risk behaviors after they leave the correctional system, but more 
importantly, [emphasis added] women need to learn to identify positive supports 
and resources that will help them avoid the drug-using or criminal networks that 
do not promote healthy living (pg. 368). 
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In the above excerpt, the authors make multiple discursive moves in one 
paragraph. First, they name socio-economic issues that criminalized women face during 
reentry, such as lack of housing and lack of access to treatment, but rather than highlight 
a systemic lack of these resources, the authors reduce structural barriers to a lack of 
individual coping skills, lack of individual change, and poor service utilization on the part 
of individual women. The supposition being that services and resources are not only 
abundant but also accessible, and that women are not being proactive enough in their 
recovery to find and utilize them. Furthermore, the authors deploy notions of “positive 
supports” and “healthy living” which rely on normative understandings of what 
constitutes healthy behavior and positive relationships, thereby reinforcing notions of 
what constitutes risky behavior. Such strategies of normalization were consistently 
deployed throughout the dataset. O’Malley (1996) describes normalization as the method 
by which norms of behavior are identified. He argues that normalization is the primary 
technique of disciplinary power and that “normalization, in the disciplinary sense implies 
‘correction’ of the individual, and the development of a causal knowledge of deviance 
and normalization” (pg. 189). Therefore, through processes of normalization, social work 
enables its function as a form of governance. 
The previous excerpt from Salina et al. (2011) also exemplifies how risk-thinking 
manifests through the use of narrow and positivistic outcome measures that are primarily 
focused on recidivism as an indicator of success. The authors in the above statement 
associate recidivism solely with individual behaviors and assert that programming must 
focus on skill development. They go on to suggest that the more important thing is that 
women must learn to identify positive supports and resources to help them change and 
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avoid a life of crime. The use of the phrase “more importantly” emphasizes individual 
responsibility in identifying resources and supports, and renders invisible the very real 
possibility that resources and support may not be readily available or equally accessible 
to all women. This type of individualizing related to the causes of recidivism was 
abundant in the dataset, with 24 of the 49 articles focusing on recidivism as the primary 
outcome for success. Overemphasis on recidivism as a marker for success fails to reflect 
the sociopolitical realities that women face and relies primarily on individualized 
understandings of how and why women get entangled and re-entangled with the criminal 
justice system. Further, an emphasis on recidivism neglects other outcomes that women 
may define as success for themselves, such as obtaining housing, regaining custody of 
their children, or gaining employment (Pollack, 2007).  
Here, we see evidence of what Hannah-Moffat (2005) calls the “transformative 
risk subject.” The transformative risk subject emerges when need is fused to risk. Unlike 
the static risk subject, the transformative risk subject has “intervenable needs” (i.e. 
substance abuse, attitudes, and behaviors), which are “amenable to targeted therapeutic 
interventions” that when addressed will lower the risk of recidivism (Hannah-Moffat 
2005, pg. 31). The creation of intervenable needs is emblematic of a wider shift in 
governing; intervenable needs facilitate governing at a distance as women become 
regulated through their needs rather than direct repression (Hannah-Moffat, 2001). In the 
examples from the dataset listed above, the transformative risk subject is constructed by 
first translating women’s gender specific socio-economic oppression into gender specific 
psychological deficits. In so doing, her criminal behavior is linked to her inability to 
reason and choose. An inability to make good choices is then interpreted as an essential 
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part of her riskiness (Pollack, 2007). To take the argument further, I would highlight how 
the creation of intervenable needs may be inherently related to the neoliberal economy of 
knowledge production: intervenable need = intervention = $$$ (i.e. funding) = research = 
publications = tenure and recognition and all those prized accomplishments that go along 
with being an academic. Taken to this point, we can see how whole academic careers are 
built on the (re)construction of risk. 
The use of value-laden and judgmental language to invoke images of risk and 
responsibility was littered throughout the data set. This raises a number of key concerns 
regarding the discriminate application of even basic social work values in the process of 
knowledge production. Social justice is a particularly thorny problem in the analysis and 
will be discussed more in depth later in this chapter. Of particular concern at this point 
are the social work values related to: dignity and worth of the individual; the importance 
of human relationships; and integrity. It seems as though authors apply these social work 
values discriminately (i.e. to children and not mothers, and unevenly among participants 
in their studies). This points to the active construction of worthiness in the social work 
discourse, in regards to not only who deserves services but also who deserves 
decency. Indeed, deservingness was constructed time and time again in the dataset 
through specific lexical choices. 
Discourse analysts note that lexical choice is significant because it allows authors 
to lay out a lexical field which signals certain values, judgments, and identities (Mayr & 
Machin, 2012). For example, the use of terms such as “female offender,” “high risk 
group,” “criminal behavior,” or “deviant lifestyle” is common in some articles. Such 
terms are borrowed from the Corrections lexicon and load the text with particular kinds 
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of meanings, which allow the authors to foreground an emphasis on individual behaviors 
and choices. Pollack (2006) states that “accepting normalized criminal justice concepts 
and categories and the widespread use of terms such as ‘women’s criminality’ and 
‘female offenders’ helps to consolidate the deficit based individualism characteristic of 
penal-welfare approaches” (p. 247). She goes on to argue that terms such as “offender” 
reify “women’s identity as permanently criminal or offending…and can be used to 
rationalize unjust correctional practices” (p. 247). 
By contrast, other articles set up an entirely different lexical field through the use 
of terms such as “criminalized women,” “justice involved women,” “vulnerable 
population,” and “mothers who have an arrest history.” This is not to imply that these 
terms are not also imperfect, but rather to illustrate the different orientations and 
judgments that can be made visible through the use of language. “Criminalized women” 
for example, alludes to the social construction of crime and allows for an analysis beyond 
the individual toward larger social and political processes that criminalize (Pollack, 
2006). “Vulnerable population,” on the other hand, reifies the individualist orientation of 
the “offender,” yet it is void of the same sense of blame. Amongst data that is plagued 
with value-laden and judgmental language, the lexical field of vulnerability allows for a 
softening in the dataset. However, the discourse is once again focused on individual 
characteristics and individualized understandings of crime, which are then linked to 
practices aimed at reducing risk and bolstering resilience. It is to this framing of 
vulnerability that I now turn my attention.    
Object of Pity. In general, the articles (or pieces of articles) in this group highlight 
women’s vulnerabilities and/or draw on discourses of empathy or pity. The object of pity 
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is constructed through a lexical field that describes criminalized women as “vulnerable,” 
“weak,” “invisible,” and “voiceless.” As women who struggle “fiercely with negative self 
perceptions” and “low self-esteem,” who are “imprisoned by their own guilt and 
remorse.” At the same time, they are “poorly served by systems that should be helping.” 
Women’s criminal justice involvement is seen as a product of “troubled life histories.” 
They are observed as suffering from “unresolved trauma” which leads to substance abuse 
as a “means of self medication.” The object of pity is, therefore, unable to escape from 
the “cycle of criminality.” Above all, she is “powerless.” The following excerpt from 
Allen, Flaherty and Ely (2010) illustrates the expression of powerlessness found in the 
data: 
…these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound 
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to 
protect their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child 
welfare system, powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the 
society from which they have become so disenfranchised [emphasis added] (p. 
165).  
 
The authors’ exaggerated use of the word powerless enhances a representation of 
criminalized women as tragic and vulnerable. It evokes feelings of empathy and pity. 
From the title of the article “Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and the 
Criminalization of Female Poverty,” one could assume the authors are trying to humanize 
their participants and disrupt dominant narratives told about women in the criminal 
justice system. However, the article minimizes discussions of poverty and oppression by 
using emotive language and “feelings talk” as their main argumentation strategy. In so 
doing, they inadvertently demean their participants, strip them of agency, and distract the 
discussion away from larger structural issues. In many ways, it may be necessary to step 
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back from this critique in order to see the political utility of conjuring up sympathy to 
build support for a highly stigmatized and marginalized population. However, the 
problematic of sentimentality remains: the authors changed the focus of the article from 
one concentrated on inequity and injustice to one that is driven exclusively by 
emotionality and misdirected sentiment, thereby depoliticizing the issue.  
As is the case in the above excerpt from Allen, Flaherty, and Ely, the object of 
pity is similarly portrayed throughout the dataset as having very little agency. Agency is 
stripped in a variety of ways, but typically by making the case that a woman’s “criminal 
behavior” is the result of an addiction, trauma, or mental health issue. The implication 
being that she does not actively choose her behavior. Substance use, for example, is often 
discussed as something used to self-medicate the untreated symptoms of trauma and 
abuse. Therefore, it is understood as something requiring treatment, rather than a bad or 
deviant choice the woman has made. In this way, women are constructed as passive 
rather than active participants in their criminalized behaviors. Paradoxically, treatment 
and intervention for the object of pity then centers on helping a woman heal so she can 
make better choices. So while she is framed as powerless, she can be saved. She is the 
“fallen woman” (Rafter, 1983; Zedner, 1991). 
Note that criminalization or social structure is still not of concern here. The focus 
remains steady on behaviors. Though there is some recognition of constrained choice, it 
is recognized as being constrained by trauma or life circumstance that the individual, with 
treatment, can widen. For example, in their article on improving pregnancy outcomes 
during incarceration, Siefert and Pimlott (2001) state: 
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Issues that trigger substance abuse and criminal conduct, including physical and 
sexual abuse and their sequelae, such as low self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and 
self-destructive behavior, must be addressed (p. 129). 
 
As was the case with much of the data, these and similar claims allow authors to 
construct women as vulnerable. In so doing, they distract attention away from the 
“criminal conduct” and onto an underlying psychological issue the authors believe to be 
at play. However, her vulnerabilities (i.e. trauma and mental health issues) are 
simultaneously turned into risks for “substance abuse” and “criminal conduct.” Women’s 
trauma and lack of self-esteem then become the focal point of intervention: the 
intervenable need. The construction of vulnerability in the data is also highly gendered— 
lack of self-esteem and lack of skills (e.g. parenting, decision making, etc.) are typically 
linked to experiences of trauma and gendered socio-economic issues (Hannah-Moffat, 
2010). This is demonstrated in the following excerpt from an article by Mignon and 
Ransford (2012), advocating for the maintenance of parent-child relationships while 
incarcerated:  
The difficult early life of many incarcerated mothers, coupled with their current 
circumstances, can often have a negative impact on a woman’s self-esteem 
(Houck & Loper, 2002; van Wormer & Kaplan, 2006) [emphasis added] (p. 70). 
 
From this excerpt, “difficult early life” is understood to be code for abuse and neglect; 
and “current circumstances” stands in for poverty, incarceration, and child welfare 
involvement. Pollack (2007) argues that 
When incorporated into corrections logics and discourses, the victimization 
narrative becomes psychologized; that is, there tends to be a focus on the 
psychological and emotional impact of such experiences and how impaired 
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thinking, decision-making, and lack of emotional control lead women to commit 
crimes. The psyche of the criminalized woman is the site at which reformation 
occurs (p. 160). 
Indeed, explicit recognition of victimization and trauma was used to construct 
vulnerability in many of the articles in the dataset. However, it was highlighted in 
different ways. In the articles that take a more transparent risk focus, trauma is generally 
named as a characteristic when describing the population and then sidelined or not 
discussed at all. Vulnerability, in these cases, is established by comparing criminalized 
women to their counterparts including, for example, incarcerated men, non-incarcerated 
women, and incarcerated women without children. For instance, Horton (2011) describes 
incarcerated women as “a particularly vulnerable population” (p. 184) and strengthens the 
case for vulnerability by reporting on the differential rates of childhood abuse among 
incarcerated women, men, and the general population: 
A greater percentage of incarcerated women report being physically or sexually 
victimized before the age of 18 (37%) compared to their incarcerated male peers 
(14%), as well as the general population (8% for men, 17% for women; Harlow, 
1999) In addition, on every measure of drug use, female inmates report higher use 
than their male peers (Greenfeld & Snell, 2000) (p. 184). 
 
Here the meaning of “particularly vulnerable” is established through difference; thus, it is 
through opposition to their “incarcerated male peers” and “the general population” that 
the author is able to make incarcerated women’s vulnerability visible.  
The articles that vigorously emphasize vulnerability over deviance tend to locate 
victimization in the interpersonal violence of spousal or family abuse/neglect. Here, 
trauma is understood as an underlying cause of “criminal” behaviors. These articles make 
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a direct link between women’s trauma and her engagement in “crime.” For example, 
Kubiak (2004) asserts that: 
Attention to trauma-related disorders among incarcerated women may be pivotal 
in preventing relapse and as a consequence, recidivism (p. 430). 
 
By contrast, in the articles that I identified as part of a counter-discourse (more on 
this later) the authors discuss victimization but they characterize it as a gendered social 
issue rather than a personal one; in this way, they focus less on a woman’s victimization 
and more on her marginalization. Further, while the general assumption in most of the 
articles appears to be that trauma and mental health issues can be effectively treated in 
prisons27, the articles that comprised the counter-discourse ardently disavowed such a 
stance while also calling attention to the state sanctioned violence women experience 
through interactions with penal-welfare systems.  
As I have demonstrated, while most articles in the dataset deploy notions of risk 
by emphasizing choice and responsibility, others emphasize vulnerability. Some do both. 
An example may help illuminate this phenomenon. In their article on developing a 
parenting program for jailed mothers, Miller et al. (2014) foreground the challenges 
incarcerated mothers face that make it difficult for them to maintain their parenting roles 
both in jail and upon release. The authors identify histories of trauma, abuse, and a 
subsequent loss of confidence as things that interfere with a woman’s ability to parent. 
The authors also emphasize the distress mothers feel upon being separated from their 
children. In this way, they highlight criminalized women’s vulnerabilities. She is not 
constructed as “deviant,” but rather a woman who cares and is up against uniquely 
																																								 																				
27 Indeed, with few exceptions, the violence of prison was left unexamined in the dataset.  
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gendered challenges. Later in the same article, while advocating for the effectiveness of 
jail-based parenting interventions, the authors assert that:  
A jail stay may function as a “wake up call” for some mothers, offering a chance 
to prevent them from falling deeper into the system (p. 164).  
 
Though the authors first position the mothers within powerlessness, the 
symbolism of a “wake up call” indicates the need and ability for women to take 
responsibility for themselves and their actions; through this symbolism, crime is firmly 
re-established as a fact rather than a social construction (Pollack, 2006). Miller et al. 
(2014) end their article by pulling both of these constructions (risky and vulnerable) 
together: 
Although challenging, implementing parenting programs in jail settings represents 
an opportunity for high-risk mothers to focus on and develop their parenting 
skills. Although the setting may prevent practicing new skills with children, 
offering parenting sessions in jail may be an effective way to reach this 
vulnerable population of women [emphasis added] (p.169). 
 
Whether deployed exclusively or simultaneously, the language of both risk and 
vulnerability accomplish similar things. They individualize the reasons for committing 
crime and divert attention away from a woman’s social context, locating both the 
problem and solution within the individual (Hannah-Moffat 2010; Maidment 2006). 
Indeed, throughout the dataset, the redefinition of the structural into the individual has the 
effect of constructing women as both the cause of and solution to not only crime, but also 
the increasing rates of women’s incarceration. The supposition being that to decrease 
incarceration rates, you have to deal with problematic individual behaviors, not 
problematic policies or the conditions of inequality that facilitate “crime.” This will be 
discussed more in depth in relation to research question #2.  
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The Unfit Mother. The representation of the unfit mother is another way the 
construction of risk plays out in the dataset. Many women in the criminal justice system, 
about two-thirds, are mothers (Kajstura, 2018). Not surprisingly then, my sample 
included a number of articles with an emphasis on children and motherhood. Specifically, 
such articles focused on either incarcerated/criminalized mothers/pregnant women or 
children with incarcerated/criminalized mothers. This category is significant for analysis 
because over half (n=25) of the sample is comprised of articles with a focus on children 
and mothers. Indeed, if I had not used the word “mother” in my keyword search, my 
sample would have been reduced by about half.  
In a significant proportion of these articles, the welfare for children is framed as 
the primary concern and is bolstered through the construction of the unfit mother, and 
through a strong focus on negative outcomes for children and an infant determinism for 
such negative outcomes—children are framed as being “at risk” and bound for 
problematic life trajectories. These outcomes are further attributed to the mother, not the 
larger social context. The mother herself is then framed as risky because she is 
responsible for the creation of damaged children, or worse, future criminals. This plays 
out in a number of ways. 
Attachment. 11 of the 25 of articles in this part of the sample (i.e., those focused 
on children and mothers) deploy narrowly defined conceptualizations of attachment that 
emphasize the mother-child relationship, and exclude an analysis of contextual issues, 
such as poverty, that may lead to poor outcomes for children. For instance, in an 
attachment-based study on the relational health of infants who live in a prison-based 
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residential parenting program with their incarcerated mothers, Condon (2017) introduces 
their28 article by stating: 
Many infants in the United States have incarcerated parents (Pattillo, Weiman, & 
Western, 2004; Rebecca Project, 2010; Villanueva, 2009) and are at risk for poor 
social outcomes, partially as a result of disrupted attachment relationships 
(Cassidy, Poehlmann, & Shaver, 2010; Kjellstrand & Eddy, 2011; Lange, 2008; 
Myerson, Otteson, & Ryba, 2010) [emphasis added] (p. 5). 
 
Here, the author links poor outcomes for children (at least partially) to the only named 
variable of “disrupted attachment relationships.” Through the remainder of the article 
Condon hints at how social context could lead to “disrupted attachments,” but remains 
squarely focused on the mother child-attachment as the site of intervention and asserts a 
very clear idea of what a “normal” and “healthy” relationship between mother and infant 
should be. Failure of the dyads in this study to achieve normative standards for bonding 
and attachment is then attributed to the mother’s individual characteristics, not the prison 
environment or other possible factors. For instance, while listing the constructs under 
study, Condon looked for: 
(d) moments in which mothers showed awareness of their own and their child’s 
inner worlds (reflective capacity); and (e) high-stress moments during which it 
was very difficult for mothers to be anything but self-centered, reactive, self-
protective, or dismissive of their children’s experiences (pg. 12).  
 
To begin, “high stress” is not defined, but given the context of the prison environment 
one can assume it may involve experiences that trigger a mother’s trauma29. Next, the use 
of such value-laden language regarding a mother’s response to these “high stress 
moments” implies judgment and implicitly asserts a norm for mothering that involves not 
																																								 																				
28	Gender-neutral pronouns are used when an author’s pronoun is unknown.  
29 It is interesting to note how in this article and others like it, the discourse of attachment becomes 
entangled with the discourse of trauma. I wonder in some ways if trauma is the new shiny thing that has 
come in to replace attachment. But that’s another paper. 
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only awareness and engagement (as in point d) but also selflessness. These types of 
lexical choices implicitly assert universal norms for parenting and were prevalent 
throughout the data set. In juxtaposition, it could have been just as easy to look for “high 
stress moments during which it was difficult for mothers to be present.” 
Later in this same article, Condon (2017) doubles down on the implications of the 
mother-child relationship for a child’s future: 
Over time, their experiences during interactions with their parents become a 
blueprint or inner working model for their developing sense of self, and set the 
stage for later relationship patterns [emphasis added] (pg. 19).  
 
The imagery of a blueprint harkens back to Beck’s notion of “colonizing the 
future.” Similar to Condon’s article, it was common among the other articles that drew on 
notions of attachment to include little to no discussion of how culture, socio-economic 
status, or the prison environment itself may impact a child or the context of parenting. 
Ghenie and Wellenstein (2009) refer to this as a “context stripping view of attachment” 
and assert, 
Larger issues of poverty, racism, social exclusion, and violence become reduced 
to blaming birth parents who fail the test of proper parent-child bonding. Through 
diagnosis and treatment of their children in care, the problem is further reduced to 
one located in the “detached” child, who has one therapeutic shot at connection 
before being written off as a future sociopath (pg. 161).  
Ghenie and Wellenstein contend that such an application of attachment theory moves the 
focus away from the larger social context that plays a role in child development, and 
lends itself to a form of infant determinism—the assumption that problems in childhood 
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will inescapably lead to poor outcomes across the lifespan30. Indeed, throughout the data, 
there is a strong focus on problems predetermined for children of criminalized mothers 
and an emphasis on women’s deficits as mothers, which constructs them as a deviant risk 
group because she is seen as being at risk of (or responsible for) causing her children 
future harm or creating “risky” children and future criminals. Similar to Cruikshank’s 
(1999) argument regarding self-esteem discourses, I argue that by linking the mother-
child bond to larger societal goals of eliminating crime and reducing incarceration, 
attachment becomes both a normalization strategy and a “political obligation.” Through 
the discourse of attachment, the mother-child bond becomes a relationship that is 
governable. “Here the social sciences can be seen as productive sciences; the 
knowledges, measurements, and data they produce are constitutive of relations of 
governance as well as the subjectivity of citizens” (Cruikshank, 1996, p. 237). 
Intergenerational Risk. The construction of the unfit mother was also evident in 
the way many of the articles on maternal incarceration drew on assumptions of 
“intergenerational crime" (n=14). Typical statements in this regard include the following 
by Miller et al. (2014): 
																																								 																				
30 Traditional developmental models, such as attachment theory, take inherent biological and psychological 
processes as a starting point for analysis of people and provide a rationale for notions of “normative” to 
which all others are deviant or “at risk.” They work off of a foundational assumption of human 
development based on the idea that all people go through a series of universal and natural developmental 
stages, and if the developmental tasks of one of those stages are compromised, the window of opportunity 
closes and it is difficult, if not impossible, to recover. However, at this point in time a large body of 
interdisciplinary literature integrating the discovery of neuroplasticity has complicated, if not refuted, the 
foundation of developmental models. It is interesting to me that social work still persists in centering 
traditional and outdated developmental theories in both research and education. I would argue that by now, 
rather than being scientific, the discourse around attachment is largely symbolic. In so being, it can be 
deployed in a resistive manner.  
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Parents, particularly mothers, in the correctional system have also often 
experienced poor parenting role models and experience multiple associated 
challenges that make it difficult to break the intergenerational cycle of 
incarceration [emphasis added] (p. 163).  
 
Similarly, Hanlon et al. (2005) state: 
Noting that children of mothers in prison are vulnerable to the adoption of a 
deviant lifestyle because of the risk factors to which their families’ difficult life 
circumstances have exposed them, Greene, Haney, and Hurtago (2002) point out 
that many of these children experience the very same criminogenic conditions that 
contributed to their mothers’ incarceration—ultimately giving rise to an 
intergenerational cycle of criminality [emphasis added] (p. 68).  
 
Not only do statements such as these impose an inevitable “cycle” of generational 
incarceration (or criminality), but the language around “poor parenting role models” and 
“adoption of a deviant lifestyle” strips away all social context and locates the problem of 
incarceration solely in the behavior of individuals. In this way, incarceration is implicitly 
linked to problematic behaviors rather than problematic sentencing policies and/or 
unequal application of the law. The logic of this link relies on an assumption that when 
people are incarcerated, 1) they are guilty, and 2) they have violated some universal (i.e. 
normal) standard for behavior, and 3) they deserve to be incarcerated. The underlying 
notion of “criminal behavior” and the logic of punishment goes unquestioned; and 
deservingness remains firmly embedded in the discourse around criminalization.  
These types of arguments rely on cultural ideologies about crime that take crime 
to be a stagnant, fixed category. However, as has been discussed previously in this 
dissertation, plenty of research shows that crime is a social and historical construct, 
which arises through discourse and is applied differentially across lines of gender, race, 
and class (Boyd, 2006; Comack & Balfour, 2004; Faith, 1993; Laberge, 1991; Pollack, 
2007). Cultural myths about crime and criminality are deeply embedded in the dataset, 
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conflicting with and constraining the profession’s most aspirational values toward social 
justice. A risk framework that pre-determines future criminal justice involvement leads to 
responses that always include more surveillance and intrusion into the lives of those 
under its gaze. 
Relatedly, in an attempt to establish relevance for a study on the relationship 
between maternal incarceration and school dropout rates for children, Cho (2010) 
introduces their paper by discussing the limitations of previous research on children of 
incarcerated mothers and states: 
…such studies are not able to examine the cumulative process of 
intergenerational disadvantage [emphasis added] triggered by a mother’s 
incarceration, and this process may eventually lead to the social exclusion of their 
children as adults (Foster and Hagan 2007) (p. 258).  
 
The notion of “intergenerational disadvantage” is reminiscent of the “culture of poverty” 
theory, which suggests that poor people have certain innate characteristics (psychological 
and behavioral) and values that perpetuate poverty. The culture of poverty rhetoric is 
often invoked in media and political debates on the welfare state, but has been largely 
cast aside in the social sciences.31 This type of rationality sidelines the major economic 
and political systems that place various groups at risk for poverty and disadvantage, in 
favor of individual level explanations. Similarly, by proposing that “intergenerational 
disadvantage” is “triggered by a mother’s incarceration,” the author is ignoring a large 
body of research which shows that many families are disadvantaged prior to the mother’s 
incarceration, and that such disadvantage is likely to shape one’s entry into the criminal 
justice system. Certainly, incarceration exacerbates disadvantage, but it is notable that 
																																								 																				
31 Its explanatory power, in the social scientific sense, is both problematic and weak because it centers 
culture, rather than poverty, as the explanatory variable. 
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Cho frames incarceration as the cause of disadvantage and social exclusion and not the 
other way around. Despite nodding to structural factors throughout the paper, this initial 
framing exposes the underlying neoliberal logic embedded in Cho’s research.  
Cho (2010) further establishes relevance for this study by discussing concerns 
related to the “intergenerational transmission of crime” (p. 267). Transmission, like a 
message from space or the plague. Cho cites research that: 
finds that maternal incarceration is associated with high rates of incarceration 
among those mothers’ children when they reach adulthood (p.267).  
 
Cho’s study then examines school dropout rates among children in relation to length of a 
mother’s “incarceration spell” (“dosage”) and the “developmental stage” of the child 
during the mother’s incarceration (“timing”). Cho asserts that dosage matters because as 
dosage increases so do disruption and stigma. The author then attributes greater 
disruption and stigma to prison stays by stating: 
About half of the inmates sentenced to jail are convicted of a crime and usually 
receive a sentence of a year or less. They are admitted for light felonies, 
misdemeanors, and probation violations....prison inmates generally have longer 
sentences than jail inmates do and are convicted for more serious crimes” (p. 
262).  
 
Despite this being wildly inaccurate—mandatory sentencing policies send people 
to prison for many of the same reasons people end up in jail, including violations of 
probation32—by positioning severity of behavior as the factor for imprisonment this 
statement inadvertently positions the mother as the sole explanatory variable for child 
outcomes, despite all other obvious issues such as poverty, racism, or other contextual 
																																								 																				
32 In fact it has been widely recognized that probation often serves as a back door to incarceration. 
Probation increases surveillance and monitoring on a person’s life. Therefore many probationers are sent to 
prison for technical violations in regards to the terms of their probation, rather than re-offense. 
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disadvantages empirically associated with incarceration. In the context of Cho’s study, 
school dropout rates could likely have something to do with the type of school a child 
attends. Further, the link between school dropout rates and a child’s own incarceration 
could have something to do with zero tolerance policies and the school-to-prison 
pipeline. When viewed through this wider lens, the association between a mother’s 
incarceration and her child’s incarceration has less to do with the severity of a mother’s 
crime and more to do with systems of inequity that perpetuate social exclusion.  
Manufactured Risk. Like many of the studies in my sample, Cho’s found, at best, 
mixed results and was ultimately unable to confirm their hypothesis (i.e. maternal 
incarceration = destined detrimental outcomes for children)33. Still, by foregrounding the 
paper with arguments related to the mother at the expense of a discussion on structural 
issues, the article paints a misleading picture regarding correlation. It is as though the 
researchers forget the most basic rule of statistics: correlation does not equal causation. 
By conflating correlation with causation, authors are able draw on the symbolism of 
“intergenerational crime,” which conjures up fears and insecurities regarding a child’s 
“risk.” This then becomes a catalyst for perpetuating messages regarding the need for 
increased surveillance.  
I emphasize this, not to negate the correlation, but to suggest that perhaps the 
focus is misplaced. Invoking a discourse of intergenerational crime narrows the 
profession’s focus to that of assessment and monitoring of a child’s risk. A focus on risk 
																																								 																				
33 It is perhaps also notable that when this same study found better outcomes for children if their mothers 
had longer stays in jail or prison, the researcher concluded that children (especially girls) might benefit 
from being separated from their mothers via incarceration—a prime example of the active construction of 
the unfit mother.   
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loses sight of a child’s agency and potential. Scholars studying the “cultural politics of 
childhood” call attention to the ways in which political and economic factors shape the 
lives of children and youth (Nybell, Shook, & Finn, 2009; Qvortrup, 2005). They connect 
their understandings of children and youth to shifting social, political, and economic 
conditions rather than just biology and family of origin factors. Social work can take 
lessons from such scholarship in order to shift the discourse on how we support children 
from one defined primarily by the assessment and management of risk to one that 
acknowledges agency and focuses on providing economic support to families in order to 
support a less constrained form of agency.  
Similar to Cho’s, many of the other studies on children in my dataset were framed 
around the expectation of dysfunction. However, results did not always compellingly 
support such expectations. At times, authors rationalized their unexpected results in ways 
that reinforced their original expectations. For example, Hanlon et al. (2005) conducted a 
study on 9–14-year-old children of incarcerated mothers in order to inform prevention 
programming. The study was premised on the assumption that these children would be 
“at-risk” for a variety of negative outcomes and, therefore, in need of targeted prevention:   
We anticipated that most, if not all, of the children of mothers who have been 
incarcerated, particularly substance-abusing mothers, would be highly vulnerable 
to the development of a deviant lifestyle (p.80). 
 
In the end, their results did not support these claims and the authors acknowledge that the 
children in their study “were neither especially deviant nor maladjusted” (p. 79). They go 
on to subtly qualify the disconfirmation of their expectations by stating: 
The majority of the children had been able to avoid the adoption of a deviant 
lifestyle at this point in their lives [emphasis added] (p. 79).  
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The use of the phrase at “this this point” indicates an inherent predication that at some 
point these children will indeed adopt a deviant lifestyle. Indeed, the authors then return 
to the larger body of literature to support this predication: 
In view of the positive relationship between age and delinquency noted in the 
literature (Elliott, 1994; Moffett, Caspi, Dickson, Silva, & Stanton, 1997), the 
vulnerability of all of the children is likely to increase during their teenage years 
(p.79).  
The authors then go on to disqualify their findings34 by emphasizing the smaller portion 
of their sample that displayed “disquieting characteristics” (p.79) related to peer 
associations and school performance, and state: 
Along with family support services, these two problem areas, both of which have 
an impact on the subsequent development of a deviant lifestyle, need to be 
promptly and aggressively [emphasis added] addressed in interventions targeting 
these and similarly disposed children (p.79-80).  
 
This example illustrates a trend in the larger dataset wherein authors persist in 
emphasizing deficits and calling for interventions related to risk despite not finding 
particularly problematic patterns of behavior35. I argue that an investment in the logic of 
risk is evidenced by such practices. Despite refuting their own expectations for riskiness, 
Hanlon et al., like other authors in my sample, cling to their predictive powers and try to 
re-invent risk. They legitimize their work by drumming up problems (i.e. risks) where 
none are indicated. In this sense not only are they displaying an investment in the 
																																								 																				
34 Another way these authors, and others in the dataset, rationalized similar unexpected findings was 
through a post facto analysis regarding the limitations of their study or sample.  
 
35 This trend was also found in the articles on intervention research. When interventions were found to be 
ineffective or inconclusive, authors rationalized the results by focusing on negative qualities of the 
participants (e.g. lack of motivation, lack of insight, etc.) rather than the qualities of the intervention. A 
prime example of this can be found in Buttell (2002) wherein the author attributes the ineffectiveness of the 
intervention under study (treatment for “female domestic violence offenders”) to a low level of “morality” 
among participants.		
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discourse of risk, but they are also creating risk. They are manufacturing risk. This 
speaks to the productive nature of social work research. Scholars produce a risky or “at-
risk” subject, generate knowledge or truths regarding that subject, and then establish 
expert interventions to regulate that subject (Cruikshank, 1996). In other words, we create 
subjects that need us and our interventions.  
Symbolic Use of Childhood. While some writers rely on symbolism around 
intergenerational crime and attachment to propel a discourse on risk, others invoke 
symbolism around childhood, and childhood lost, to tug at the heartstrings of readers. 
Common sentiments include those extorted by Harris (2017): 
 Children are innocent and have not committed a crime (p. 39);  
Miller et al. (2013): 
Implementing such practices and policies takes time, and the resources for 
implementation are not always readily available; nevertheless, the cost to children 
is too significant to delay action (p. 412); and 
 
Schlager and Moore (2014): 
Ultimately, the brunt of the impact of incarcerating mothers is acutely felt by 
children with both significant short and long-term consequences (p. 100).  
 
In these statements (and others like them), symbolism around innocence and “an 
endangered child” are used to conjure up images of subjects who are worthy of our 
attention, our efforts, and our care. Such argumentation strategies are powerful because 
they invoke symbolic consequences for children. As Sherr (1999) states, “Children are 
the quintessential example of individuals placed in circumstances beyond their control. 
The consummate victims, children are unable to overcome difficult circumstances 
without the assistance of caring adults” (p. 52).  
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Arguments that invoke the symbolism of childhood draw on larger cultural 
debates about deservingness (Cousins, 2013) and legitimize calls for advocacy and 
intervention on behalf of children. In this way, such argumentation can be seen as 
strategic and productive in the sense that it broadens the perspective regarding who is 
harmed by the carceral state and opens up spaces for resistance. However, I would argue 
that it also conceals larger questions regarding the underlying moral justifications that 
uphold the carceral state which ultimately deem it acceptable to lock those Other people 
(i.e. not innocent) in cages. The harms of incarceration are reduced to the level of 
platitude. Furthermore, I would argue that positioning children as symbolic victims 
justifies the continued regulation of their mothers. In over-emphasizing the welfare and 
worth of children, mothers are inadvertently positioned as undeserving (i.e. not innocent 
but guilty) and there is concurrently a persistent disregard for her traumas and needs, as 
well as her ability to be a loving parent. Social workers are, in turn, positioned as the 
caring adults, the guardians of the vulnerable. 
The Idealized Mother. In a smaller portion of the articles related to children and 
motherhood, the welfare, experiences, and opinions of mothers are discussed, and women 
are framed as being good or capable mothers. Typically, however, this is accomplished 
by using the binary of the good/bad mother which positions criminalized mothers in 
opposition or comparison to an idealized mother. For example, in their results section, 
under a theme labeled “Parenting: The Shame of Maternal Failure,” Allen, Flaherty, and 
Ely (2010) summarize their results by stating: 
Perhaps, the most outstanding quality of these interviews was how deeply 
reflective—often philosophical—these women were about all the subjects they 
covered but particularly with regard to the topic of motherhood. Many of the 
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women also struggled fiercely with their negative self-perceptions as parents. In 
many ways, the women expressed the same themes one would expect from any 
mother, including the aforementioned idealized mother. These themes included 
love for their children, pride in their children’s accomplishments, and worry about 
their children’s circumstances and future challenges. However, unlike idealized 
mothers, these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound 
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to 
protect their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child 
welfare system, powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the 
society from which they have become so disenfranchised [emphasis added] (p. 
165). 
 
Notice how the authors frame the first sentence in a way that presupposes the expectation 
that criminalized mothers would not be reflective and philosophical in regards to 
motherhood. The use of the phrase “most outstanding” rather than an evidentiality36 such 
as “of course” propels certain assumptions about the women and has the effect of 
denaturalizing their participants as good mothers. A question to ask ourselves is: if these 
participants were middle class women (or non-criminalized women), would this even be 
considered a finding? Further, the authors work from an assumption that “idealized” 
mothers do not feel powerless. This again speaks to the normative 
constructions/expectations around motherhood. Though the authors appear to set the 
women up in this dichotomy so as to challenge the construction of criminalized mothers 
as unfit, it ultimately ends up reinforcing the bad/good mother dichotomy and the 
construct of an idealized mother as legitimate and achievable. Similar normative 
gendered expectations around mothering were deployed throughout the dataset. Rarely 
																																								 																				
36 Evidentialities are phrases that suggest factuality (e.g. “of course”). Such discursive moves have the 
effect of naturalizing certain statements as common sense. It is notable that the authors use of “most 
outstanding” in effect worked off of a “commonsense” notion that women in the criminal justice system 
could not possibly be thoughtful, engaged mothers. In trying to dispel such narratives they make space for 
their sample to be considered “exceptional.” And though I would love it if the adage were that the 
exception complicates the rule, it is generally understood that the exception proves the rule.  
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was the criminalized mother discussed as being a complicated mother, who is neither 
idealized nor demonized (see Vandermause, Seversten, and Roll (2013) for an important 
exception37). Throughout the data there was a heavy emphasis on how one’s ability to 
meet (or not) these expectations is shaped by substance use and mental health issues and 
the subsequent lack of mental health and addictions treatment. In honing in on the lack of 
services and treatment, I believe the authors think they are looking at social justice and 
structural issues; however, without including a discussion related to how a woman’s 
ability to meet expectations for parenting is shaped by things such as poverty and racism, 
it ultimately reifies the focus on individual deficit and fault and holds steady the 
underlying logic of punishment and control. 
Similar to the use of normative constructions of motherhood, guilt was deployed 
as a gendered strategy of responsibilization. The articles on incarcerated mothers pull on 
guilt in different ways. For instance Allen, Flaherty, and Ely (2010) emphasize the guilt 
and shame mothers do feel in statements such as the following: 
Perhaps, the most powerful and heartbreaking themes were those of the maternal 
love that these women consistently expressed for their children and the profound 
sense of guilt and staggering remorse they were all struggling with when they 
discussed the impact of their actions on their children. It became abundantly clear 
that their substance abuse problems and criminal justice involvement were 
symptomatic of extremely troubled life histories (p. 170). 
 
																																								 																				
37 It is perhaps noteworthy that these authors are nursing scholars rather than social work scholars. I 
debated whether this constituted a discourse outside of social work, but in the end because it was published 
in an explicitly named social work journal (QSW), with an editorial board consisting of mostly social work 
scholars, I decided that it contained something important related to how social work discourse is/can be 
shaped by interdisciplinary scholarship.		
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Here, the focus on guilt emphasizes the action of taking responsibility and renders the 
women worthy of our empathy and understanding. In contrast, Gilham (2012) also 
deploys guilt but emphasizes the lack of remorse mothers feel.  
It seemed clear that these mothers were attempting to protect their children, but by 
denying their incarceration, they were able to save themselves from further 
embarrassment and shame. When asked whether their children had experienced 
negative consequences related to their incarceration, all of the women expressed 
that their children had indeed experienced at least some negative consequences. 
Many of the women seemed to minimize the impact of their behavior on their 
children, and several stated that they had not done drugs or committed any illegal 
activity in the company of their children. Three women in particular spoke at 
some length about their positive parenting skills and concern for their children 
despite their other actions. One mother was quoted as saying, ‘‘My kids are my 
life. I’m not a bad mom.’’ Incidentally, this participant was separated from her 
two children and two step-children, and her two sons had entered mental health 
counseling since she was jailed. Another mom, a newly admitted heroin and crack 
addict, spoke at length about the positive relationship she shared with her 6-year-
old daughter even though she had not seen her in more than a year. It is 
noteworthy that these three women were more recent admissions to the facility 
and had not had the benefit of the treatment the other women had received, which 
may account for their responses (p.94). 
 
Now, the focus on guilt emphasizes the absence of taking responsibility and renders the 
mothers unfit and no good for their children. However, in the last sentence readers are 
reassured that therapy can fix them right up. Indeed, Gilham goes on to say: 
From the women who had been in the facility for longer periods, we found that 
releasing them from their denial enabled them to have a somewhat different 
understanding of their family situation. The women who had served more of the 
typical 6-month sentence at the facility when interviewed made us aware that 
once a woman was able to admit to and begin to address her personal issues, 
including her addiction, she was able to re-examine her parenting behavior and 
how her problems affected her children (p. 96). 
 
In many ways, these two examples highlight the two primary constructions of 
criminalized women found in this study, the former being the vulnerable woman (object 
of pity) and the latter being the straight up risky woman. Despite the distinction, I don’t 
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necessarily see these two constructions as being completely oppositional, in that they 
both draw on neoliberal notions of responsibilization (for changing the self) and exert a 
reliance on the needs/risk paradigm (Hannah-Moffat, 2005). One portrays riskiness 
through the use of psychological language, which emphasizes a “fallen” or pitiful woman 
in need of help and treatment. The other frames a pattern of riskiness through the use of 
criminogenic language and needs, which ultimately paints a picture that emphasizes 
deviance and criminality. Though one highlights a woman’s vulnerability and the other 
her culpability, they both expose the underlying neoliberal ideology that is at work across 
constructions. Juxtaposed to one another, we can see that they come from different sides 
of the same needs/risk coin. Further, the distinction between risk and need is reminiscent 
of the historical binary of criminal woman/fallen woman, which is not only gendered, but 
also highly raced (Colvin, 1997).  
Concluding Thoughts. Throughout this section I have shown how the 
construction of risk operates through processes of normalization. In this way, risk 
becomes self-evident and taken for granted as an appropriate conceptual framework 
through which to view criminalized women and their children. Garrett (2016) discussed 
how dominant texts and popular ideas within social work “are frequently riddled with 
take-it-for-granted assumptions reflective of a particular historical and economical 
conjuncture” that show up in the “verbal categories that social workers are apt to use, 
promote, and reify” (p. 1912). I argue here that risk is one such verbal category.  
Risk saturates the discourse in this dataset in a manner that is reflective of (and 
reinstates) a neoliberal hegemonic order. The unquestioned reliance on risk is so strong 
that it is frequently hard to distinguish what constitutes a need from what constitutes a 
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risk. The persistence of risk as a totalizing discourse cannot be denied. Its subjects are 
caught up in a form of discursive capture and risk is turned into a scholarly platform and 
a profession. A closer look at the knowledge claims underlying and enabling the rampant 
use of risk helps to expose and rupture the places where neoliberalism hides out in the 
discursive production of risk. These knowledge claims are the focal point of the next 
section.  
Knowledge Claims 
Question #2: What particular knowledge claims about criminalization and criminalized 
women are made through these constructions? 
The following analysis is heavily influenced by Foucault’s concern with the 
production of knowledge through discourse. For Foucault, power does not exist outside 
of the production of knowledge (1995). He theorized the connection between power and 
knowledge in terms of not simply producing certain understandings of social reality but 
actively shaping reality. In other words, discourse produces knowledge claims that, in 
turn, shape what can be said and known about any topic. Jäger and Maier (2009) explain, 
“Discourses exert power because they transport knowledge on which collective and 
individual consciousness feeds. This knowledge is the basis for individual and collective 
action, which in turn shapes reality” (p. 39). In this way, discourses are tied up with 
power because they are ultimately capable of inducing ways of thinking and behaving. As 
modes of power, discourses not only construct reality but do so in unequal ways, 
privileging some as legitimate and normative while rendering others illegitimate and 
abnormal. Which, of course, circles us back around to Foucault's (1991) idea of 
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governmentality and the importance of examining knowledge claims for how they 
produce objects of governance.  
My examination of knowledge claims in the dataset revealed a consistent use of 
depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement throughout the 
data. From a Foucauldian perspective, such knowledge claims serve as normalizing 
technologies through which the discursive production of “criminal behavior” and a 
“criminal self” emerge. Being productive of neoliberal ideology rooted in self-
determination and responsibilization, depoliticized knowledge claims promote 
individualized discourses which then serve as the basis for governing through the 
regulation of conduct. More broadly, depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal 
justice involvement can be seen as a way of legitimizing the logic of punishment and 
control. As I outlined in the previous section, when it comes to social work, depoliticized 
knowledge claims emerge from a preoccupation with vulnerability and risk. In this 
section, I outline how depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal justice 
involvement are made through three primary neutralizing mechanisms: 1) an overriding 
emphasis on women’s individual choices; 2) an absence, or relegation, of issues related to 
structural context (decontextualization); and 3) a strong reliance on the language of the 
“psy” professions.  
Emphasis on Individual Choices. Depoliticized knowledge claims were exerted 
through a strong emphasis on choice and responsibility present throughout the dataset. 
Notions of choice and responsibility reflect neoliberal assumptions about individual 
autonomy and presuppose an “empire of choice” (Rose, 2000) in which all people have 
access to the same choices and opportunities. Like risk, choice rhetoric was deployed in 
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both implicit and explicit ways throughout the data. For example, in their article on the 
challenges of conducting research with women in prison, O’Brien and Bates (2003) state: 
And most important, how can we make use of these women’s experiences to help 
us construct better alternatives for holding women accountable for the crimes 
they commit while recognizing their potential to make different choices and 
enhance opportunities to make these positive choices? [emphasis added] (p. 223). 
 
In the above excerpt, we can see that the authors are being critical in that they are 
suggesting “alternatives” to prison. Their use of the modality “most important” even 
suggests a sense of urgency and serves as a call to action. Yet the suggestion for 
alternatives is not premised on questioning the underlying logic of criminalization; rather, 
alternatives are suggested in order to “hold women accountable.” The authors thus frame 
crime as a problem of the self. However, a strengths-based rhetoric also shines through in 
the authors’ desire to “recognize the potential” for women to make better “choices.” For 
Foucault, reformation of the self is a key aspect of governance. In this way, the authors’ 
utilization of a strengths-based position can be seen as upholding the mantel of 
neoliberalism. The above excerpt provides an exemplar of the sneaky ways in which 
neoliberal ideology is embedded in social work discourses and how it undercuts claims 
toward social justice. The authors clearly recognize that all women do not have access to 
the same choices, hence the need to “enhance opportunities.” However, despite this 
acknowledgement, their focus on individual choice still locates the cause of crime and 
criminal justice involvement in individuals and their intrapersonal concerns related to 
substance use, mental illness, poor self-esteem, and poor decision-making (i.e. choices). 
In so doing, the authors’ calls for “alternatives” fall short. Because the discursive 
production of the individual as the problem remains intact, “alternatives” simply relocate 
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punishment and control to the community. Similar assumptions of choice show up 
consistently throughout the data. Typically, they are explicitly gendered. I understand this 
as a strategy of gendered responsibilization. 
Decontextualization. Similar to the emphasis on individual choice, depoliticized 
explanations for crime and criminal justice involvement were further developed through 
various methods of decontextualizing the content. Decontextualization is a process 
whereby women’s actions, choices, and circumstances are predominantly represented as 
disconnected from larger social, institutional, and historical contexts. Such 
representations act as a mode of reasoning which legitimates research and interventions 
fixated on naming and changing personal and behavioral characteristics of individuals at 
the expense of those aimed at understanding and unsettling the discourses of the penal-
welfare state. Analyses of criminalization that do not engage with the political economy 
not only are incomplete, but function to promote discourses of individualization. 
Decontextualization, then, overlaps with a discussion on normalization in that individuals 
who are unable, or unwilling, to meet socially prescribed (read: normative) rules and 
expectations are understood as individuals who fall outside the bounds of what is 
considered normal and natural, and thus are in need of fixing. Within social work, this is 
enacted through processes of responsibilization (Rose, 2000). Therefore, I understand 
decontextualization as an enactment of neoliberal ideology: it discounts the social, 
political, and economic factors that account for women’s involvement in the criminal 
justice system in favor of explanations focused on individual deficit and choice.  
Women are the fastest growing segment of the correctional population, and this 
fact appeared to be widely acknowledged within the data. Consequently, most of the 
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articles in the dataset touch on the causes for the increasing rates of 
incarceration/criminalization; however, they do so in different and often conflicting ways. 
While some articles recognize sentencing policies as playing a part in the growing rates 
of incarceration, many others do not. For example, Gilham (2012) opens their article by 
acknowledging women’s growing rates of incarceration and then states: 
This ballooning incarceration rate for women has been associated with drug and 
alcohol addiction (Alleyne, 2006; Arditti & Few, 2008) (p. 89).  
What Gilham’s discussion lacks is any acknowledgement of the social and 
sentencing policies related to the war on drugs that lead to the criminalization of 
substance use. Instead, the author focuses solely on addiction as the driving factor for the 
mass incarceration of women. This was a common discursive strategy within the dataset 
whereby the larger context of mass incarceration is highlighted only to establish 
significance for research, which, conversely, explains rising incarceration rates through 
the lens of addiction or other individualized discourses. In this way, substance use and 
addiction become understood as the cause not only of individual crime, but also of mass 
incarceration. Such discursive framings obscure the fact that drugs (use, possession, 
proximity to) are in fact the crime, and not the cause of crime; and presuppose that crime, 
rather than policy, is the causal factor leading to punishment and incarceration, an 
assumption that has been effectively disputed by sentencing experts (Tonry, 2007).  
To take the discussion further, it is prudent to hone in on the word addiction. 
Gilham, like other authors in the dataset, associates increasing rates of women’s 
incarceration with addiction rather than drug use or involvement in the drug trade. 
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the criminalization of drugs has less to do with 
actual addiction than it does with systemic racism and how that racism plays out on a 
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national stage. Certainly, many individuals involved in the criminal justice system are 
managing issues related to addiction, but many have also been arrested and prosecuted 
for recreational and periodic use and/or their proximity to drugs. Conversely, many 
people with addictions (depending on their classed and raced social locations) never 
become criminalized. To characterize women who are caught up in the drug war as 
“addicts” is a gross misrepresentation of the actual political and economic forces at play 
in the carceral state. The focus on addiction = mass incarceration is a discursive strategy 
that obscures the social and historical production of crime, and thereby reconstructs 
gendered, raced, and classed social exclusion as being the result of individual behaviors 
and deficits. By now, there is a large body of research that challenges the notion that 
drugs cause crime. Rather, it is recognized that the link between drugs and crime is part 
of a broader problem generated by poverty and racism. Further, Taylor (2016) notes the 
othering effect that the drugs = crime discourse has in purporting dominant notions of 
criminality and simplifies understandings of drug use as dangerous.  
In general, I am concerned about the overall lack of engagement with the political 
economy that I saw in the data. Lack of awareness regarding the political economy leads 
to incomplete understandings and overreached knowledge claims. For instance, in their 
study on the role of gender in post-jail homelessness, Fries, Fedock and Kubiak (2014) 
state: 
Screening for CODs upon jail intake is perhaps the first and most crucial step 
social workers can take to reduce homelessness among the incarcerated 
population (p. 113). 
 
When reading this statement, and others like it that are strewn throughout the dataset, I 
wonder: how far away from any understanding of the political economy does one need to 
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get to not only make this statement, but also make it intelligible? And it is not just a 
problem related to the authors. This article passed the editor’s desk, went through the 
process of peer review, and was ultimately published. According to Google Scholar, it 
has been cited 27 times. The authors, the gatekeepers, and other scholars have deemed 
the above excerpt a reasonable and logical assertion. I take this to be indicative of a 
broader lack of engagement with both gender and the political economy in social work at 
large. 
Leaving behind the articles that completely exclude contextual and policy factors 
related to women’s involvement in the criminal justice system, at least 40% of the articles 
in the dataset acknowledge systemic issues, such as punitive sentencing policies and the 
war on drugs, as the cause of women’s mass incarceration. However, a contradiction 
emerges whereby despite acknowledging systemic issues, most of these articles 
ultimately fall back on individualized understandings of crime and/or scale their 
suggested intervention down to the level of the individual. For example, in a study testing 
an intervention for “female batterers,” Buttell (2002) explains that: 
Women are increasingly being arrested and prosecuted for domestic violence 
offenses under mandatory arrest statues (p. 349).  
 
Buttell then goes on to use that as evidence for the existence of, and increasing rates of, 
women’s violence, which the author explicitly links to morality. Buttell’s project then 
studies the relationship between moral reasoning and recidivism. To establish relevance 
for this investigation, the author asserts: 
In summary, there is an abundance of empirical support indicating that (a) the 
structure of moral development is universal (e.g., equally applicable to men and 
women) (Kohlberg, 1984; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Rest, 1993; Snarey, 1985; 
Snarey, Reimer, & Kohlberg, 1985; Walker, 1994); (b) offenders most often employ 
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a preconventional level of moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980; DeWolfe, Jackson, & 
Winterberger, 1988; Jennings, Kilkenny, & Kohlberg, 1983; Jurkovic, 1980); (c) 
moral education programs are effective in raising the level of moral reasoning (Blasi, 
1980; MacPhail, 1989; Rest, 1986; Rest & Navarez, 1994; Thoma, 1984); and (d) 
enhancing moral reasoning results in decreased criminal activity (Blasi, 1980; 
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Ma, 1989; MacPhail, 1989) (p. 350). 
 
Notwithstanding the many normalizing knowledge claims based on dated and limited 
data, Buttell effectively de-genders women’s use of violence by defining such violence as 
an issue related to individual morality. Further, linking the use of violence to immorality 
in such broad strokes creates (ironically) moralistic claims that violence is never 
warranted, even in the case of self-defense. Though this is a somewhat extreme example, 
it was a common practice in the dataset. Few of the articles in the dataset locate the cause 
of crime as rooted in issues of inequity and oppression, and fewer problematize the 
category of crime at all.  
When policy and structural issues were acknowledged by authors, they were 
commonly relegated to the margins of the texts, given a nod in the introduction, literature 
review, or conclusion, and then ignored in the substance of the article in favor of a focus 
on individual level factors such as feelings, behaviors, and relationships. For example, in 
their introduction, Berry et al. (2009) introduce a number of structural issues that impact 
criminalized women, such as: 
punitive public welfare structures, low-paying and unstable jobs, husbands and 
boyfriends who cannot or will not provide adequate financial support, and the 
absence of community-based supports (p. 294).  
 
However, the authors immediately frame these as, 
factors that can push women into lifestyles that bring them in contact with the 
criminal justice system [emphasis added] (p.294).  
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Here we see a key responsibilization strategy in what Rose (2000) calls the politics of 
conduct, where the “problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral or ethical 
problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and 
conduct themselves and their existence” (p. 334). In this way, women are understood as 
not just making one bad choice or engaging in a specific crime, but rather living a 
criminal lifestyle. This provides an exemplar of how power is exercised throughout the 
data. The discursive shift to lifestyle produces a “truth” in which a woman’s whole 
identity (i.e., existence) is constituted through the notion of criminal lifestyle.  
The discursive reformulation of choice into lifestyle “opens the possibility for a 
whole range of psychological techniques to be recycled in programmes for governing the 
excluded” (Rose, 2010, p. 334). Through the remainder of Berry et al.’s (2009) article, 
the aspects that make up this lifestyle are then identified and targeted for intervention. 
The authors specifically implicate women’s personal relationships for interfering with 
“self sufficiency” and invoke a dependency discourse which renders political and 
economic impacts on women’s “lifestyles” and law-breaking obsolete. In their conclusion 
Berry et al. make several suggestions for programs that could improve women’s self-
sufficiency, including education, job training, pregnancy prevention programs, and 
substance abuse treatment. At the very end, they tag on the need for “changes in the laws 
mandating prison sentences for drug-related crimes” (p. 299).  
Such nods to social, political, and economic factors give an illusion of invoking 
social justice. And perhaps they do. My students often argue that providing individual 
level services is indeed linked to social justice. They assert that systems level change 
takes time and, while we wait, it is important that people receive services in order to meet 
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their needs. I am drawn to the openness and certainty of such argumentation. And I 
would say they it is without merit. Still, I argue that for social justice to be social justice, 
a practice/analysis needs to be firmly rooted in a scrutiny of power. Perhaps this brings us 
to a larger ambiguity within social work: what exactly constitutes social justice and who 
gets to decide? Relatedly, there is lack of consensus in social work regarding what 
constitutes power and how it is exercised in practice. Which, of course, leads us back to 
the ambiguous nature of the undecidable. The space of undecidability is where Foucault’s 
conceptions of power may have particular significance for social work. Foucault invites 
us to think about power as diffuse, not in terms of who possesses it and who does not, but 
rather in terms of how it is exercised in context specific situations (Foucault, 1991). In 
this sense, power is discursive and produced in multiple, conflicting ways. Power then 
functions through the production of knowledge, or regimes of truth, which shape subject 
positions and dominant ways of knowing and seeing.  
For my analysis, then, rather than thinking in terms of social justice as being 
either present or absent, it seemed more helpful to think in terms of shades of social 
justice. Along these lines, I would argue that many of the articles in the sample exercised 
power through engagement in apolitical invocations of social justice, which can be just as 
dangerous as apolitical deployments of empathy and love. Just as a discourse of empathy 
and love can mask the power involved in the helping relationship (Margolin, 1997), so 
too can the discourse of social justice (Badwall, 2015), thereby allowing social work to 
function under a veil of innocence.  
Textual Silence: Racism. A stark example of decontextualization can be found in 
the textual silence around racism. Huckin (2002) describes textual silence as being “the 
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omission of some piece of evidence that is pertinent to the topic at hand” and by its 
omission provides or inhibits certain views (p. 348). As I read and re-read through the 
data, I started to notice that a conversation about racism was starkly absent. To confirm 
this observation, I counted the occurrences of the word racism using the word cruncher in 
ATLAS.ti. As a comparison, the word risk (and its derivatives risks, risky, etc.) appears 
783 times in the dataset; the word racism appears only eight. The concept of risk shows 
up in virtually every article, whereas racism is discussed in only four. In Chapters 2 and 
3, I reviewed the profound racial disparities that plague corrections and argued that we 
cannot talk about the criminal justice system without talking about and centering race and 
the historical legacy of racism through which it emerged. As I have illuminated 
previously, racism is one of the largest structural issues causing and impacting high 
incarceration rates in the United States, yet the discursive practices of scholars in the 
dataset enable racism to be disregarded or completely silenced. The question remains, 
when racism goes unacknowledged and unchallenged, what is enabled and what is 
constrained? First, inattention to racism inherently limits any analysis of the criminal 
justice system. Second, it also serves as a powerful neutralizing technology allowing 
authors to claim objectivity. Deployment of objective, apolitical analyses allow authors to 
bolster their legitimacy in a knowledge production enterprise that privileges the value 
neutral objectivity of positivism. Further, the erasure of racism reinscribes individualizing 
discourses and reveals how neoliberalism and whiteness remain at the heart of knowledge 
production and social work praxis.  
Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes the racial ideology of the post-civil rights era as 
one marked by colorblindness and “apparent non-racialism.” He explains how under an 
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ideology of colorblind racism, racial inequalities are rationalized through cultural rather 
than biological explanations. From this understanding, the overwhelming explanations 
for criminal justice involvement related to individual and familial traits, found in the 
dataset, can be seen as naturalizing the racial inequities embedded in the criminal justice 
system. Bonilla-Silva (2014) asserts that this “is the central way in which contemporary 
scholars contribute to the propagation of racist interpretations of racial inequality. By 
failing to highlight the social dynamics that produce these racial differences, these 
scholars help reinforce the racial order” (p. 8). 
Scholars have also examined the production and erasure of racism in social work 
education and practice settings (Badwall, 2015; Jeffery, 2005). Badwall (2015), for 
example, examines how the historical production of the kind, charitable helper intersects 
with neoliberalism to shape contemporary practice. Badwall shows how the social work 
as “helper” identity is built upon colonial scripts of whiteness and argues that whiteness 
then serves as a centralizing organizing principle for practice. Badwall further argues that 
acknowledging the function of racism and social work’s participation in perpetuating 
racist systems requires disrupting a professional identity defined by “goodness.” 
Therefore, under discourses of helping and empathy, racism necessarily disappears so 
that social work may maintain an image of itself as a “good helper,” a place of innocence 
in processes that perpetuate racialized exclusion and oppression. Badwall states, “The 
very naming of racism disrupts both the ideals of the profession and the neoliberal 
underpinnings of the state. Being seen as moral subjects requires an erasure of race” (p. 
19). If knowledge production is the site in which such helping practices are legitimized, 
whiteness can be seen as operating through the erasure of racism in my data as well. 
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There are three primary types of articles in which this textual silence manifests: 1) 
articles that make no mention of racialized issues, by either avoiding it entirely or 
implicitly disavowing it as an explanatory variable related to criminal justice 
involvement; 2) articles that make note of racial disproportionality in the criminal justice 
system, but include no further mention or analysis around racism; and 3) articles that 
focus on a specific racial group but include no analysis around racism. I will address each 
of these in turn.  
Complete Silence. 26 articles include no analysis of criminal justice involvement 
as a racialized issue, and mention race only when describing sample demographics. This 
omission of race and racism is explicit in the following excerpt from Allen, Flaherty, and 
Ely (2010): 
These women are already marginalized by their gender, class, and victimization 
status and the systemic barriers they consistently face (p. 162).  
 
Note the missing category of race. Throughout this article, the authors name gender and 
poverty as axes that are pivotal to understanding the criminalization of women, but they 
remain silent on race. Despite almost half of their sample being composed of women of 
color, neither race nor racism is discussed. The only time the authors mention anything 
related to race is when they name the White racial identity of participants in their study, 
as in the following statement:  
Margie, a 24-year-old White woman, has a 14-month-old son who is in state 
custody [emphasis added] (p.168).  
 
Moreover, phrases such as “crack subculture” and “America’s poor struggling 
communities” (p. 166) appear to operate as proxies for race in this study. The effect this 
has is to whitewash the study and its participants and subsequently neutralize (i.e., 
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depoliticize) the analysis. By not considering race as a factor that shapes gendered 
experiences and women’s interactions with the various systems that impact their lives, 
women are then homogenized. Historically this has meant women = white women. 
The silence on race and racism is so stark in this article that it is hard to believe it 
is unintentional. The blatant omission of race and the use of coded language throughout 
make me think there was some effort involved in this process. But the question remains, 
why? Are the authors drawing on colorblind ideology of “goodness” and in so doing 
making their expressed feminist intentions more appealing to a broader (i.e., racist) 
audience? If so, what good does this do given that racism is so firmly embedded in the 
criminal justice system? Here, it is interesting to note that this article draws heavily on 
the construction of vulnerability discussed earlier in this chapter. This article and many 
others that also draw on the construction of vulnerability are similarly silent on this issue 
of racism. “Vulnerability,” then, can also be read as white. Vulnerable (i.e. white) women 
are worthy of our empathy and can be redeemed. In this we see social work drawing on 
an historical discourse regarding the “fallen” woman. While in the time of the 
reformatories the fallen woman was constructed as childlike and led astray, in the 21st 
century she is recast as vulnerable. However, as has historically been the case, women of 
color are excluded from this construction and consequently deemed more “criminal,” 
further justifying their imprisonment.  
Racial Statistics. The issue of racial disproportionality is mentioned as a matter of 
fact, but is left unproblematized and not linked to processes of racism in 15 articles. For 
example, in the introduction to an article on gender responsive programming in prisons, 
White (2012) states:   
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The number of women arrested and incarcerated is at an all-time high. As a result 
of two distinct arms of the War on Drugs (legislative changes and the social 
construction of the drug user as a criminal), women have become more vulnerable 
to arrest for drug crimes than they were in the past. Add to this a group of 
conspiracy laws used to prosecute women who are acquainted with a drug dealer, 
and the numbers escalate even more (Merolla, 2008). Poverty and a lack of 
education often lead women to make poor choices and engage in high-risk 
behavior; it happens that the majority of these women are Black and Latina. The 
number of women admitted annually to the Illinois Department of Corrections 
quadrupled between 1990 and 2005, and women of color make up 90% of that 
number (CLAIM, 2006) [emphasis added] (p. 284). 
 
A number of neutralizing strategies merge in the above excerpt. First, the author frames 
the high rates of criminalization as a direct result of sentencing policy and the war on 
drugs. However, White immediately casts that aside in favor of a discussion on individual 
“high-risk behaviors” and “poor choices,” which the author then links to women of color. 
The use of the phrase “it happens” allows her to treat racial disparities as a matter of fact, 
as a somewhat natural occurrence for which there is no responsibility to be had. Finally, 
White calls attention to racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system, but never 
once throughout the entire article does she mention racism. Racism is effectively 
disregarded as a factor contributing to high rates of incarceration, poverty, and lack of 
opportunity, or “high-risk behavior.”  
Ferraro (2008) argues that presenting racial statistics without reference to the 
historical, social, and political context from which they emerged has the potential to reify 
“racial realist” notions about the deficiencies and pathologies of people of color. She 
astutely notes, “Without careful contextualization of data, these analyses can obscure the 
social processes of domination and lead to spurious conclusion about race as a cause” (p. 
194). Ferraro (2008) asserts that within a neoliberal context where widespread 
“individualistic and moralistic interpretations of social problems” is common, it is 
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important not only to present racial statistics, but to also consider how they will be 
received. Therefore, the concern with discussing racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system but leaving them unexamined is that it reinforces dominant notions of people of 
color as being inherently more "criminal” and uses the power of positivity to undercut, 
rather than promote, racial justice. In so doing women of color are, once again, framed as 
“criminal” while white women are framed as "fallen."  
Race without Racism. Race was the explicit factor of analysis in four articles. 
However, even when this was the case, the naming and analysis of racism was still 
bypassed (with the exception of Epperson et al., 2009). For example, in their study on the 
moderating effects of race on the behaviors of children with criminal justice involved 
mothers, Miller and Bank (2013) explicitly compare the effects of maternal criminal 
justice involvement on “Black” and “non-Black” children. Though the main point of 
analysis is clearly centered on the racial category of Black, and it could be assumed that 
this choice was made based on the gross overrepresentation of Black women in the 
criminal justice system, the authors include no discussion of the role that racism plays in 
shaping these racial disparities or the results of their study. Rather, the authors draw on 
culture as a protective factor in shaping Black children’s outcomes. Thereby, a discussion 
of racism is circumvented through a discussion of culture. Given women of color’s 
disproportionate representation in the criminal justice system, the absence of a discussion 
and analysis around racism feeds into depoliticized explanations for crime and criminal 
justice involvement, thereby producing a limited vision regarding the space for social 
work intervention. Engagement with racism as a cause for mass incarceration would 
render incoherent rationales for individual level interventions and the program 
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evaluations that ensue. At the very least, engagement with racism would require scholars 
to admit to the limits of individual level interventions and evidence-based practice 
knowledge. Silence around racism, therefore, depoliticizes the issue and helps to not only 
secure a place of innocence, but also legitimize a fundable research enterprise in social 
work. 
We need to talk about gender. I’m deeply unsatisfied with the way gender is dealt 
with in the data set. I will start by noting the simplistic analysis of gender that was 
prevalent throughout the data. It is actually quite remarkable how little gender is dealt 
with in the dataset. In fact, there was a striking un-discussion of gender. In most of the 
articles, gender is only discussed or explained in relation to naming demographic 
characteristics that criminalized women share as a group. For instance, women were 
typically defined in relation to men; as not men. Specifically, women were most often 
described as distinct from men in three primary ways: they are mothers, they have more 
extreme experiences of victimization and trauma, and they have higher levels of 
substance abuse. It appears then that gender is operationalized along the lines of trauma, 
substance abuse, and motherhood. In this way, gender is privileged as an analytic 
category and the differences that exist between women are largely ignored. It is 
presupposed that criminalized women have more in common with other women than with 
criminalized men. Issues of race, class, sexuality, disability, age, nationality, etc.38 are 
subsequently erased or ignored.  
																																								 																				
38 Notably, the data marginalizes women who do not have children (or in some cases pathologizes them), 
and completely ignores older women, trans women in men’s prisons, and women with disabilities. 
Furthermore, there is an assumed heterosexuality inherent in the discussions of gender, particularly in the 
ways in which women’s intimate relationships are pivoted around men. 
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Vis-à-vis a simplistic framing of gender, many articles in the dataset deployed the 
notion of “gendered pathways” as an explanatory framework for understanding women’s 
crime and criminal justice involvement. The discourse on gendered pathways came about 
in the 90s as feminist criminologists sought to explain the gendered nature of women’s 
trajectories into crime (Comack, 2006). The pathways discourse looks at specific factors 
that put women “at risk” for ongoing criminal involvement. Trauma and victimization are 
central concerns under a pathways umbrella; victimization is understood as leading to 
mental health concerns, which lead to substance use as a self medicating strategy, and 
ultimately living in poverty—factors that are all assumed to lead to criminal activity. The 
pathways approach was successful in drawing attention to the violence women face 
before, during, and after contact with the criminal justice system, and thus complicating 
presumed knowledge regarding criminalized women. In other words, by turning trauma 
into a risk factor, the pathways discourse essentially reframed women as victims instead 
of criminals. However, as some feminist criminologists have since pointed out, when 
women are equated with trauma, and trauma is equated with crime, risk is uniquely 
gendered (Hannah-Moffat, 2004). As I have already demonstrated, this discursive chain 
of logic (trauma = substance abuse = crime) was common throughout the dataset. 
Furthermore, the pathways approach was deployed throughout the data in such a 
way as to highlight pathways to individual acts of crime, not pathways to criminal justice 
involvement. For example, in a study on the effect of maternal criminal justice 
involvement on children, Miller (2014) states: 
While the purpose of the current study was not to examine the association 
between children's outcomes and risks for intergenerational criminal justice 
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involvement, these findings speak to the literature on the link between female 
traumatic life experiences and pathways of delinquency and crime [emphasis 
added] (p. 76). 
 
Similarly, in a systematic review of the effects of correctional-based programs for 
“female offenders,” Tripodi et al. (2011) state: 
Substance abuse, a criminogenic factor, is one of the most prevalent pathways to 
crime for female offenders [emphasis added] (Chesney-Lind, 1998; Covington, 
1998). 
 
Such discursive framings naturalize crime as a fact rather than a social construct (Pollack, 
2006). Indeed, except for the counter-discourses (which I will discuss later in this 
chapter), the underlying construct of “crime" is rarely questioned in the data. This clearly 
circles us back around to the emphasis on choice and the ways in which choice is bound 
up with gender and neoliberalism. Within a neoliberal framework, concepts such as 
choice, gendered pathways, and the gender-responsive strategies that flow from them are 
depoliticized and deployed as regulatory strategies of self-governance. 
At this point, I have reviewed two reasons for why a pathways framing is 
inadequate. First, it genders risk; and second, it takes crime to be a stagnant category 
located within individual behaviors. This brings me to a third reason. In an era of mass 
incarceration and “new penology,” dominant narratives of gendered pathways are no 
longer logical. Let me elucidate. The pathways approach emerged prior to the passage of 
welfare reform and Clinton’s crime bill, two pieces of legislation that collided to 
exacerbate mass incarceration and to propel an unprecedented growth in the female 
correctional population. As such, pathways rationality is notably void of any analysis 
regarding the impacts of the neoliberal political economy on women’s lives.  
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As I discussed in Chapter 2, the context of neoliberalism produces a rolling back 
of the welfare state and the rolling out of the carceral state. This simultaneous “rolling 
back and rolling out” has been documented as a key dynamic in bringing increasing 
numbers of women into contact with the law (Sudbury, 2000). While I do not disagree 
with the fact that violence is a gendered issue and that women face a disproportionate 
amount of violence, pathways analytics, which center on experiences of trauma and 
victimization, do not adequately explain the current levels of women’s criminalization 
and incarceration under a rubric of neoliberal globalization.  
A brief discussion on the concept of “new penology” is warranted here. Feely and 
Simon (1992) introduced the term new penology to describe a distinct shift in the 
apparatus of corrections that occurred in the late 20th century. This time period marked a 
shift away from a focus on the individual in criminal justice toward an overwhelming 
concern with aggregates. The rationalities undergirding the new penology have brought 
forth a conglomeration of actuarial policies concerned not with the rehabilitation of 
individual offenders, but rather with the identification, classification, and management of 
selected risk groups. The logic of new penology relies on discourses of risk, which seek 
to assess and predict probability of offense and re-offense. Such logic is apparent in 
sentencing policies, such as three strikes you’re out and mandatory minimums, which 
allocate punishment indiscriminately rather than on a case-by-case basis. The logic of 
new penology is also evident in an overreliance on a number of other practices that entail 
targeted policing and surveillance. As such, scholars have identified the emergence of 
new penology as the fuel for mass incarceration.  
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The data suggest that social work appears to draw on notions of individual choice 
and responsibility, indicative of the old penology, while simultaneously deploying the 
discourses of risk prevalent in new penology. It is as though social work is attempting to 
hold on to the rehabilitative ideals of the previous penal ideology (which is perhaps better 
aligned to the ideals of social work) while also clinging to the promise of the evidence-
based movement. The contradiction produces a paradox in which social work continues 
to individualize and responsibilize under a ‘new’ penal regime which classifies, targets, 
and criminalizes entire groups of people based not on their individual behaviors and 
choices, but on the characteristics they share: for having black and brown bodies; for 
being poor, homeless, unemployed, uneducated; for experiencing violence or mental 
illness; the list goes on.  
There are two problems I see here. First, the logic does not hold. If gone are the 
days when individuals were criminalized for their individual acts alone, and not because 
they were caught up in a system of surveillance and regulation (though it is contestable 
whether this was ever the case), then to continue to focus on individual choices and 
behaviors is clearly misguided. Second, and following the same line of reasoning, the 
focal point of intervention should not be the individual behavior of so called “criminals,” 
but rather the systems levying their powers of prediction and surveillance and the 
discourses that enable them. Even if we were to agree that crime is a real thing, and that 
trauma leads women (for whatever reason) to engage in such crime, and even if we 
agreed that treatment for trauma could then prevent criminal behavior, trauma treatment 
is not going to keep women from being classified in a risk category and subsequently 
regulated because of that classification; it is not going to stop mass incarceration, or even 
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put a small bandage on the gaping wounds caused by mass incarceration. Under the logic 
of new penology, the purpose of punishment is not rehabilitation; the purpose of 
punishment is deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. Social work’s continued 
discursive framing of punishment as rehabilitation is ultimately dehumanizing to those 
caught in the apparatus of new penology. New penology also parallels broader trends in 
the professionalization of social work. Like social work, corrections is caught up in the 
rise of managerialism and the scurry toward “evidence-based” practice (EBP) and 
research. Both managerialism and EBP prize objectivity and emphasize a reliance on 
economic efficiency. Privileged then are research and practice activities that advance 
predictability, consistency, and effectiveness. Scholars highlight the danger this holds in 
terms of shifting the focus of criminal justice from retrospective penalty to prospective 
regulation and control, thus widening the carceral net of control (Balfour, 2006; Carlton 
& Segrave, 2016; Maidment, 2006). Social welfare systems are intimately caught up in 
such prospective processes of regulation and control. 
Language of the Psy-Professions. Depoliticization is further enhanced through a 
reliance on the language of the “psy-professions.” Rose (1998b) refers to the discourses 
of the “psy-complex” as “ways of understanding and responding to human concerns 
using psychiatric terms, logics, and practices” (p. 101). Drawing on Rose, feminist 
scholars analyze how psychiatric and psychological discourses play out in correctional 
systems to organize how criminalized women are constructed, understood, and therefore 
managed (Hannah-Moffat, 2001; Kendall, 2000; Pollack, 2006). These discourses play 
out in my study’s data as well, and can be understood as ideological narratives that 
depend on psychological understandings of criminalized women and their behaviors. Psy-
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discourses establish a discrepancy between a normative or “ideal” and the 
person/behavior under analysis, which then prompts individuals to adjust their behavior 
in order to achieve the ideal. In this way, the narratives of the psy-professions can be seen 
as a governing through self-determination. Foucault would describe this as a productive 
rather than repressive power; a power that induces behavioral change and pre-supposes 
unconstrained agency and flexibility of “choice.”  
When used to explain the behavior of women involved in the criminal justice 
system, psychological discourses presuppose that errant behavior causes criminal justice 
involvement. Similar to risk thinking, the ideology of the psy-professions works on the 
assumption that criminalized women have psychological, emotional, or thinking deficits 
that lead them to engage in “criminal behavior.” Therefore, interventions are aimed at re-
orienting one’s thinking in order to promote emotional regulation and, thereby, change 
behavior. These techniques rely on notions of individual responsibility and thus allow 
women to be governed in ways that are aligned with neoliberalism. Psy-based 
interventions play nicely with the demands of funders for measureable outcomes, such as 
improved self-esteem, decreased depression, and, ultimately, lowered rates of recidivism. 
When deployed in a carceral context, psy-based interventions presuppose that the purpose 
of corrections is rehabilitation rather than incapacitation and retribution. The narratives of 
the psy-discourse effectively elide attention to the broader social context within which 
criminalization flourishes and allow social work to do the control work of the state (what 
in many ways it has always done) under the guise of treatment instead of punishment. As 
such, psy-based interventions are steered by social work’s investment in 
professionalization. 
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Though the discourses of the psy-professions were evident in most of the data, I 
focus the majority of the following discussion on one specific article that represents an 
exemplar of typicality in deployment of the psy-discourses. In an article titled, “Women’s 
Psychological Adjustment to Prison: A Review for Future Social Work Directions,” 
Fedock (2017) reviews research findings from the perspectives of deprivation theory (the 
effects of the prison environment on a prisoner’s well being) and importation theory (the 
effects of a prisoner’s history and personal characteristics on their well being while 
incarcerated) in order to build a case for a research agenda that integrates both 
perspectives. The author claims that such a research agenda is important because: 
Psychological adjustment has been understudied…however, psychological 
adjustment is a core issue for determining the mental health needs of prisoners, 
preventing worsening mental health, and promoting lowered recidivism [emphasis 
added] (p. 33).  
 
The sneaky issue of recidivism rears its head once again. Linking psychological 
adjustment, or lack thereof, to risk for recidivism once again assumes an individualized 
understanding of the factors that lead to recidivism and (re)entanglement with the 
criminal justice system and keeps the discussion located at the site of individual choices 
and feelings. The individual, rather than the prison, is centralized as the explanatory 
variable for recidivism. Such explanations ignore the research that shows that 
incarceration itself actually works to increase recidivism (Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). The 
author proceeds to define and discuss psychological adjustment in prison: 
Initial psychological distress on entry into prison is considered normal and 
typically decreases after the first few weeks (Islam-Zwart, Vik, & Rawlins, 2007). 
However, persistent psychological distress is viewed as abnormal and indicative 
of a potentially long-term, chronic concern labeled “prison adjustment 
depression” (Reitzel & Harju, 2000) [emphasis added] (p. 34). 
 
 175 
Here, the discourse invokes normalizations regarding how a prisoner should adjust to 
prison, which presupposes that prison is a place one should adjust to, or that one would 
naturally adjust to. What’s left out of such conjecture is the possibility that prison may 
actually be an impossible place for healthy adjustment or that not adjusting to such a 
violent atmosphere might actually be a healthy response. What is also left out is the 
possibility that depression may actually be the only normal response to being locked in a 
cage. What this author calls “prison adjustment depression,” others might call post-
traumatic stress disorder. 
After discussing deprivation theory, which does indeed connect inmate distress 
and mental health issues to the prison environment, Fedock presents critiques of the 
perspective and states: 
Also, in regard to social work practice models, this perspective ignores active 
ways that individuals cope with difficult environments. There is limited research 
about prison-specific ways that women cope in prison (for example, Negy, 
Woods, & Carlson, 1997), and research has not examined resiliency within prison 
life for women and a potential mediating role of individual-level coping with 
deprivation factors [emphasis added] (p. 36). 
 
In this excerpt, the author effectively disavows concerns with the prison and returns to 
typical social work focus on an individual’s ability/responsibility to “cope” with the 
deprivation of prison. Here, resiliency is aligned with coping, rather than resistance or 
even survival. Coping thus becomes a moral imperative and personal resilience is 
positioned as the remedy for “difficult environments.” Garrett (2016) argues that with its 
overemphasis on individual adaptation, resilience operates as a “keyword” of 
neoliberalism. From this perspective, a resiliency discourse, when deployed in the 
manner illustrated above, can be seen as complicit with the demands of neoliberalism as 
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women are charged to take responsibility for the impact of prison through the use of 
coping skills. Simultaneously, the role of social work is reduced to one of fostering or 
facilitating the capacity for coping and becoming resilient. The author then moves on to 
talk about importation theory, which 
posits that an inmate’s demographics and past experiences determine his or her 
psychological adjustment to prison (p. 37).  
 
When linked to the previous critique of deprivation theory, the inmate’s personal 
characteristics and past experiences become an important focal point in assessment and 
intervention because such factors determine an individual’s ability to be resilient and 
cope. In Foucauldian terms, resiliency, then, works as a “technology of the self.”  
Fedock makes various critical, seemingly social justice oriented, points 
throughout the article while also relying on the logic of positivism to erase a point of 
view. The author appears to be utilizing normalizations (perhaps strategically) to make a 
case for improving prison conditions, without ever actually claiming an advocacy 
position. Though a neutral, apolitical stance was not exclusive to this author, or rare in 
the data set, I had to spend a lot of time with this specific article trying to unpack it in 
order to understand its purpose and what it accomplished. The article exerts a veil of 
objectivity that I find confusing but not at all compelling. Driven by the logic of 
positivism, objectivity requires measurable outcomes which, I argue, drive the creation of 
intervenable needs. This raises concerns for me regarding how success is conceptualized 
and what is expected from humane treatment. I am of the mind that people should be 
provided humane treatment regardless of how they respond to it. Arguments such those 
provided in Fedock’s article, though in some ways strategic, inadvertently imply that 
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humane treatment is valuable only if it produces certain outcomes (i.e., healthy 
psychological adjustment). These outcomes may be unrealistic and overly demanding of 
individuals, given the inherent violence of the prison. The danger, then, lies in the 
possibility that politicians and funders will discredit the need for humane treatment if the 
externally defined outcomes for success are not met. The question remains: what use and 
whose interests does objectivity actually serve in this article?  
The discourse deployed throughout the dataset was one that allowed authors to 
appear progressive in intent while ultimately remaining neutral. Through the use of subtle 
contradictions, detached descriptions, and passive language, authors manage to not claim 
any perspective at all, and to stay politically neutral. For instance, when presenting 
common critiques of importation theory, Fedock (2017) states: 
Importation factors are often described as prisoner risk factors, and the conflation 
of needs into risk factors has shifted the responsibility from system solutions to 
individual-level factors (Hannah-Moffat, 1999; O’Malley, 1996) (p. 38). 
 
In the above excerpt, the author cites feminist (Hannah-Moffat) and post-structural 
(O’Malley) scholarship in order to provide a critique of risk thinking. However, a 
reliance on risk is simultaneously re-inscribed throughout the article, demonstrating a 
subtle contradiction as well as a lack of sophisticated engagement with the feminist and 
post-structural perspectives she invokes. For instance, Fedock explicitly names a range of 
risk factors (for poor psychological adjustment and recidivism) throughout the article, 
including: “chronic mental health distress,” “poor psychological health,” and being a 
“woman of color.” Despite presenting a discussion of how deprivation theory accounts 
for emotional distress, the author never once names the prison itself as a risk factor (a 
feminist critique); nor does she ever question the notion that women should adjust to 
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prison (a post-structural critique). Nor does the author acknowledge the very real 
possibility that one might be depressed precisely because they are in prison. In fact, 
despite calling for an integration of importation and deprivation theories, the author uses 
the discourses of the psy-professions to reconfigure disciplinary control through a lens of 
rehabilitation. Such discursive sleights of hand were a common way that the authors in 
my dataset remained neutral and undermined their professed alignments with social 
justice. 
Fedock also maintain neutrality through the use of objective description:  
   
The prison environment is a physically, socially, and psychologically distinct 
location with intentional deprivations (such as loss of privacy), with adjusting and 
adapting to this environment as challenges [sic] for inmates (Owen, 1998). 
Prisons are total institutions in that they operate within a contained space, 
dictated by their own set of rules, regulations, surveillance, and consequences and 
maintained by authoritative custodial staff (Goffman, 1961) [emphasis added](p. 
32). 
 
As in other discussions in this article, the author provides no critique or commentary of 
prisons as a “total institution.” Rather, she presents a detached, matter-of-fact description. 
Further, when discussing the “dynamics of women’s prisons” the author gives a brief 
historical overview and then states: 
It has been argued that gendered ideas of corrections persist in how women’s 
prisons function [emphasis added] (p. 32).  
 
The use of the passive phrase “it has been argued” allows the author to remain neutral, to 
not take a stance. While the use of depersonalized, passive language may be in line with 
the norms of the genre of academic literature, such tactics are also indicative of a 
positivist epistemology that privileges objectivity in revealing “truth.” Why, you might 
ask, is a critique of the prison necessary when examining psychological adjustment? 
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Precisely because the concepts this discourse invokes to describe adjustment (i.e. coping, 
resilience) presuppose a certain level of control and flexibility of choices, which in prison 
do not exist (Hannah-Moffat, 2000). The effect of such neutralized discourses on and 
about the prison reduces the purpose of social work to one in which our mandate is to 
simply teach people to cope with mechanisms of oppression so they can be better 
managers of their own risk.  
Furthermore, throughout the article, Fedock establishes a need for a future 
research agenda by emphasizing the lack of research on a number of issues related to how 
women respond to and cope with prison.39 However, there is in fact significant feminist 
engagement on a number of fronts that the author purports as lacking. For instance, there 
is thoughtful scholarship on how women form relationships, navigate power, and resist 
oppression and loss of personhood while incarcerated (e.g. Bosworth & Carribine, 2001; 
Rowe, 2015; Smoyer, 2015). Likewise, there is substantial research on the violence of 
prison and the inhumane conditions/treatment women experience in prison (e.g. Law, 
2012; Rafter, 2017). There is also research documenting how the era of ‘new penology’ 
impacts women and how it is taken up in women’s prisons (e.g. Hannah-Moffat, 2001; 
McCorkel, 2013). Emphasizing a lack of research when there is indeed research was 
common throughout the data. 
Perhaps by “lack of research,” authors really mean lack of quantitative, positivist 
research. Or perhaps the overarching point of this particular article is that the research 
that is done is not explicitly linked to mental health outcomes. However, the harms of 
																																								 																				
39 The criminalization and mass incarceration of women has gained substantial scholarly attention over the 
last decade. Fedock’s claim regarding the lack of research in this area may be attributable to the fact that 
most of the research she cites is from the late 20th century and the first decade of the 21st.  
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prison are, in fact, well documented, which begs the question: why are scholars investing 
their time in making a case for more research on what we already know, rather than 
advocating hard for policy change and alternatives to prison? After all, wouldn't not 
going to prison in the first place better support the goal of improving women’s mental 
health? Whose interests are actually served through scholarship of this sort? Pollack and 
Rossiter (2010) argue that under neoliberalism, the academy, and by consequence 
individual scholarly agendas become instruments of the state; in social work, a profession 
that has been historically aligned with the public good, the position of scholars thus 
changes to “one of self-interest rather than contribution to the common good” (p. 160). I 
would argue that scholarship of the sort that is advocated for throughout the dataset 
supports a fundable research agenda more than it supports criminalized women’s actual 
needs, and leaves the fundamental machinery of the carceral state untouched. 
I also find it notable that a couple of the authors in the dataset hold positions of 
leadership on social work’s national Smart Decarceration Initiative. Though intentions 
may be pure—after all, many authors present a case for either improving prison 
conditions or attending to women’s complex needs, which is both necessary and noble—
it is important to remember that the powerful function of discourse lies outside of 
intention. Individual intention has little bearing on the operation of disciplinary power 
which “works through and upon the individual and constitutes the individual as an object 
of knowledge” (O’Malley, 1996, p. 189). Therefore, advocating for improvements to 
prison so that women can better “adjust” invokes a strategy of normalization and engages 
a logic that fortifies the existence of the prison. In essence, it is calling for “kinder, 
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gentler cages,” which can be likened to rearranging the furniture on the Titanic. Yet, as 
Hannah-Moffat (2006) reminds us, “prisons, by any name, or in any form, are limited in 
their ability to respond to the needs of women offenders or to appreciate the context of 
their offenses” (p. 30). Fedock’s discussion then ultimately supports the logic of 
punishment, and her neutrality puts her out of alignment with the goals of Smart 
Decarceration, a discursive tendency within the dataset that is by no means exclusive to 
this author. I argue that neutrality on issues related to the carceral state allows social work 
scholars to shirk ethical and moral responsibility for promoting social justice and aligns 
social work with carceral systems in troubling ways. It seems that, in line with a 
neoliberal agenda, social work has engaged a depoliticized mandate for Smart 
Decarceration that operates through discourses of risk and psychological treatment rather 
than engaging ways of thinking and speaking that could enable solutions geared toward 
systems responsibility and change. Indeed, within the discourses of the psy-professions40, 
social justice and social change are rendered irrelevant and obsolete.  
Concluding Thoughts. De-politicized explanations for crime are dominant in 
social work discourse. As such, women’s involvement in crime and the criminal justice 
																																								 																				
40 On a final point regarding the overreliance on the “psy” discourses, I feel as though it is important to 
draw attention to the way in which an escalated focus on the psychological and emotional has led to what 
appears to be an abandonment of physical bodies. If we are talking about prisons and jails, I would argue 
that we also need to talk about the bodies that inhabit them. Bodies matter. However, while psychological 
interventions are advocated for because of their perceived ability to reduce and prevent recidivism, I found 
little to no concern for incarcerated bodies in the data set. For all the talk about substance abuse and 
addictions treatment, there is no discussion of what it might be like to detox in prison or jail. For all the talk 
of motherhood and parenting programs, there is very little about the physical experience of being pregnant 
and giving birth in a prison (the pregnancy pieces are primarily focused on the emotional aspects of having 
one’s child taken away after giving birth). Similarly, there is nothing said about managing menstruation or 
going through menopause while incarcerated. And there is not even a slight acknowledgement of bodies (or 
gender for that matter) outside of the binary—what happens to the physical bodies of trans women in men’s 
prisons (or trans men in women’s prisons). Through the use of the discourses of the psy-professions, it 
seems that social work has abandoned bodies in order to colonize minds. I see this as another place in 
which neoliberal ideology hides out. 
 182 
system becomes framed as pathological rather than a product of discursive systems of 
oppression and disadvantage. The effect this has is to erase the link between inequality 
and criminality. Further, a reliance on individualized understandings of crime and 
criminal justice involvement has the effect of destabilizing any attention given to 
social/political issues in an article and undermining an author’s social justice claims.  
Though my analysis was confined to social work high impact journals, referring 
to high impact journals as producing social work discourse is not without grounding. 
Foucault (1972) recognized that the power of discourse is reinforced through institutional 
support, thereby producing systems that enable, constrain, and govern discourse. 
Ultimately, what comes to be seen as legitimate knowledge or “truth” is a product of both 
discourse and power. Thus, with their conferred status and legitimacy, academic journals, 
and high impact journals in particular, can be understood as governing social work 
discourse. The institutional support behind high impact journals merges with the 
totalizing power of “the scientific” to (re)produce and reinforce specific knowledge 
claims which in turn shape social work practice. In other words, the knowledge claims 
made in academic journals become naturalized through the use of scientific discourse and 
cemented in practice.  
That being said, I would be epistemologically remiss if I grounded my analysis of 
social work discourse solely in the texts themselves. While it is necessary to consider the 
structures and practices underlying the production of knowledge, it is also necessary to 
account for the larger context of social work discourse in order to properly assess the 
power it holds. In that, my analysis is not without reference to the larger trends in the 
profession. The discursive patterns I see unfolding in the profession at large (and which 
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others have astutely traced) are similar to the neutralizing mechanisms I have outlined 
above. The dominance of individualized and depoliticized discourses on crime and 
criminal justice involvement looms large in social work. Such dominance marginalizes 
and constrains other ways of knowing and alternative possibilities for addressing the 
carceral state. From my analysis, it appears that the privileging of positivism and 
evidence-based practices accounts, in part, for the depoliticized engagement with the 
carceral state throughout the data. In the economy of knowledge production, 
neoliberalism has resulted in a competitive drive toward funding, proliferation of 
evidence-based practices, and professionalization (Pollack & Rossiter, 2010). Under this 
rubric, scholarship that questions and seeks to alter the fundamental structure of 
institutions is not recognized as valuable because, often, it is not fundable41. While 
counter-discourses and ways of understanding are certainly evident, both in my data and 
in the profession at large, the forms of knowledge and the practices that emerge from 
them are not institutionally supported through publishing and funding mechanisms. The 
dominant knowledge claims that flow from social work discourse are connected to power 
because, through dominance, they gain a discursive advantage and, thereby, inform how 
the profession addresses issues related to criminalization and mass incarceration. It is to 
the specific impact on practice and research that I now turn my attention. Though much 
of this has already been reviewed, in the following section, I will attempt to synthesize 
key points of my analysis.  
  
																																								 																				
41 There is much to be said regarding the conflation of funding and worth in the academy. Here, I will 
simply say that when it comes to high quality, intellectual endeavors, just because something is not 
fundable does not mean it is not worthwhile.  
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Governance and Resistance 
Research Question #3: How have these constructions and knowledge claims impacted 
social work practice and research with criminalized women? 
This section brings the analysis together and examines the implications for social 
work practice and research with criminalized women. I outline the various interventions 
and practice modalities offered in the data. With the exception of the systems and multi-
level interventions offered by the counter-discourses, I’ve noted a clear preference for 
individual level service delivery. Through analysis of the interventions called for and the 
specific outcomes they privilege, I argue that social work functions as a form of 
government at a distance. As such, there are very obvious ways in which dominant 
societal discourses and practices are reproduced. However, a close examination of the 
ways in which the data construct criminalized women and the implications for social 
work also show that the discursive limits of social work can be, and are currently being, 
stretched to embody a site of possibility and resistance. I begin this section by reviewing 
social work as a site of governance and end by considering social work as a site of 
resistance.  
Social Work as Governance. There are two primary ways in which the discourse 
in the dataset approach criminalized women. One is focused explicitly on risk and risk 
reduction and the other is focused on the enhancement of a psychological self (self-
esteem, skill development, parenting, etc.). As I have previously elucidated, these two 
approaches are distinct in some ways and overlap in others. Additionally, authors do not 
always draw on one or the other exclusively, but often pull on both. I do not see this as 
contradictory in that they both rely on depoliticized understandings of the nature of 
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women’s crime, which creates the conditions of possibility for individualized discourses 
and interventions rather than efforts aimed at addressing policy issues and structural 
inequity to emerge as the “natural” and logical response. As such, the data call for a 
variety of such practices that monitor and surveil criminalized women while 
simultaneously encouraging them to become experts on themselves and work to change 
themselves. Alongside this, however, is a clear discourse of empathy and what some 
might call an ethic of care. These discourses interact in a contradictory manner, in some 
ways reinforcing neoliberal discourses and in other ways challenging them. As such, 
social work emerges as a form of governance and therapeutic surveillance.  
In an examination of drug treatment courts, Moore (2011) presents the concept of 
“therapeutic surveillance” and describes it as a “seemingly benevolent form of 
monitoring which also troubles the ‘care/control’ dichotomy” (p. 255). Throughout 
Moore’s discussion we are introduced to the ways in which practices of care and 
discourses of empathy exist alongside practices of regulation and control. Surveillance is 
typically thought of as oriented explicitly toward disciplinary purposes. The concept of 
therapeutic surveillance provides us with a more nuanced view of surveillance, of what it 
means to watch and be watched, and, I believe, accurately reflects what I see in the data. 
Like Moore’s, my analysis shows that strategies aimed at control and those aimed at care 
do not sit in opposition to one another. For instance, earlier in this chapter I distinguished 
the varying ways social work constructs risk. This helped illuminate the less obvious 
ways that social work is implicated in surveillance and control and how this involvement 
is not always antithetical to elements of care. Therapeutic surveillance, then, can be seen 
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as a manifestation of Foucault’s conceptualization of governance, which accounts for the 
multifaceted, discursive nature of power.  
Risk Management Practices. Flowing seamlessly from the construction of risk, 
the majority of articles include a strong reliance on risk frameworks, with a focus on risk 
assessment and risk reduction as the intervention, and reduced recidivism as the 
preferable outcome. The logic of risk management rests in a framework of assessment 
and prediction that determines future criminal justice involvement (i.e., recidivism). Such 
determinations then lead to responses that always require more intrusion into the lives of 
those who are marginalized. In this we see a positivist, neoliberal rationality that defines 
social work’s role as that of assessor and manager of risk. In so doing, such articles often 
call for expansion of programs and services both in and out of the criminal justice system 
to act as surveillance mechanism for criminalized women and their families. Such 
surveillance is often coded through the language of helping. For example, Jung and 
LaLonde (2016) state: 
We conclude that incarcerated women with foster care experiences need more 
attention and extra support [emphasis added] from the appropriate institutions 
upon their release (p. 41). 
 
The discourse throughout the data often identifies risks women face and then, like Jung 
and LaLonde, proceeds to call for increased “attention and support.” Such calls 
presuppose benevolence in attention and support rather than an element of intrusion and 
surveillance. Increased surveillance of any sort, even the professed benevolent type, 
paves the way for more criminal justice interventions and sanctions. Indeed, technical 
violations while on parole and probations account for the largest proportion of recidivism 
rates (Sawyer & Wagner, 2019).  
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Jill McCorkel (2017) writes about profiteering in relation to for-profit carceral 
drug treatment. “Alternatives” to incarceration are implemented under the guise of 
treatment, yet they work by inserting constant surveillance into the lives of those 
convicted, and are backed up by the looming threat of incarceration for technical 
violations. In this way, community based alternatives can be said to expand rather than 
displace the carceral net of control. When social work blindly advocates for and 
implements such interventions, they are effectively supporting the expansion of carceral 
institutions into the community, rendering social work a transcarceral agent of control.  
The issue of working with and for the criminal justice system was present 
throughout the dataset. Authors in the data accomplish this in a number of ways, 
primarily by: calling for collaboration of various sorts between criminal justice and social 
work; emphasizing what social work can offer the criminal justice system; and discussing 
the “opportunities” for practice and research that are available in carceral systems. For 
example, Fedock (2017) advocates for the increase of social workers in carceral settings 
and states: 
Given the inherent tension between prison goals of security and the mental health 
needs of prisoners, social work may serve as a field for mediating this tension (p. 
39). 
 
These and similar statements throughout the data assume that social work will, or can, 
exert a therapeutic, perhaps humanizing quality on the criminal justice system. Such 
statements do not account for the danger that the influence will work in the inverse 
direction and that the goals and values of social work will be consumed under 
correctional logic. Fedock’s sentiment functions to align social work with the interests 
and goals of carceral institutions.  
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Discourses of Empathy. As I moved through the various phases and layers of 
analysis, it was interesting to see how I began to read into the depth of the discourse(s). 
For instance, there is a group of articles which I initially labeled “social justice light.” 
These articles named, and provided more than a simple nod to, policy and structural 
inequality. Many also claimed social justice values, albeit often in an apolitical way, 
usually falling back on individualized understandings and interventions. The “social 
justice light” articles were, in my mind, what one would expect from a “typical” social 
work discourse. They emphasized a preference for micro-level service delivery while also 
claiming a space, through discourses of empathy and social justice, for social work to 
perform the identity of “helper.” An article by Epperson et al. (2009) investigating HIV 
risks for Black female defendants provides a good example of this type of article. The 
following excerpt illuminates the discursive trends of such an article: 
Investigating policies that support alternatives to standard criminal justice 
practices in reducing recidivism is a key element of social work with this 
population. The empowerment of Black criminal justice-involved women through 
HIV prevention and other culturally sensitive social work interventions is greatly 
needed (p. 269). 
 
This was the kind of statement and article I expected to see more of when I began 
this project. Though there are some obvious places of critique that align with discussions 
presented previously in this dissertation (specifically in regard to the use of correctional 
outcomes [i.e., recidivism] and the flaccid use of terms such as “empowerment” and 
“culturally sensitive” that imply a politics of social justice), I initially thought of these 
articles as being relatively benign, and as “on board” with social work’s mandate toward 
social justice. However, upon deeper inspection of this type of article, I began to see how 
deployment of social justice, despite being politically infused, at times operates as a 
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screen and a mechanism of innocence. For instance, authors claim good intentions and 
social justice values while simultaneously eliding  the profession’s responsibility toward 
enacting those goals through textual silence. Here I began to see how deeply intertwined 
the textual silence on racism is to the project of innocence; whiteness as goodness 
becomes re-inscribed through depoliticized discourses of empathy.  
The various grammar elements utilized in texts, such as the use of passivity and 
agentivity, also helped illuminate the maintenance of innocence. For example, many 
articles discuss child welfare policies that are linked to the increase in termination of 
parental rights for incarcerated mothers, but never acknowledge who is responsible for 
policy implementation or the role of the social worker in perpetuating disparate outcomes 
in child welfare. Similarly, many authors do not claim their arguments in their pronoun 
use. They often say “it,” as in “it can be argued,” rather than “we,” as in “we argue.” 
Authors are thereby able to remain relatively neutral on the topic at hand despite bringing 
up the issue for inspection.  
Other articles drew on empathy discourses in a more overt way to propel an image 
of goodness. The typical “social work as savior” or good helper narrative was propelled 
through empathy in a number of ways. Stark examples are found when researchers 
defined themselves as on a “mission” to help the powerless, or “give voice to this 
invisible population.” The positive qualities of the researchers (and social work) were 
also emphasized through the use of participants’ quotes. For example, in an article on 
group therapy in a prison for women, Harris (2014) stated: 
I was constantly reminded each week by the women of what the group meant to 
them. For example, one woman in the group stated, “This group has been 
something sent from God himself. I never thought I had a chance for any program 
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from the prison. You gave me the skills to go through with my Family & Offender 
Sentencing Alternative Program application” (p. 50). 
 
The excerpt above provides an example of how authors can draw on a discourse of 
empathy and compassion by specifically choosing words from participants that 
emphasize gratefulness. This is a discursive strategy which propels the image and 
narrative of helping as a place of innocence. This article, and many like it, is strengths-
based and respectful. Throughout such articles the authors make it clear that they are on 
the women’s side. Yet, they simultaneously obscure power relations. The tensions that 
exist between the goals of social work and the goals of criminal justice are, thus, 
minimized or ignored under a depoliticized discourse of empathy.  
Gender Responsive Strategies. Discourses of empathy also emerged through the 
promiscuous use of “gender responsive/specific” interventions found throughout the data. 
Drawing on the “pathways” discourse discussed in earlier in this chapter, most of the 
articles in my sample called for gender specific/responsive interventions in some way. 
However, what is meant by gender responsive or gender specific is often vague and left 
undefined. One is generally left to assume what it means through the context of the text. 
Revisiting the way gender is dealt with in the data helps illuminate the key assumptions 
guiding the use of gender responsiveness in the data set. Primarily, gender responsiveness 
appears to parallel understandings of gender embedded in the pathways approach, which 
relies on a binary of men/women, and is focused on trauma, mental health, parenting, 
substance use, self-esteem, choice, and decision making.  
“Gender specific” interventions, then, appear to be primarily focused on 
therapeutic strategies for bolstering self-esteem as well as skill building around decision 
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making and parenting. When deployed in this way, gender specific strategies can be seen 
as an exemplar of practices that work with the “transformative risk subject” (Hannah-
Moffat, 2005). The transformative risk subject relies on creation of intervenable needs—
the process through which needs are constituted as intervenable by way of a risk 
management framework and then targeted for intervention—interventions which draw on 
the “psy” discourses and, ultimately, perpetuate depoliticization. As Nikolas Rose (2000) 
notes, interventions focused on personal fulfillment and personal development are closely 
aligned with risk management, and in their reliance on “self-surveillance” and “self-
regulation” also serve as another form of governmentality.  
It appears as though the discourse on gender responsiveness has largely escaped 
critical scrutiny in the social work discourse. As such, it has been ubiquitously taken up 
as a “commonsense” framework for thinking about social work interventions with 
criminalized women. Given the concerns I have outlined earlier in this chapter regarding 
the discourse on gender that is deployed in the data, as well as the almost universally 
accepted framework of risk, there is reason for alarm. Essentialized and psychologized 
notions of gender function in tandem with risk discourses to reduce gendered 
sociopolitical realities as a problem of the self. I argue that the notion of gender 
responsiveness in this data operates as a “screen discourse” (Garrett, 2016) to provide a 
veneer of progressiveness/social justice, while simultaneously minimizing or erasing the 
importance of economic oppression and racism. Further, when deployed in this way, it 
ultimately justifies the existence, and expansion, of carceral institutions.  
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Prison as Opportunity. There are many ways in which the existence of the prison 
is bolstered throughout the data. I have spoken to some of these already, but the most 
troubling trend I observed in the data is the explicit framing of prison, or criminal justice 
involvement, as an opportunity (n=17). Flowing from the construction of women as 
“risky” and de-politicized explanations of crime, prison and supervision are subsequently 
constituted as an opportunity for growth, reflection, and skill building. For example, after 
discussing the challenging life experiences many incarcerated women face, Miller et al. 
(2014) assert that: 
Jail may at some level provide—if not a respite—an opportunity to reflect 
[emphasis added] (p. 168).  
 
Similarly in an article on substance use, Hepatitis C, and service availability among rural 
incarcerated women, Staton-Tindall et al. (2015) discuss the dearth of substance abuse 
treatment facilities in rural areas and state: 
In the absence of these available and accessible services, the rural jail may 
provide an opportunity to “sober up” and return to the street where relapse and/or 
overdose is a significant risk. Thus, jails provide a valuable and often untapped 
opportunity to provide drug abuse and related health interventions to this high-
risk population [emphasis added] (p. 393). 
 
In the above excerpt, the authors not only frame jail as an opportunity for women 
to “sober up,” but they also frame it as an opportunity for service providers. They 
reinforce the use of incarceration as a way to accommodate for neoliberal eviscerations to 
the welfare state. Through the assertion that jail is an appropriate venue for providing 
treatment, the authors implicitly affirm that it is also an appropriate way to compensate 
for the lack of treatment and services in the community. This statement highlights the 
very real ways in which jails and prisons are used to manage the social issues that 
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manifest as a consequence of social exclusion under neoliberalism. Furthermore, the 
research that is conducted to support such statements effectively constrains social work’s 
advocacy efforts. Rather than advocating for appropriate treatment availability in the 
community, Staton-Tindall et al. activate a logic that works to sustain the use of 
incarceration as a means for dealing with substance use. Through the propagation of 
social service/criminal justice alignment, they also ensure their own (i.e., social work’s) 
legitimacy in a rapidly disintegrating welfare state. The question remains: what happens 
when services that are designed to “help” are dictated in and through (and perhaps 
depend on) the carceral system?  
In another explicit framing of incarceration as opportunity, Gilham (2012) states: 
 
Preparation for and return to life beyond the institution requires a corrective 
treatment experience that is based on exploration of past behaviors, skill 
development, and enhancement of the individual’s self-confidence and self-
efficacy to meet the demands of the future. These women must capitalize on the 
opportunity they have while incarcerated [emphasis added] (p. 100-101). 
 
There are obvious ways in which the above statement reflects the ideological positioning 
of the psy-discourses and activates technologies of the self to initiate self-governance. As 
with other examples I have provided throughout this dissertation, the authors presuppose 
that the purpose of incarceration is treatment and rehabilitation rather than incapacitation 
and punishment. As I have previously discussed, with the advent of new penology, this 
assumption has been widely discredited. This discussion dovetails onto previous 
conversations presented in this dissertation questioning the purpose and ethics of prison. 
In a less explicit framing of incarceration as opportunity, Schlager and Moore 
(2014) state: 
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Mothers who use incarceration constructively as a time of self-reflection can have 
more successful reunification with their children [emphasis added] (p. 100).  
 
In this statement, the authors implicitly assert that there is a right way and a wrong way to 
“use incarceration.” For them, the correct way involves “self-reflection.” It leaves one to 
wonder if self-reflection is really all that is needed to support reunification with children? 
There is a inherent responsibilizing quality to their assertion. Women are held responsible 
not only for the behavior that fostered their incarceration, the behavior for which they 
presumably need to “self-reflect” (sit in the corner and think about yourself), but they are 
also held responsible for what reunification looks like. If reunification does not go well, it 
can then be reduced to a problem of the self—an individual woman’s lack of effort or 
inadequate self-reflection.  
My discussion here is not meant to diminish a woman’s agency, but to point to the 
factors that constrain agency and therefore limit the logic of the author’s assertion. The 
reality is that there are many reasons that reunification is challenging post-incarceration, 
and many fall outside of the control of individual women. Child welfare requirements for 
employment, housing, and childcare all interact with policies that disenfranchise and 
restrict the upward mobility of “offenders.” There are also factors related to gender, class, 
and racial biases embedded in the child welfare system, as well as assumptions regarding 
“criminals” and the danger they pose to children, that influence worker discretion in 
promoting or inhibiting reunification. Workers are not just influenced by dominant 
cultural ideology in this regard. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, dominant 
discourses regarding crime and the welfare of children are actively reproduced in social 
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work. This speaks loudly to the need to shift the discourse around crime and criminal 
justice involvement in social work knowledge production.  
The framing of incarceration as an opportunity is troubling for many reasons. 
First, it requires infusing the discourses of treatment and “helping” with those of 
punishment and control, a process Carlen and Tombs (2006) dub “thera-punitive.” 
Second, thera-punitive rationality assumes that women are getting effective treatment and 
support in carceral settings, which has been widely critiqued as a contradiction in terms 
given the violent and often traumatizing nature of correctional involvement (Hannah-
Moffat, 2001; Pollack, 2010). Third, a discursive framing of incarceration as a 
therapeutic “opportunity” elides moral and political concerns regarding the carceral state, 
and upholds the use of prisons and jails as an appropriate response to social exclusion. 
Further, it passively accepts the logic of punishment and aligns social work with carceral 
institutions in concerning ways. The effect this has is to ultimately depoliticize social 
work itself.  
Social Work as Resistance. Though not dominant by any means, there was a 
small subset (n=4) of my sample that I would consider as offering a counter-discourse 
(i.e., Heidemann et al., 2016; O’Brien & Ortega, 2015; Smith & Young, 2003; Willison 
& O’Brien, 2017). Counter-discourses are examples of resistance that contest prevailing 
representations and ways of knowing (Hall, 1997). In that, lies the possibility of multiple 
identifications and interpretations of both dominant and counter-discourses. My 
discussion of counter-discourses here is gleaned from my analysis of the major discursive 
themes and strategies that I have problematized so far throughout this dissertation. As I 
moved through analysis, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between what 
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constituted a true contestation to the dominant discursive patterns found in the data and 
what simply stretched them. In other words, I made an effort to distinguish between what 
served simply as a “less problematic” enactment of the dominant discourse and the truly 
counter-discursive. In so doing, I identified, and discuss here, pieces that present a 
significant challenge to the dominant ways of constructing, knowing, and working with 
criminalized women that were prevalent in the dataset. The meaning of a counter-
discourse is revealed only in juxtaposition to the dominant discourse. Therefore, the 
counter-discourse does not seek to simply supplant the dominant discourse; it exists in 
the same discursive space and by virtue of that existence exposes and questions the logic 
and strategies of the dominant discourse, and thereby undermines it.  
In contrast to the discursive themes and strategies that are dominant in the data 
(and which have been discussed thus far), the articles that form the counter-discourse 
firmly anchor their analysis in explanations of structural inequity and construct 
criminalized women as subjects of structural oppression and disadvantage. As such, they 
rely on explicitly politicized explanations of crime and criminal justice involvement and 
expand the discursive limits within which social work operates and, thus, the possibilities 
for resistance. Unlike the majority of articles in my sample, the pieces I identify as a 
counter-discourse disrupt the underlying construction of crime and question the logic of 
punishment. Accordingly, they move away from reliance on the criminal justice system 
as a means of dealing with social problems. They call on social workers to engage in 
policy advocacy, utilize anti-oppressive practice frameworks, and consider prison 
abolition as a viable option. In this counter-discourse, social work defines itself 
politically, as an advocate and an agent of social change.  
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There is very little behavior talk in the counter-discourse. When a discussion of 
individual level issues or behaviors is presented, the articles of the counter-discourse tend 
to situate behaviors within a sociopolitical context and examine them as manifestations of 
larger structural issues related to inequality. For example, in a discussion regarding the 
impact of the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 on women, Willison and O’Brien (2017) state: 
When women turn to survival behaviors, these are criminalized, stripping the 
contextual factors of poverty and institutional racism from the analysis (p.41).  
 
This short sentence gives you a sense for how the flavor of the counter-discourse differs 
from the majority of what has been reviewed thus far in this dissertation. There are a 
number of factors worth noting. First, behaviors are discussed as being criminalized, not 
inherently criminal. Second, behaviors are also contextualized within, and as an 
inevitable product of, the political economy. The use of the adjective survival also 
depathologizes women without stripping them of their agency; it alerts us to the fact that 
in a neoliberal political economy, not everyone has the same choices, and the choices that 
people make may be among the best that are available to them. In other words, the term 
“survival behaviors” creates space to conceptualize behavior that is criminalized as a 
form of resistance to poverty and oppression. Third, sociopolitical factors are emphasized 
and racism is explicitly named. And finally, because the sentence was linked to a 
discussion of the impact of welfare reform, the authors attend to the nuanced ways in 
which seemingly disparate policies (i.e., social welfare and criminal justice) intersect in 
complex ways to impact the lives and criminalization of women. As you can see, this 
little sentence packs quite a punch and provides an excellent example of how, in the 
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counter-discourse, women are constructed as criminalized and marginalized rather than 
risky. 
 Though the term risk is used very little in this portion of the data, when it is 
utilized, the locus of risk as well as the site of intervention is firmly grounded in systemic 
issues and the need for systemic change. Smith and Young (2003), for example, do a 
deep dive policy analysis on “The Multiple Impacts of TANF, ASFA, and Mandatory 
Drug Sentencing for Families Affected by Maternal Incarceration.” After providing an 
overview of the intention and impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, they state: 
There is a societal obligation to address risk factors related to poverty, and 
concurrent planning does not address this reality [emphasis added] (p. 544).  
 
In this statement they not only name poverty as the problem (i.e., risk), they also address 
the failures of policies such as ASFA when they are decontextualized. The authors often 
move beyond description to call for action, with intervention situated at the site of 
poverty. Further, the use of the term “societal obligation” creates a sense of urgency and 
responsibility. In this way, the authors are taking an explicit political stance.  
 Similarly, recidivism is not framed as the definition of “success” in the counter-
discourse. When recidivism is discussed, it is linked directly to structural barriers. By 
way of example, Heidemann, Cederbaum, and Martinez (2016) state: 
The vast majority of women incarcerated in the United States will eventually be 
released (Visher & Travis, 2003). Hoping to build a new life for themselves and 
their children when they come home, formerly incarcerated women (FIW) instead 
return to their communities to face an array of barriers to successful reentry, 
including barriers to employment, housing, education, civic participation, and 
income assistance, and difficulties reuniting with children and families. These 
barriers contribute to a staggering rate of recidivism (p.24). 
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Rather than framing recidivism as a result of individual deficit or deviance, as is typical 
of the discourse on recidivism that runs through most of the dataset, the focus here is 
squarely on political and economic barriers. What is particularly notable about this article 
(as with the others in this subset) is that the authors do not move on from here to simply 
relocate the solution for recidivism in individual level interventions. In fact, this article is 
specifically about redefining outcomes and indicators of success for formerly 
incarcerated women, beyond that of recidivism. This type of scholarship creates space for 
the nuanced ways in which success can be conceptualized. Rather than attaching the label 
“criminal,” “offender,” or “at-risk,” this work opens space for a variety of subject 
positions and in so doing is deeply humanizing. 
Generally, interventions and outcomes in this subset of the data are aimed at the 
systems level. Smith and Young (2003), for example, call for changes in sentencing 
policies, and also target TANF and ASFA as the site of intervention. They call for 
administering financial assistance (i.e., money) to women and their families, rather than 
skill building, in order to promote reunification, reduce recidivism, and foster well-being. 
Smith and Young, like the others in the counter-discourse also stress that “substance 
abuse should not be considered primarily a criminal justice problem” (p. 549). Such 
statements shift the discourse on substance use and urge for a public health approach 
rather than a criminal justice response to substance use.  
O’Brien and Ortega (2015) call for a complete dismantling of the criminal justice 
system and emphasize the politics of prison abolition: 
Decarceration and/or prison abolition requires an emphasis on building 
community accountability for responding to harm rather than reliance upon 
policing, surveillance, and the criminal processing system. Prison abolition 
 200 
exposes the racism and institutionalized oppression inherent to the prison system 
and challenges the ideological ‘need’ for prisons. Advocates and activists within 
the prison abolition movement recognize that prison does not make us safer and 
calls for shifting resources to reinvestment in community-based empowerment, 
community-led education, and radical activism as alternatives to the prison 
system (p. 143). 
 
Similarly, Willison and O’Brien (2017) call for a number of changes at the economic and 
policy level: 
Durable change to the mechanisms of the Prison Nation and its resulting mass 
incarceration requires that we address the early criminalization of girls and 
women by rebuilding the safety net of economic supports that can provide quality 
education, fair wages employment, and the structural supports for health and well-
being. In addition, we must advocate for the retooling of sentencing policies in 
response to women’s criminalized behaviors to incorporate treatment and 
supports for recovery and for the expansion of in-prison programs available to 
currently jailed and incarcerated women. Finally, we argue for the creation of 
realistic pathways to citizenship after release from prison. Feminist social work 
practice requires that we address the outcomes of institutional sexism, racism, and 
class injustice in the lives of marginalized women who are impacted by the Prison 
Nation (p.46). 
 
The above excerpts are both from articles co-authored by Patricia O’Brien. O’Brien’s 
body of work in this dataset includes articles from various projects spread throughout the 
sample timeframe; the first was published in 2003 and the last in 2017. This provides the 
opportunity to examine the work of a single scholar over the course of almost two 
decades. What stands out from this analysis is how deeply politicized O’Brien’s 
scholarship has become over the years. If you contrast the two excerpts above, from 2015 
and 2017, to the one analyzed on page 153 from 2003, you can see a stark difference in 
the flavor of the scholar’s work. Whereas I placed the piece from 2003 in the “social 
justice light” category because it simultaneously drew on notions of choice and 
responsibility as well as discourses of empathy and social justice, I included the later 
pieces as part of the counter-discourse as they are explicitly critical and political. I 
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believe this illustrates a stretching of discursive limits. In this way, I find O’Brien’s work 
to be amongst the most exciting in the dataset. It shattered my preconceptions and draws 
my attention to a genuine capacity for change in the social work discourse. It also raises 
many questions regarding the mechanisms that politicize social work scholars and, 
thereby, allow us to re-think the discourse on criminalization. 
The articles in the counter-discourse all, in some way, actively undermine, rather 
than bolster the use of the prison and criminal justice system. For example, Heidemann, 
Cederbaum, and Martinez’s (2016) interviews with formerly incarcerated women 
highlight the dehumanizing nature of interactions with criminal justice authorities: 
Tina went on to describe the humiliation she feels when her female parole officer 
stands in the door of the bathroom and actually watches her urinate when she is 
drug tested. The feeling of being under constant surveillance—which has been an 
increasing function of parole in recent decades (Solomon, Kachinowski, & Bhati, 
2006)—and the constant fear of ‘messing up’ and violating strict parole 
conditions, which were often arbitrarily enforced, greatly hamper FIW’s ability to 
feel free and to fully live their lives. For those still on probation/parole, success 
was defined not solely as the desire to discharge but more as an opportunity to 
fully live their lives no longer under the oppressive surveillance and control of 
criminal justice authorities (p. 32). 
 
In their description and analysis of Tina’s predicament, the authors address the 
problematic nature of surveillance, and thereby subtly interrogate the benevolence of 
community. The counter-discourse carries not just a critique of the criminal justice 
system, but also of social work and the ways in which social work research, policy, and 
practice perpetuate mass incarceration. The counter-discourse actively implicates social 
work in processes of criminalization and demands that social workers engage morally and 
politically. In short, all of the articles in the counter-discourse have goals related to 
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building social justice. Though just a small subset of my sample, I see these emergent 
counter-discourses as critical to fostering spaces of hope and possibility. 
Concluding Thoughts.  
Throughout the data, there is a strong focus on “what works,” with what works 
defined primarily in terms of managing risks and reducing recidivism. Indeed, risk 
assessment and risk management strategies as well as individualized interventions which 
focus on individual choice and therapeutic treatment appear to be the dominant model of 
service delivery in social work with criminalized women. The legitimacy for such 
interventions is bolstered through a discourse of neutrality. Neutrality surfaces when a 
stance is not taken on the issue of incarceration, when the issue of incarceration and 
criminalization is discussed in neutral or psychological terms, and when interventions are 
focused solely on individuals.  
Furthermore, very little explicitly political language is used in the data. For 
example, despite being a large-scale issue that is recognized by our national professional 
organizations as an urgent social justice issue, mass incarceration is named in only two 
articles. This is the primary tension in the data whereby many authors invoke yet, 
ultimately, undermine social justice values. When terms such as social justice, 
empowerment, and oppression are used, they are immediately undermined by the 
suggested use of individual treatment, which effectively drains these words of their 
political and ideological meanings. Though I did not find any of this particularly 
surprising, I was caught off guard and deeply troubled by the calls, both explicit and 
implicit, for social service and criminal justice alignment that I found in the data. 
Through the acceptance of risk discourses and eager alignment with carceral systems, the 
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profession functions as a instrument of state sanctioned governance and is depoliticized 
far too easily. Social work’s imbrication in the carceral state brings into stark relief the 
profound ethical ramifications of doing business as usual. Our ability to contribute to the 
common good is thwarted by reckless engagement with neoliberal rationalities. I worry 
that we are too far removed from the moral and political discourses that are necessary for 
promoting social justice and social change.  
By contrast, the articles of the counter-discourse provide an alternative way of 
seeing criminalization and social work’s role. They also helped deepen my own analysis 
and lift my spirit of generosity. As I saw scholars become increasingly politicized in their 
scholarship over time, I thought about the notion of discursive limits: how they constrain, 
but also, how they can be stretched. I began to rethink how I was viewing the use of (or 
lack of) social justice in the data. Social justice may not be an all or nothing concept; like 
most things, it may be more usefully conceptualized as existing in shades. In this, the 
tension of the undecidable might also include a struggle to define social justice. Perhaps 
social work’s inclination toward the individual and individual level treatment serves as a 
way of (re)defining social justice in neoliberal terms.  
Though it is beyond the scope and epistemological assumptions of this study to 
speculate different interpretations, throughout this project, I often wondered how the 
interpretations of those with more clinical/micro orientations in the profession might 
differ from mine. I believe many clinicians would say, without a doubt, that they support 
and uphold social justice values, just as I do. Similarly, I believe many of the authors in 
my dataset would also claim social justice values, and perhaps ardently so. Which begs 
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the question: within social work, is “helping talk” synonymous with social justice talk? If 
so, what are the implications for the profession’s ability to effect social change?  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This project examined social work’s engagement with criminalized women. Using 
a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) I looked at how criminalized women are constructed 
in social work high impact journals and the implications this has for research and 
practice. In line with what Laura Nader calls “studying up,” this project puts the gaze on 
a governing technology of social work in order to examine how the profession 
participates in maintaining and/or resisting the carceral state. Critical Discourse Analysis, 
informed by critical and post-structural frameworks, is premised on the notion that 
analysis and meaning making are both political and subject to multiple interpretations. As 
such, the interpretations and analyses in this dissertation are shaped by my subjectivity as 
a social work scholar who holds a pointed social justice perspective and strong 
commitments to advancing and strengthening macro thinking/practice in social work. In 
this chapter, I summarize the analysis and arguments of the dissertation and speak to 
what I see as some of its most pressing implications. 
The overarching finding is that social work privileges a psychological discourse, 
and that the assessment and management of risk has supplanted a holistic approach to 
meeting client needs and addressing mass incarceration. There is a substantial emphasis 
on framing criminalized women and their children as “at risk” individuals who can be 
helped by social service and criminal justice alignment. I argue that social work’s 
growing dedication to practices that seek to adjust the psychological fortitude of 
criminalized women relies on broader cultural discourses of responsibilization, which 
reproduce rather than interrupt criminalization, and divert attention away from the need 
for social and economic change, leading ultimately to the profession’s depoliticization. 
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My results show that approaches to practice which fail to address historical and 
structural contexts are dominant in the social work scholarship. This is achieved through 
a variety of what I have termed “neutralizing strategies,” including decontextualization, 
the erasure of racism, and an overreliance on the languages of the psy-professions. These 
neutralizing strategies actively produce depoliticized understandings of gender, crime, 
and social justice. Depoliticized understandings shape social work practices that center on 
risk and responsibility, which undermine (or perhaps redefine) social work’s professed 
commitments to social justice and to addressing mass incarceration. I have specifically 
begun to refine my understanding of and stance on gender specific/responsive 
interventions. My analysis shows that social work draws upon essentialized notions of 
gender to demarcate women from men, identify lifestyles, and produce ideas about risk, 
all of which drive the implementation of gender responsive assessment and intervention. I 
have thus become more skeptical of “gender responsive” approaches since completing 
this research. As other feminists have noted, gender responsive approaches tend to 
prescribe, rather than respond to, gendered notions of risk (Hannah-Moffat, 2010). If 
gender is going to be operationalized in this manner, then perhaps gender needs to be 
abandoned, or at the very least reworked as an analytic category.   
Further, if our larger attempts as a profession toward addressing mass 
incarceration, such as the Grand Challenge of Smart Decarceration, are built upon 
discourses of risk and responsibilization, then we risk simply relocating the punishment 
and control of marginalized populations into the community. Social work’s alignment 
with carceral systems and the subsequent call for prison based treatment programs and 
community “alternatives” leaves out a critical analysis of the underlying culture of 
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punishment. Indeed, as critical and feminist criminologists have argued, many 
“alternative” programs often reproduce rather than displace the reach of the criminal 
justice system and create countless new spaces of governance.  
My analysis therefore exposes how social work is implicated in processes of 
criminalization, and propels a shift in emphasis from individualized service delivery, 
aimed at changing the behavior of individuals, to launching interventions that tackle 
structural injustice and inequity. I do not intend to imply that social work cannot or 
should not provide individual level supports and treatment, but there are some serious 
questions our profession must grapple with regarding: 1) how we can provide effective 
support when aligned with carceral institutions and 2) how we sustain our values and 
ethical imperatives for social justice if some of the most influential scholarship coming 
out of our field is bound up in individualizing and pathologizing discourses. 
The implications of this analysis are many. First, this work has sought to provide 
an account of social work discourse in relation to criminalized women. I explored and 
exposed the power function in social work knowledge production to produce subjects of 
governance and fortify the carceral state. Because power is beyond individual intention, 
we need to pay close attention to the ways in which it manifests and reproduces itself in 
the specific discourses and knowledge claims that form the foundation of our professional 
practices and knowledge. Neutralizing strategies make it difficult to identify 
responsibility for the continued existence of the carceral state and inspire doubts about 
the possibilities for change. Understanding the subtle and productive work of power to 
undermine our “good intentions” and aspirations for social justice requires us to rethink 
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explanations for crime and our understandings regarding the purpose and necessity of the 
criminal justice system.  
It is here that I discovered a profound ethical dissonance between social work’s 
engagement with criminalized women and social work values. Specifically, I found that 
social work discourse passively accepts the logic of punishment and supports dominant 
ideology surrounding gender and crime, while concurrently attempting to redress the 
consequences of such constructions through social justice values. I conceptualize this as 
discursive struggle over the meaning and purpose of social work; a struggle that 
embodies some of the most salient historical and contemporary tensions in our field 
related to our professional identity and an increasing drive toward professionalization.  
Though I knew upon setting out that I was studying the entwined aspects of 
criminalization and social work, I did not quite see that what I was examining was much 
bigger than that specific interaction. As I moved through this project, I found that my 
project felt less and less about criminalization, and more about confronting the soul of 
social work. And I am left wondering, what is the actual promise of social work? If it 
does indeed include visions for social justice and social change, can those visions be 
adequately met under an apparatus of neoliberalism, or only performed? Ethically 
speaking, I see this as a fundamental crisis in contemporary social work. Neoliberal 
discourses of individuality and responsibility are ill suited for addressing the harms 
caused by the carceral state, and when deployed through the process of knowledge 
production serve only to deepen our participation in it. In this sense, I believe ethics may 
be at the crux of my work.  
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In examining the need for an ethics that accounts for trespass as an inevitable 
consequence of being, Orlie (1997) tells us that: 
“Ordinary evil is the product of trespass, not sin; of thoughtlessness, not 
wickedness. Prevalent notions of ethical conduct—performing contracts, being 
reasonable, behaving predictably—do not necessarily diminish ordinary evil, but 
in fact often reinforce and extend it. Moreover, predominant rationalities often 
make us thoughtless rather than thoughtful agents of the governing powers that 
multiply trespasses” (p. 11). 
Consequently, we face a crisis of the undecidable borne out by our difficulty in living up 
to our aspirational values while justifying our profession’s continued existence. This 
raises serious questions worth our consideration: What does it mean to engage in 
responsible social work practice and research in the context of neoliberal globalization 
and mass incarceration? How do we proceed in ethical decision making within the 
discursive space of undecidability? Is the enactment of hegemonic discourses the 
inevitable consequence of the undecidable? Perhaps, but I think it is also within the 
terrain of undecidability that possibility emerges. Orlie (1997) calls for “transgressive 
thinking.” Like Foucault, she argues that discursive limits cannot be transcended, but 
they can be transgressed. She asserts that “judgment is an insufficient way to care for the 
world. Rather, thinking (in contrast to judgment) cares for the world by attending to the 
effects of the limits through which we constitute the world” (p. 7). Thinking that 
questions the inevitability of crime and the carceral state expands our vision of the 
possible and re-centers social work as a political profession.  
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Throughout this project, I kept returning to the same questions: Why has the 
prison and carceral state become such an inevitable, or necessary, feature in the social 
imagination of our profession? And why does social work seem to continuously fall back 
on individual level skill development as the answer for systemic issues? Do we simply 
lack imagination? Foucault reminds us that wherever there is power, there is resistance. 
In fact, the sustenance of power, in part, relies on the tension produced through 
resistance. Resistive ideas, then, are not suppressed but remain marginal, because in 
comparison to what passes for “truth” or common sense, they often seem illogical and 
irrational. Indeed, under a rationality of neoliberalism, resistance to the carceral state 
seems not only illogical, but also untenable. 
Although the discourse of risk seems to be firmly entrenched in the contemporary 
social work lexicon, it should not be treated as infallible or inevitable. Neither should the 
use of punishment as a means of dealing with social problems. As the articles comprising 
the counter-discourse in my sample illustrate, it is possible to push beyond dominant 
narratives toward abolition. Just because what is, is, does not mean it must be. I argue 
here that the project of social work may benefit from claiming space for imagination: a 
stance of radical imagination. When we begin to imagine what is possible, even if it 
appears improbable, we also begin to create the conditions for its existence. In other 
words, only through radical acts of imagination can the improbable become possible.  
The question remains, what does this analysis mean in terms of better 
understanding and responding to criminalized women? In thinking about how to shift the 
decontextualized and depoliticized approaches to understanding and working with 
criminalized women that emerged in my analysis, one place we can look is to education. 
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However, as recent research shows, issues related to the criminal justice system are 
scantly covered in the literature and inadequately addressed in schools of social work 
(Epperson et al., 2013; Jemal & Graham, 2017; Wheeler & McClain, 2015). This has 
serious implications for the education of future social workers who are quite likely at 
some point to come into contact with criminalized populations (Wilson, 2010).  
With what seems like an ever-increasing emphasis on professionalization and 
licensure in social work, it’s crucial that we retain a focus on the historical and structural 
processes and discourses that contribute to production and reproduction of the carceral 
state. It is not enough to simply integrate material related to criminal justice issues in 
social work education, research, and training; I argue that in order to adequately respond 
to the “ordinary evil” in which Orlie implicates us we must also engage ethical and 
political discourses—the forms of thinking and speaking that cannot accommodate 
neutrality and which shatter certainty.  
In her book Getting Lost, Patti Lather (2007) talks about the difference between 
“lovely knowledge” and “difficult knowledge.” She tells us that lovely knowledge comes 
easy and “reinforces what we think we want from what we find” (p.13). Difficult 
knowledge, in comparison, works against affirming claims through data and “induces 
breakdowns in representing experience” (p.13). Throughout this project, lovely 
knowledge flourished in the data as social work confirmed, over and over again, what it 
thinks it knows, thereby limiting what can be known. Meanwhile, I found myself buried 
in difficult knowledge, burning with confusion, lost in paradox; working within and 
against my own (in)competence. This project forced me to re-think aspects of my 
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intellect that I thought I had figured out: gender, social justice, the box I put all “those” 
social workers in, where I thought this research would lead me and where it did lead me, 
and ultimately my own identity within the profession. Through this, I have learned to be 
less strident, and in many ways I am left with more questions than answers. Questions 
that I suspect, if I am brave enough and strong enough, will pave the road for the difficult 
knowledge that is to come. It is a humble, yet hopeful position.  
The temptation of lovely knowledge is strong, but the intellectual rapture that 
emerges from the depths of difficult knowledge is the very force of ethical scholarship. It 
is from the rigor of difficult knowledge that possibilities for change arise. As Lather says, 
“what one loves when lovely knowledge is lost is the promise of thinking and doing 
otherwise” (p.13). I believe it is here, in the abandonment of lovely knowledge, that we 
may begin to reimagine the carceral state. My challenge to social work is this: resist the 
seductions of the lovely knowledge found in the tools of assessment and prediction and 
on well-worn paths to funding and tenure. Engage the questions and conundrums found 
in the places where difficult knowledge dwells. It is here that we might begin to think 
what hasn’t been thought and do what hasn't been done. It is here that we may begin to 
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It is notable that of the 25 journals I searched, my final sample came from only half (n=12) of the 
original list. The other half did not contain articles meeting inclusion criteria from the specified 
time period. The breakdown is listed below. 
 
Journal Number of 
Articles in Sample 
Children and Youth Services Review  10 
Research on Social Work Practice 10 
Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work  8 
Social Work in Public Health 6 
Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social 
Service 
3 
Smith College Studies in Social Work  3 
Social Work Research  3 
Social Work  2 
Health and Social Work  1 
Journal of Social Service Research  1 
Social Service Review  1 
Qualitative Social Work  1 
 
The following journals did not contain articles that met inclusion criteria: 
Administration in Social Work 
British Journal of Social Work  
Child and Family Social Work 
Clinical Social Work Journal 
European Journal of Social Work  
Human Service Organizations Management Leadership and Governance  
International Journal of Social Welfare 
International Social Work 
Journal of Social Work 
Journal of Social Work Education 
Journal of Social Work Practice 
Social Work in Health Care 
Trauma, Violence, and Abuse 
 249 
APPENDIX D: Detailed Breakdown of Articles per Journal 
Children and Youth Services Review – 10 
Hanlon, T. E., Blatchley, R. J., Bennett-Sears, T., O'Grady, K. E., Rose, M., & Callaman, J. 
M. (2005). Vulnerability of children of incarcerated addict mothers: Implications for 
preventive intervention.   
Jung, H., & LaLonde, R. (2016). The relationship between re-incarceration and their own 
childhood foster care experience of women.   
Kjellstrand, J. M., Cearley, J., Eddy, J. M., Foney, D., & Martinez, C. R. (2012). 
Characteristics of incarcerated fathers and mothers: Implications for preventive 
interventions targeting children and families.   
Miller, A. L., Weston, L. E., Perryman, J., Horwitz, T., Franzen, S., & Cochran, S. (2014). 
Parenting While Incarcerated: Tailoring the Strengthening Families Program for use with 
jailed mothers.   
Miller, K. M. (2014). Maternal criminal justice involvement and co-occurring mental health 
and substance abuse problems: Examining moderation of sex and race on children's mental 
health.   
Miller, K. M., & Bank, L. (2013). Moderating effects of race on internalizing and 
externalizing behaviors among children of criminal justice and child welfare involved 
mothers.   
Phillips, S. D., & Erkanli, A. (2008). Differences in patterns of maternal arrest and the 
parent, family, and child problems encountered in working with families.   
Scudder, A. T., McNeil, C. B., Chengappa, K., & Costello, A. H. (2014). Evaluation of an 
existing parenting class within a women's state correctional facility and a parenting class 
modeled from Parent-Child Interaction Therapy.   
Smith, C. J., & Young, D. S. (2003). The multiple impacts of TANF, ASFA, and mandatory 
drug sentencing for families affected by maternal incarceration.  
Woodard, T., & Copp, J. E. (2016). Maternal incarceration and children's delinquent 
involvement: The role of sibling relationships.   
	
Research on Social Work Practice – 10 
Buttell, F. P. (2002). Levels of moral reasoning among female domestic violence offenders: 
Evaluating the impact of treatment.   
Buttell, F. P., Powers, D., & Wong, A. (2012). Evaluating Predictors of Program Attrition 
Among Women Mandated into Batterer Intervention Treatment.   
Carney, M. M., & Buttell, F. P. (2004). A multidimensional evaluation of a treatment 
program for female batterers: A pilot study.   
Carney, M. M., & Buttell, F. P. (2006). An evaluation of a court-mandated batterer 
intervention program: Investigating differential program effect for African American and 
White women.   
Ferreira, R. J., & Buttell, F. P. (2016). Can a "Psychosocial Model'' Help Explain Violence 
Perpetrated by Female Batterers?   
Kubiak, S. P. (2004). The effects of PTSD on treatment adherence, drug relapse, and 
criminal recidivism in a sample of incarcerated men and women.   
Kubiak, S. P., Kasiborski, N., & Schmittel, E. (2010). Assessing Long-Term Outcomes of 
an Intervention Designed for Pregnant Incarcerated Women.   
 250 
Kubiak, S. P., Kim, W. J., Fedock, G., & Bybee, D. (2015). Testing a Violence-Prevention 
Intervention for Incarcerated Women Using a Randomized Control Trial.  
Tripodi, S. J., Bledsoe, S. E., Kim, J. S., & Bender, K. (2011). Effects of Correctional-Based 
Programs for Female Inmates: A Systematic Review.   
Valentine, P. V., & Smith, T. E. (2001). Evaluating traumatic incident reduction therapy 
with female inmates: A randomized controlled clinical trial.   
 
Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work - 8 
Allen, S., Flaherty, C., & Ely, G. (2010). Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and the 
Criminalization of Female Poverty. 
Epperson, M. W., Platais, I., Valera, P., Barbieri, R., Gilbert, L., & El-Bassel, N. (2009). 
Fear, Trust, & Negotiating Safety HIV Risks for Black Female Defendants.   
Heidemann, G., Cederbaum, J. A., & Martinez, S. (2016). Beyond Recidivism: How 
Formerly Incarcerated Women Define Success.   
Mason, L. G. B. (2013). The Journey of One Pregnant Incarcerated Woman Through 
Systemic Bias: How Family Support Workers Can Positively Affect Change-A Case Study.   
O'Brien, P., & Bates, R. (2003). Negotiating the waves: Challenges of conducting in-prison 
and follow-up research with women.   
O'Brien, P., & Ortega, D. M. (2015). Feminist Transformation Deconstructing Prisons and 
Reconstructing Justice with Criminalized Women.   
Smoyer, A. B. (2015). Feeding Relationships: Foodways and Social Networks in a Women's 
Prison.   
Willison, J. S., & O'Brien, P. (2017). A Feminist Call for Transforming the Criminal Justice 
System.   
 
Social Work in Public Health – 6 
Gilham, J. J. M. (2012). A Qualitative Study of Incarcerated Mothers' Perceptions of the 
Impact of Separation on Their Children.  
Horton, A. (2011). Heroin Users: The Need for Improved Treatment for Incarcerated 
Women.   
Kubiak, S. P., Kasiborski, N., Karim, N., & Schmittel, E. (2012). Does Subsequent Criminal 
Justice Involvement Predict Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights for Children 
Born to Incarcerated Women?   
Mignon, S. I., & Ransford, P. (2012). Mothers in Prison: Maintaining Connections with 
Children.   
Staton-Tindall, M., Webster, J. M., Oser, C. B., Havens, J. R., & Leukefeld, C. G. (2015). 
Drug Use, Hepatitis C, and Service Availability: Perspectives of Incarcerated Rural 
Women.   
White, G. D. (2012). Gender-Responsive Programs in U.S. Prisons: Implications for 
Change.   
 
Family in Society – The Journal of Contemporary Social Service -3 
Berry, M., Johnson, T., Severson, M., & Postmus, J. L. (2009). Wives and Mothers At Risk: 
The Role of Marital and Maternal Status in Criminal Activity and Incarceration.   
Schlager, M. D., & Moore, B. (2014). Risk and Resiliency of Incarcerated Mothers.   
 251 
Strozier, A. L., Armstrong, M., Skuza, S., Cecil, D., & McHale, J. (2011). Coparenting in 
Kinship Families With Incarcerated Mothers: A Qualitative Study.   
 
Smith College Studies in Social Work – 3 
Condon, M. C. (2017). Early Relational Health: Infants' Experiences Living with Their 
Incarcerated Mothers.  
Harris, M. S. (2014). Group Therapy at a Prison for Women: A Therapist's Perspective.   
Harris, M. S. (2017). Incarcerated Mothers: Trauma and Attachment Issues.   
 
Social Work Research – 3 
Fedock, G. L. (2017). Women's Psychological Adjustment to Prison: A Review for Future 
Social Work Directions.  
Fries, L., Fedock, G., & Kubiak, S. P. (2014). Role of Gender, Substance Use, and Serious 
Mental Illness in Anticipated Postjail Homelessness.   
Miller, K. M., Orellana, E. R., Johnson, A. B., Krase, K., & Anderson-Nathe, B. (2013). 
Maternal Criminal Justice and Child Welfare Involvement: Associations between Risk 
Exposures and Childhood Mental Health.  
 
Social Work – 2 
Kernsmith, P., & Kernsmith, R. (2009). Treating Female Perpetrators: State Standards for 
Batterer Intervention Services.   
Siefert, K., & Pimlott, S. (2001). Improving pregnancy outcome during imprisonment: A 
model residential care program.   
 
Health and Social Work –1 
Fedock, G., & Sarantakos, S. (2017). Physical and Mental Health Disparities for Young 
Women with Arrest Histories.   
 
Journal of Social Service Research – 1 
Salina, D. D., Lesondak, L. M., Razzano, L. A., & Parenti, B. M. (2011). Addressing Unmet 
Needs in Incarcerated Women With Co-occurring Disorders. 
 
Social Service Review – 1 
Cho, R. M. (2010). Maternal Incarceration and Children's Adolescent Outcomes: Timing 
and Dosage.   
 
Qualitative Social Work – 1 
Vandermause, R., Severtsen, B., & Roll, J. (2013). Re-creating a vision of motherhood: 
Therapeutic Drug Court and the narrative.   
  
 252 


















Argument/framing (Overarching explanations/goal?):  
 




Overall Discourse Position:  
 
Other Notes: 
• Depoliticizing Social work: Yes/No? 
• Strategies for staying neutral/depoliticizing topic? 
• Contradictions 
• Binaries  
• Omissions  
• Reliance on risk 
• Goals and values of social work or other fields? 
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APPENDIX F: Illustration of Structural and Detailed Analysis  
Allen, S., Flaherty, C., & Ely, G. (2010). Throwaway Moms: Maternal Incarceration and 
the Criminalization of Female Poverty. 
Structural Analysis 
Title: Throwaway Moms Maternal Incarceration and the Criminalization of Female Poverty 




Type: Qualitative Research Study 
Topics Covered: Maternal Incarceration; Issues Faced; Causes; Interventions/Responses 
 
Sub-Topics/Themes: Impact on Mothers, Impact on Mother-Child Relationship; Poverty, 
Substance Use Issues, Mental Health Issues, Abuse/Victimization, Marginalization, 
Custody/Child Welfare; Sentencing Policies, Structural Barriers, Individual Level Factors; 
Substance Use Treatment, Parenting Programming, Life Skills Development, Gender Specific 
Programming, Advocacy, Recidivism 
 
Vocabulary/word choice: “Drug Offending” “criminalization” “poverty” “victimization” 
“addiction” “behaviors” “giving voice” “powerless” (a lot) “substance abusing” “policy 
vacuum” “long ignored population” “troubled life histories” “impossible odds” “criminality” 
“gender specific” “inflexible child welfare policies” “recidivism” “radical criminal justice 
policies” “deeply reflective” “often philosophical” “struggled fiercely” “enthusiastic and 
grateful” “profound powerlessness” “devastating cycle of poverty” “deep shame, remorse and 
sadness” “prostituted themselves” “trade sex for drugs” “AFSA” “invisible population” 
“maternal love” “mentors and advocates” “criminality” “life skills training” “treatment” “case 
advocates”  
 
Theoretical Orientation: Feminist Standpoint Epistemological framework 
 
Collective Symbols: “imprisoned by their own guilt and shame” “giving the women a voice 
makes the political personal" “impossible odds” “crack subculture in America’s poor 
struggling communities” “deep layers of abuse and social problems the women endured”  
 
Argument/framing (Overarching explanations/goal?): Policy issues propel increases in 
incarceration. Criminal justice involvement and crime is caused by individual level factors.  
Calls for gender responsive programming to better deal with these individual level issues.  
There are structural barriers to “success” but these are framed as individual issues that can be 
solved through individual level programming. Goal is to help women take personal 
responsibility, which will then improve their circumstances and decrease recidivism.  
 
Goals and values of social work or other fields?): Micro-level social work values and 
emphasis. Compassion. 
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Social justice?: No explicit mention. Ambiguity—social justice analysis of criminalization 
but its undermined by the individual level analysis. The social justice analysis is also not 
embedded in meaningful calls for action and because of the paternalistic discussion of women.  
 




Reliance on risk?: Not overtly, but the framing of women’s powerlessness and vulnerability 
ultimately constructs them as “at risk.” 
 
What’s Missing?(omissions/textual silences): Race (even though half of their sample is 
comprised of people of color). No discussion of racism. Completely silent on the issue of race 
though they use a lot of coded language for it.  
 
Depoliticizing Social work (Yes/No?) If yes, Strategies for staying neutral/depoliticizing 
topic?): Yes. Decontextualize through a silence on race and racism. Undermines discussion of 
structural issues with emphasis on individual problems and interventions. Also undermines 
their assertions of a feminist social justice agenda through focus on individual choice.  
 
Contradictions: Policy issues cause increase in incarceration, but substance abuse and mental 
health issues cause crime. Despite recognition of policy and programmatic issues, authors still 
primarily call for change at the individual level. Article focuses on poverty, yet does not 
include implications/recommendations for dealing with poverty. 
 
Binaries/Dichotomy: Idealized mother/incarcerated mother = expectation that incarcerated 
mothers would be different than “normal” mothers. Authors are surprised when mothers 
express love and fear for children.  
 
Discursive Entanglements: Child welfare and criminal justice.  
 
Overall Discourse Position: Women are powerless and tragic. Constructed as voiceless and 
vulnerable. Social work framed as savior. 
 
Other Notes: “crack subculture in America’s poor struggling communities” (code for black). 
Lots of intently descriptive language to create symbolism and construct women as tragic. 
 







1. Why was the article selected for detailed analysis? Why is it typical? 
This article was chosen because it represented a variety of themes that emerged in the 
structural analysis. It was particularly strong on the ‘object of pity’ and 'social work as 
savior' themes. Though this is a distinct construction of criminalized women and social 
work, it always relied on the rhetoric of risk and choice, ultimately showing a preference 
for individualized service delivery. It also displayed the typical contradiction I saw 
emerge in the structural analysis of mentioning policy issues and structural context as 
causes for incarceration but falling back on individual level understandings and 
responses. I would describe this as “well intentioned” article.  
 
2. Who is the author? What is their position and status within social work? What is 
their area of expertise, and so on? 
Authors are Suzanne Allen, Chris Flaherty, and Gretchen Ely. At the time of the 
publication, they were all based in Lexington, KY.  
 
Suzanne Allen was a social work consultant and the other two were at the University of 
Kentucky’s College of Social Work.  
 
Chris Ely is still at UK and is an associate professor with a focus on mental health.  
 
Gretchen Ely is now an Associate Professor at the University of Buffalo, SUNY. It 
appears that her area of expertise is abortion and reproductive rights. These two have 
written some other articles together on social justice education. I could not find more info 
on the lead author.  
 
3. What journal was it published in? What is the aim, scope, and political orientation 
of the journal? In which section of the journal does the article appear? What kind of 
article is it? (empirical, conceptual?) Is the article a part of a special issue? 
Affilia: Journal of Women in Social Work. It is a journal oriented toward feminist 
theories, social justice, and values qualitative research. The article is a qualitative 
research study published in the ‘articles section of the journal.  
 
4. What year was the article written? Was there a specific occasion or event that it was 
written in relation to? How does this compare to newer/older articles in the sample 
by the same author? 
2010. Does not appear to be written in relation to anything in particular. Date is in the 
middle of the sample range though. Three other articles are in my sample that were 




Surface of the Text 
 
1. How is the information organized and structured? What are the headings and 
subheadings? What role does the title, abstract, introduction and conclusion play in 
the overall scheme of things?  
 
The article is organized as most academic are: intro, lit review, methods, findings, 
conclusion. It is interesting to note how the title implies a structural focus with the use of 
the word “criminalization” and emphasis on poverty. Yet, the abstract immediately 
contradicts this by the use of intense individualizing language and focus on behaviors, 
The abstract (and intro and conclusion) draws on powerful imagery to frame women as 
powerless to their own selves from which they need to be “rehabilitated”, which then 
turns the focus on to the individual rather than the structural, such as poverty. Assumes 
incarceration has rehabilitative aims that are worthy given women’s behaviors and 
problem, rather than aims of punishment. Leaves logic of punishment and criminalization 
unquestioned.  
 
2. What topics are addressed in the article? What key themes are communicated about 
it? Do the topics/themes relate to each other and/or overlap? (discursive 
entanglements)?  
 
Topics: Impact on Mothers, Impact on Mother-Child Relationship; Poverty, Substance 
Use Issues, Mental Health Issues, Abuse/Victimization, Marginalization, Custody/Child 
Welfare; Sentencing Policies, Structural Barriers, Individual Level Factors; Substance 
Use Treatment, Parenting Programming, Life Skills Development, Gender Specific 
Programming, Advocacy, Recidivism 
 
Themes: Women framed as powerless: shame, remorse, guilt. 
 
Policy issues propel increases in incarceration, yet criminal justice involvement and 
crime framed as being caused by individual level factors such as substance abuse, 
victimization. Even poverty is turned into an individual level issue that can be addresses 
through increased access to individual treatment.  
 
Call for gender responsive programming to better deal with these individual level issues.  
 
There are structural barriers to “success” but these are framed as individual issues that 
can be solved through individual level programming. Goal is to help women take 
personal responsibility, which will then improve their circumstances and decrease 
recidivism.  
 







1. What kind and form of argumentation does the article follow? What argumentation 
strategy is used? 
Stirring up emotions - main argumentation strategy used. Particularly in relation to 
characterizing women - Lots of emotive language - Feels manipulative. This can be put in 
contrast to the discussions of policy and structural issues, which use statistics and 
“objective” facts and are discussed in dispassionate, descriptive, matter of fact way. 
When reading these passages on policy and systems issues, I, as reader, am not asked to 
have feelings or emotions. Inadvertently puts the emphasis on women’s tragic 
circumstances in which we should ‘feel for them.’ Using empathy as a tool rather than 
reason. Why am I not asked to have feelings or take a position when they write about 
things that highlight structural inequity. Despite trying to make the “personal political,” 
as they state, the authors are inherently depoliticizing the issue. Emotive language shapes 
the argumentation.  
Despite recognizing structural and policy issues, they primarily keep the discussion and 
analysis of results located at site of individual choices, feelings, and behaviors.  
Attribution of agency to crack cocaine and its use, not policies that criminalize crack in a 
highly radicalized manner. Representation of crack cocaine is decontextualized, de-
racialized. Example: "Women’s rates of incarceration have increased...Much of this 
increase is due to the advent of crack cocaine, which has had a huge impact on low-
income women and the resulting increase in nonviolent crimes that are typically 
associated with its use.” 
Binary of idealized mother vs. unfit mother. Example: "Perhaps, the most outstanding 
quality of these interviews was how deeply reflective—often philosophical—these women 
were about all the subjects they covered but particularly with regard to the topic of 
motherhood. Many of the women also struggled fiercely with their negative self-
perceptions as parents. In many ways, the women expressed the same themes one would 
expect from any mother, including the aforementioned idealized mother. These themes 
included love for their children, pride in their children’s accomplishments, and worry 
about their children’s circumstances and future challenges. However, unlike idealized 
mothers, these poor and incarcerated mothers also expressed feelings of profound 
powerlessness: powerless at being separated from their children, powerless to protect 
their children from sharing their same fate, powerless against the child welfare system, 
powerless against their addictions, and powerless against the society from which they 
have become so disenfranchised.”  
It is as though they assume that idealized mothers don’t ever feel powerless? Setting them 
up within the dichotomy so as to challenge their difference, but it only reinforces 
dichotomy and notion of idealized mother. In this binary authors are still drawing on the 
unfit mother narrative. 
Example: "Although many may assume that these children would be better off without 
their mothers, this may not be the case. With proper treatment and ample opportunity to 
complete a case plan, these women may be able to achieve a life in which they can 
nurture their children—the children they so desperately love." 
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2. What implications and allusions/insinuations does the article contain? 
 
Assumes that incarceration is about rehabilitation not punishment and if women could get 
better access to treatment they could be rehabilitated to be the “better” selves they so long 
to be. There is an emphasis placed on women rehabilitating themselves, which implies 
responsibility and individual causes of crime and criminal justice involvement. Example: 
"those who had lost custody of their children felt they had no remaining reason to 
rehabilitate themselves." 
 
Lots of implications that women are powerless and the all-powerful social worker can 
help empower them.  
 
Allusions to race without ever explicitly mentioning. Example: "Poor and marginalized 
women, such as the participants in our study, do not fit the idealized portrayal of 
motherhood.”. Color-blind discourse using coded language for race. One focus in article 
is on crack cocaine and despite it being a highly racialized drug in the way it is 
criminalized, there is no mention of race or racism. Example of coded language: "These 
women are more likely to live in poverty, are less likely to have been employed, and are 
more likely to have lower educational levels and lower household incomes than their 
incarcerated male counterparts (Moe & Ferraro, 2006). They also have high rates of 
recidivism (Alleyne, 2006; Richie, 2001). That most of these women live in high-crime 
neighborhoods with increased levels of homelessness to which they must return on their 
release from jail poses serious problems for successful reentry into the community and is 
a contributing factor in the women’s high rates of recidivism.” Here a discussion of 
racism is circumvented through a discussion of poverty. Dismiss race and focus on 
neighborhood and poverty to explain involvement in CJ and recidivism. 
 
Equates prison to treatment. Example: "The average prison sentence for a woman is 18 
months (Women’s Prison Association, 2006), and the time frame for a woman to 
complete treatment varies from woman to woman, but is often lengthy.” 
 
Focus on guilt and shame in both their analysis and on the women’s narratives they 
choose to include, implies that women’s behavior is the cause of their problems. It also 
invokes normative expectations regarding mothering.  
 
Authors discuss marginalization, yet he way they draw on structural issues, and then 
emphasize personal ones implies that women and substance users cause their own 
marginalization. They do this thru passive language as well. Example: "Those who are 
addicted to crack are often the poorest of the poor and subsequently the most frequently 
arrested, victimized, disabled, and marginalized by its use.” Marginalized by the use of 
crack or by the criminalization of it? Implying that crack user brings on their 
marginalization themselves. 
 
3. What collective symbolism or ‘figurativeness’, symbolism, metaphors, etc. is used?  
 
This article is wrought with symbolism and metaphorical language that creates a sense of 




“impossible odds the women face in terms of mothering.”  
 
"women whose shame and regret were often palpable.” 
 
Conjuring up images that equate these emotions with incarceration. Example: "Many of 
the women were imprisoned by their own guilt and remorse.” - what does this legitimize? 
Perhaps individual level services that focus on their feelings and individual failings? 
 
Drug use and incarceration are depicted as cycles - conveys image that it is hard to 
escape, which furthers their construction of women as powerless. Example: “revolving 
door of incarceration, recidivism, and homelessness” - a bit passive and powerless. 
 
"The repeated lament of all these women was that they were painfully snared in a tangled 
web of addictions without the resources to help them find a way out.” – Addiction 
depicted as web that they are stuck it.  
 
Use of numbers and statistics to paint picture of context and larger structural issues. 
 
4. What idioms, sayings, and clichés are used? 
 
”we can….give voice to this long ignored population” 
“giving women a voice makes the personal political”  
"“salvage their own lives for the sake of their children” 
"ASFA clock would have already been ticking."  
 
5. What are the vocabulary and style? 
 
There is an exaggerated use of adjectives and adverbs to conjure images of powerlessness 
and evoke feelings of empathy and pity throughout the article. Enhances authors’ 
representation of women as tragic and vulnerable.  
 
Examples:  
"The mothers expressed profound feelings of guilt and remorse for the impact that their 
behaviors had on their children and expressed hope that their children would experience 
better lives than they have.” 
 
“extremely troubled and often tragic life histories in the lives of these women”  
 
"Their multiple marginality, combined with the stigma and shame of incarceration, 
renders this powerless population essentially disposable in the eyes of society.” 
 
"these women’s stories indicate that more typically it is not as the women recount their 
experiences of feeling powerless and ensnared in and betrayed by the child welfare and 
criminal justice systems.” 
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"The majority expressed feelings of profound powerlessness with regard to their status 
and their rights within the system." 
 
“bravely confided their experiences”  
 
Doing something with adjectives…maybe trying to humanize but inadvertently also 
being demeaning. Maybe trying to manipulate audience away from dominant narrative? 
 
Strong emotive language is used to describe women and detached, descriptive language is 
used to discuss context. This inadvertently deemphasized the context and emphasizes 
women’s individual feelings and behaviors.  
 
Example: "They talked at great length about their children, and the majority expressed 
deep feelings of remorse, guilt, sadness, and love when talking about their children. Most 
of these dialogues were extremely emotional, and most of the women told their stories 
through tears and even sobs."  
 
In this, the reader is not asked to have feelings or an emotional response to the policy and 
structural issues but is asked to have a strong emotional response to the women. 
"struggled fiercely” “powerless” ; “terrified" 
 
The use of such emotive language also has the effect of being 0thering and patronizing. 
Example: "Perhaps, the most powerful and heartbreaking themes were those of the 
maternal love that these women consistently expressed for their children and the 
profound sense of guilt and staggering remorse they were all struggling with when they 
discussed the impact of their actions on their children. It became abundantly clear that 
their substance abuse problems and criminal justice involvement were symptomatic of 
extremely troubled life histories”  
 
The nouns they use create a sense of risk. Example: “They are convicted criminals, 
viewed by society as social outcasts" 
  
Verbs used to create imagery and drum up sympathy. Example: “…was passed in 
response to the growing number of children lingering in the foster care system"  
 
Use of modifiers to emphasize researchers good intentions. Example: “project was 
inspired by our strong desire to hear directly from incarcerated, substance abusing 
mothers.” 
 
Evidentialities or lack thereof. Example: "Perhaps, the most outstanding quality of these 
interviews was how deeply reflective—often philosophical—these women were about all 
the subjects they covered but particularly with regard to the topic of motherhood” 
Sentence framed in a way that assumes that they would not be expected to be reflective 
and philosophical. If these were middle class women, would this be considered a 
finding? Use of “most outstanding” un-naturalized women as good mothers. Authors 
could have also said “of course” which would have propelled a very different attitude 
toward the women.  
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Passive language: used to shirk responsibility of social work in implementing and 
sustaining problematic policies (side note: also no mention of changing them. Example: 
"Although termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings have increased more than 
100% since the enactment of ASFA, the precise number of TPR proceedings that have 
been filed against incarcerated women is not known (Women in Prison Project, 2006). 
Child welfare policies on children of incarcerated women have not been modified to 
adapt to the rapidly increasing rates of female incarceration” - Passivity - leaves out the 
social worker’s part in this. Who is responsible? Action of social workers in policy 
processes is hidden. After all, who is responsible for the policy implementation and thus 
the possibilities for disrupting it? All of this talk regarding problematic policy but the 
focus in the end is still on the individual and nowhere is social work’s responsibility 
toward changing these policies mentioned. Leaves the profession untouched and 
“innocent.”  
 
Remain neutral through use of passive language. Example: "It can be argued, then, that 
many of these women are suffering not only from radical criminal justice policies, but 
from inflexible child welfare policies.” - here they are noting intersections of systems and 
policies that impact women. On the surface this seems “progressive” but again, they 
ultimately circumvent their argument but relying on individual levels of change. There is 
also a level of passivity here, “it can be argued” by who? who does the arguing? This has 
a bit of a neutralizing effect - Rather than saying “we argue” they are can “it can be 
argued” - in this they are not claiming the argument, therefore remaining neutral on the 
issue despite raising the issue.  
 
Locus of attention is on the individual “plight" rather than structural injustice. Example: 
"Through the telling of these stories, we hope to bring attention to the plight of these and 
other incarcerated mothers, raise awareness of the obstacles that the women face because 
of their incarceration and troubled life histories, and bring to the forefront the virtually 
impossible odds the women face in terms of mothering their children by conveying their 
subjective experiences to a larger audience.” - calling attention to individual life 
problems.  
 
Local coherence through article with the repeated use of guilt and shame. Example: 
"Virtually all the women expressed deep shame, remorse, and sadness for the mistakes 
they have made.” 
 
Racially coded language. Example: "Although crack has been less popular in mainstream 
culture, a crack subculture is found in America’s poor, struggling communities.” 
mainstream culture - white; poor struggling communities - black 
 
6. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed/characterized?  
 
Criminalized women: Portrayed as tragic and powerless. Terms used to describe: “long 
ignored population” “vulnerable” “poorly served” "one thing that incarcerated women 
share is their invisibility.” 
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"The experiences reported by the women in our study certainly corroborate the notion 
that the needs of children and mothers are often at odds with one another as a result of 
the intersection of policy mandates. Indeed, as is evidenced by the following interviews, 
the mothers’ experiences indicate that child welfare protocols operate, often incorrectly, 
under the assumption that the welfare of the child is separate from the welfare of the 
mother. Although this may sometimes be the case, these women’s stories indicate that 
more typically it is not as the women recount their experiences of feeling powerless and 
ensnared in and betrayed by the child welfare and criminal justice systems.” - Building 
argument to create image of tragic mother - Are their needs at odds or are the policy 
mandates at odds? Are the assumed needs embedded in the policies an accurate reflection 
of their actual needs? Positioning women and children needs at odds not the mandates of 
the policy. However, in next sentence, they clarify and put the focus on intersecting 
welfare of mom and child, not just the child. Most pieces focus solely on narrowly 
construed well being a child (and so do the policies to which these authors refer). In this 
they are disrupting the bad or unfit mother narrative but along with the next sentence, 
they are instead creating an image of a tragic mother.  
 
"The stigma of women who use crack and other drugs is further deepened by cultural 
expectations of women as nurturers and caretakers. As Campbell (2000, p. 3) stated, 
‘‘When women violate gender norms by using illicit drugs, they are represented as 
spectacular failures—callously abandoning babies or becoming bad mothers, worse 
wives, or delinquent daughters.’’ - They use this gender analysis to challenge the 
construction of the unfit mother yet at other times they draw on this construction to 
construct them.  
 
Use of adverbs and adjectives to create and emphasize image of loving mother. But why 
are their feelings of grief defined as a problem of guilt and remorse? Focus on guilt 
emphasizes their responsibility and renders them worthy of our empathy ad 
understanding. Guilt used as a responsibilizing tactic?  
 
Authors also deemphasize agency through article. Example: “Many women voluntarily 
opt to place their children in the custody of others to protect them from…” – they could 
highlight that this is a protective factor but they use this to point to powerlessness instead.  
 
Consistently include narratives from the participants that emphasize failings, 
psychological problems, and individual issues. Contradicts their expressed emphasis on 
poverty and structural issues. Turns structural issues into individual ones 
 
The researchers: portrayed as the ones who can empower the powerless. 
 
Examples: “by listening to their stories, we began to understand and give voice...”  
 
"Hence, it became our mission to learn more, and the best way to do so, we thought, 
would be to hear from the women themselves.” 
 
"Giving the women a voice makes the political personal.” 
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The description of the research procedures (pg. 164) also has the effect of framing the 
researchers as saviors/do gooders/helpers and continues to frame the women as 
powerless. 
 
Consistently textually emphasize researcher positive qualities. And often use women’s 
own experiences in the research to do so. Example: "Nearly all the women expressed 
gratitude for the chance to talk about their stories so freely.” or "all the women were 
enthusiastic and grateful to have the opportunity to speak about their children in such an 
open and nonjudgmental venue.” - Why is it important to include that they expressed 
gratitude? Using women’s expressions to emphasize the researchers positive qualities and 
do gooderness. Their positive qualities are textually emphasized through discussion of 
this type of interaction.  
 
"By giving voice to this invisible population through a standpoint perspective, we 
revealed complex stories of unfinished lives, of victimization and abuse, of poverty and 
exploitation, of cyclical and generational obscurity, of classism and sexism, and of 
stigma and shame.” – researchers revealed, not the women.  
 
7. What references are made? (e.g. cultural references, references to other 
disciplines/professions, media or policy referenced, does the text imply knowledge 
from other sources?) 
 
I did not notice anything particularly notable about this. Lots of references to other 
academic sources, as is standard for this genre. Draw on outside empirical and theoretical 
literature to support their points and make their case. Draw on women stories to 
emphasize their results. Noting seems particularly questionable about the sources they 
used or how they used them, except that the excerpts from the data they used could be 
interpreted differently, but research of this type is already subjective.  
 
However, there are some notable quotations they use to support their point but they use 
them in a way that does not appear to be supported by the quote. For example, on pg. 
161, the authors assert, "By listening to these experiences, we can begin to understand 
and give voice to this long-ignored population. As Comack (1999, p. 296) stated, ‘‘the 
voices of women behind bars have for too long been silenced; it is time we begin to listen 
to what they have to say.’’” - The authors frame themselves as giving voice to the 
powerless and then use Comack’s words to support this as a noble endeavor, but what 
Comack actually says is very different than “giving voice”. Her words imply that they 
have a voice that has not been heard and our job as researchers is to listen to them, not 
“give them their voice.”  
 
Gender specific programming - but left undefined. Are we to know what this means? 
With lack of discussion, the presupposition is that it focuses on parenting, trauma, and 
substance abuse, the only characteristics they defined as gendered. And no discussion of 




Content and Ideological Statements 
 
1. What notion of social work does the article presuppose and convey? 
 
Social work: innocence. Portrayed as helper/do gooders. Savior - use of passive language 
when describing policy creation and implementation shirks responsibility from SW to 
disembodied “policies.” Lots of language of whiteness as goodness “give voice” “our 
mission”  
 
Purpose is to help individuals. "Raise them up” through individual level service delivery 
and "giving voice.”  
 
2. What notion of criminalized women does the article presuppose and convey? 
 
Tragic and powerless. Victim and vulnerable. She wants to be a good, loving mother and 
with enough treatment she can be.  
 
3. What kinds of understandings of crime, criminality, and punishment does the 
article presuppose and convey? What explanations for criminalization are given? 
Where does the problem for a woman’s crime/criminalization lie? (i.e. individual? 
structural? socially constructed? a pathology?) Who/what needs to change? 
 
Ends up being individualized despite discussion of policy and professed social justice 
intentions.  
Constantly framing meaning in individual level understandings.  
 
Does not question underlying logic of punishment and ultimately assumes problematic 
behaviors are cause of crime and therefore solution rest in changing individuals and 
providing them support so they can change.  
 
4. What notions of normality\ does the article presuppose and convey?  
 
Invokes normative expectations of motherhood  
 
5. What notions of practice and intervention does the article presuppose and convey? 
What is the focus of intervention? What is deemed as “effective” practice? How are 
outcomes defined?  
 
Fall back on individual problems that can be addressed through individual level treatment 
and advocacy without systemic change. Nothing about addressing poverty to policies that 
criminalize, focus is on increasing access to behavioral change programs.  
 
Calls for community based programs and probation programs that do not question the 
underlying logic of punishment.  
 
“All the women had negative self-perceptions as mothers, because many expressed 
feelings of inadequacy related to their motherhood. At the programmatic level, this 
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finding indicates that these women could perhaps benefit from parenting classes and even 
mentoring programs both in jail and after their release. Mentors and advocates could 
also help the mothers negotiate other systems in which they and their children are 
involved. Another thing to be addressed is the consistent lack of successful treatment 
services, as reported by the women, that are geared specifically to crack cocaine 
addiction in the jail setting and in the larger community that address the financial 
barriers and obstacles related to social support, extensive waiting lists, and child care. 
As the literature has demonstrated and indeed as these women verified, all programming 
must be developed to be gender specific. In addition, because the women expressed so 
much frustration and powerlessness in dealing with the systems, case advocates are 
needed, who can help these women navigate both the child welfare and the legal systems. 
Ideally, reentry programs that would implement all these elements in the form of wrap-
around services would be developed. These services could include treatment for 
substance abuse and parenting and life-skills training to prepare the women for life on 
the outside in an attempt to combat the high rates of recidivism reported herein. To 
combat some of the issues surrounding reentry and recidivism, community-based 
programs that help neighborhoods work with these women and connect them with needed 
services could be most beneficial. Community probation programming should include 
ways in which these women can explore what led them to incarceration by examining 
their multiple marginality, family histories, and experiences of abuse as a means of 
gaining a better understanding of the cycles and patterns that led them to criminality.” 
 
"Although many may assume that these children would be better off without their 
mothers, this may not be the case. With proper treatment and ample opportunity to 
complete a case plan, these women may be able to achieve a life in which they can 
nurture their children—the children they so desperately love” 
 
Outcomes ultimately defined in terms of reducing recidivism.  
 
6. What frameworks of thought/rationalities are these practices embedded in? (i.e. 
Risk? Welfare? Morality?) 
 
Neoliberal psychologizing framework with a concern for welfare. It's like there is this 
discursive struggle between risk and welfare.  
 
7. How are gender, race, and class discussed, explained, and exposed? 
 
The article is completely silent on the issue of race and racism. Only time they even come 
close to discussing race is in the following passage: "The ethnicity of the sample was 
dependent on the ethnic makeup of the inmate population at the time of the study and did 
not serve as a selection or exclusion criterion.” - Does ethnicity equal race here? Later 
they describe their sample: “Of the 26, 15 were Caucasian, 9 were African American, 
and 2 were other races.” Half of their sample were POC but they do not mention race or 
racism anywhere in the article. Not even disproportionality. Is this sentence a way to 
mention disproportionality without mentioning it? Does this operate as a proxy for 
disproportionality?  
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Lack of discussion on racism inherently limits their analysis and further individualizes 
the issue by not focusing on perhaps the largest structural issue causing and impacting 
high incarceration rates. Also serves as a way to stay neutral despite professed feminist 
and progressive intentions. (social justice light). In the rest of the article the only time the 
mention anything related to race is when they are naming the White racial identity of a 
participant in some way. Despite describing their sample here, this really has the effect to 
whitewashing the study and their participants.  
 
What effect does this have? Definitely neutralizing but does it make it more appealing to 
a broader (and racist audience)? Is that their intention? The silence on race and racism is 
so stark in this article, it is hard to believe it is unintentional. The use of coded language 
and how they blatantly leave out race, like in the following example, "These women are 
already marginalized by their gender, class, and victimization status and the systemic 
barriers they consistently face.” makes me think there was some effort involved in this 
process. Are the authors drawing on colorblind ideology of “goodness”? Doesn’t matter, 
it still rein scribes whiteness. What good does this do given the racism embedded in the 
CJS?  
 
Gender analysis is present around motherhood but they also draw on the analysis to 
construct the women. Thereby they invoke normative standards for mothering and 
naturalize them by “showing” that “these” women also fit into the box of the idealized 
mother, rather than calling into question what it means to be a good mother. Gender 
ultimately is defined through describing them as mothers, victims of abuse and trauma, 
and people with substance abuse issues. The emphasis on the above aspects of “gendered 
experience” are then assumed to lead to criminal behavior. “substance use, in turn, often 
leads to criminal behavior” - gendering crime? 
 
Gender specific - With lack of clarity on what constitutes gender specific, the 
presupposition is that it focuses on parenting, trauma, and substance abuse, the only 
characteristics they defined as gendered. Again, no discussion of how gender interacts 
with race, or any other aspect of experience. 
  
"these women’s unique needs may be addressed.” - seems to be in relation to guilt and 
shame if they are building on their own discussion, which then leads directly to treatment 
as mean of addressing incarceration. Behavior is problem, not prison.  
 
Other peculiarities of the article. 
Missing discussion of race and racism. Only mention race in demos and when describing 
participants who are white. Sort of has this whitewashing effect on their whole 
article. This whitewashing is significant given that they deploy the discourse of tragedy 
and pity (similar to the fallen woman of the reformatories) rather than a discourse of risk 
and danger. Though still limited given he population, this article has the most in depth 
description of their consent process out of the whole sample (pg. 164).  
Discourse position and overall message of the article.  
 
Object of Pity.   
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APPENDIX G: Categories for Analysis at the Level of Language 
Discursive Device Function/Purpose 
Lexical Choices/Word Groups Creates contextual reasoning. Regularities in 
lexical choice can shed light on the kind of 
logic the text implies. Reveals interests, 
ideology, and positions.  
Grammar Features Adjectives and adverbs can illuminate 
judgments in the text. Active or passive speech 
can obscure relationships. Pronouns can 
suggest protagonists and antagonists 
Direct and Indirect 
Speech/Attribution of Agency 
Can be used to assert or shirk responsibility, to 
take a stand or remain neutral. 
Modalities Used to create a sense of urgency. 
Evidentialities Suggest factuality. Naturalizes certain 
statements as common sense. 
Rhetorical and Literary 
Figures/Symbolism/Metaphorism 
Helps construct certain kinds of categories and 
associations, which shape the argument. Used 
to explain or enhance the representation of 
something. 
Modes of Reasoning Used to justify or legitimate 
arguments/ideology. Logic and rationale 
behind meaning. Are representations 
contextualized or decontextualized? 
Characterization Words and expressions used to characterize 
events, people, and situations can be used to 
justify ideological positions.  
Exclusion Used to justify arguments. What information 
has been left out or only implied? 
Specificity Level of detail in the presentation of 
information used to legitimize claims. What is 
emphasized/deemphasized (topically, 
stylistically, rhetorically)? Look for 
generalizations? 
Difference/Contrasts Used to establish meaning is established. 
Meaning is made sensible through 
differentiation—through oppositional and 
hierarchical pairing. Binaries. Contradictions.  
 
